1986 PLP 321 (MLD)

MUNAWAR ALI KHAN, J.‑‑By this Constitutional petition, the petitioner, M.A. Muid Khan seeks reversal of the order dated 4th March, 1981 passed by the Pakistan Defence Officers' Housing Authority, Karachi dismissing the petitioner's appeal against the award given by the nominee of the registrar in the arbitration Case No.54 of 1979. The petitioner's case is that in 1970, he was allotted a plot of 2,000 sq. yds. bearing No. 108, in 5th Street Phase VI, Pakistan Defence Officers Co‑operative Housing Society Ltd. ,Sometimes in 1971 his attorney Shakeel Ahmad got some typed document signed from him and subsequently on the basis of that document the said Shakeel Ahmed in collusion with the respondent No.1, got the petitioner's disputed plot exchanged with that of the respondent No.2 by playing fraud and misrepresentation. When the alleged fraudulent transaction in respect of his plot came to the notice of the petitioner, he made arbitration application No.54 of 1979 before the Deputy Registrar who referred the same to a nominee. After observance of legal formalities the nominee announced a majority award by which the respondent No.1 was required to allot a plot of equal or maximum size to the petitioner. Aggrieved by the award both the respondent No. l and the petitioner preferred appeal before Deputy Registrar Co‑operative Societies. As repeated notices issued to the respondent No.2 could not be served, the Deputy Registrar ordered substituted service and the said respondent was served through publication of notice in the daily 'Dawn', dated 12‑12‑1979. The Deputy Registrar after hearing the Advocates of both parties reserved the judgment. Pending announcement of the judgment, the President's Order No‑7 of 1980 was promulgated. By this Order the Pakistan Defence Officers' Housing Society was dissolved and in its place new authority known as Pakistan Defence Officers' Housing Authority was established. In the wake of this change the assets and liabilities of the defunct Society devolved on the new Authority and by force of Art.17(f) of the President's Order all pending appeals under Co‑operative Societies Act stood transferred to the Executive Board of new Authority. Accordingly the appeal was heard by the said Executive Board and announced the impugned judgment on .4‑3‑1981. As stated above the present petition has been filed against the said judgment. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties at great length. The main grievance of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that no reasons have been given by the appellate authority in support of the impugned judgment and furthermore the said judgment is biased. As for the first point, we want to make it clear that any order or judgment for which no reasons have been assigned cannot be sustained as a legal order or judgment. But that is not the position in this case. We cannot agree with the learned counsel for the petitioner that no reasons have been given in support of the impugned order. In this connection reference may be made to the following passage on page 3 of the impugned order: " Both the parties were provided full opportunity in presenting their respective contentions. We have heard at length the learned Advocates of the parties and have also examined the pleadings of the parties oral as well as documentary evidence on record. We are of the view that the dissolved society was neither negligent nor at fault in transferring the plot allotted to the respondent No.1, in favour of respondent No.2." From the above observations there should be no doubt that the findings arrived at by the Executive Board are based on their appraisal of the evidence both oral and documentary produced by the parties and arguments of the parties' counsel. Therefore, it cannot be said that the impugned order is not supported by reasons. May be that the evidence brought on record has not been discussed in detail. In other words it may be argued that sufficient reasons have not been advanced in support of the impugned order. On the ground of insufficiency of reasons alone the impugned order cannot be held as legally defective. In our writ jurisdiction we cannot go into the mass of factual evidence available on record nor can we undertake its detailed appraisal to examine if the conclusions reached by the Tribunal are correct. We are not appellate authority so that we may sift each bit of the evidence produced by the parties with a view to upset or uphold the findings arrived at by lower authority. The scope of our interference is very limited. Unless some jurisdictional defect in the impugned order is pointed out or glaring violation of ‑ some mandatory legal provision has been complained against, we would be reluctant to interfere with the said order. The learned counsel for the petitioner was unable to convince us that the Executive Board had no jurisdiction to pass the impugned order. All that he stressed upon was that since the appellant was party to the case, the Executive Board which is the body of the appellant could not be the judge in its own cause. Suffice it to say that the appellate Board is creature of President Order No.7 of 1980 and is given powers of appeal under the said Order. Since the Board C in passing the impugned order has exercised powers vested in it by the statute, it cannot be held to have acted without jurisdiction. The learned counsel for the petitioner also could not point out that any mandatory provision of law has been Violated in passing of the impugned order. He was unable to elaborate his submission that the order is biased. For above reasons we see no merit in the petition which is therefore dismissed with no order as to costs. S. A. Petition dismissed.