1992 PLP 1717 (CLC)

(2) Whether the respondents are rent defaulter? OPD. (3) Whether the disputed premises are required by the petitioners in good faith for their personal use? (4) Relief.

4. In support of their case, one of the respondents appeared himself as his only witness while one of the appellants was produced by them as R.W.1. At the time of hearing of petition, the ground of default was not pressed with the result that issue No.2 was decided against the respondents‑landlords. However, the other two issues were held in their favour and the appellants were ordered to be ejected from the property in dispute vide the impugned order dated 27th April, 1991.

5. Mr. Fayyaz Hussain Qadri, Advocate, the learned counsel for the appellants has raised the following two contentions:‑ (i) That it stands established on the record that Hafiz Muhammad Rafi Dar, the original tenant had died leaving behind his four sons and two daughters out of which Muhammad Irfan Dar and Mst. Sadia Waheed were not impleaded as parties to the ejectment petition which thus suffers from fatal defect on non‑joinder of necessary parties and was liable to be rejected. The learned counsel in support of his contention placed reliance upon the judgment of this Court in Civil Revision No.203 of 1978 titled "Majid Hussain v. Muhammad Rafique etc." decided on 22‑5‑1979. (ii) That in the petition for ejectment it was averred that the property was required by the respondents i.e. all the petitioners in the ejectment petition for their own use and occupation while in the evidence the case set up was that only one of the respondents‑petitioners namely Ghulam Sabir needed the property for his use. G. Mr. Wilayat Hussain Haidri, Advocate counsel for the respondents has been heard in reply. He contended that according to R.W. 1 Muhammad Arif Dar the property was originally rented out both to him as also his father Hafi Muhammad Rafi Dar and he remained in possession of the property after the death of his father and as such it was not necessary to implead all the heirs of Muhammad Rafi Dar. It was further argued that in fact all the heirs of Hafiz Muhammad Rafi Dar were brought on the record and at the most it was a case where some of the legal heirs had been misdescribed. On merits it was argued by the learned counsel that requirement of one of the landlords is sufficient and the Rent Controller was justified in directing the eviction of the appellants.

7. So far as the first contention of the learned counsel for the appellants is concerned, it is to be seen that all the legal heirs of Hafiz Muhammad Rafi Dar were impleaded as parties but it appears that the name of Irfan Dar was misdescribed as Muhammad lmran Dar. This position stands fortified by the fact that in the ejectment petition Muhammad Irfan was also shown having alias Nanna. The fact that Muhammad Arif Dar was also known as Nanna has not been disputed. It is also to be seen that although, it was stated in the written reply that another brother of the appellants was also in possession but his name was not disclosed. As regards Mst. Sadia Waheed she has been mentioned as Saeeda Dar and this too appears to be a case of misdescription. Be that as it may, there is no evidence on the record to show that left out son and daughter were also running business in the shop in question. The precedent relied upon by the learned counsel is distinguishable inasmuch as in that case it stood established by the production of cogent evidence that the other legal heirs of the tenant were also running business in the shop in question. In the present case on the contrary, it has been admitted by R.W.1 that both the daughters of Muhammad Rafi Dar are married and are living separately. It is also to be noted that neither Mst. Sadia Waheed nor Muhammad Irfan Dar have come forward to raise any objection as to the maintainability of the ejectment petition nor have they challenged the order of eviction. As such the argument of the learned counsel for the appellants which is based upon a hyper technicality cannot be accepted.

8. Reverting now to the second contention of the learned counsel for the appellants, the law is well‑settled that the need of any one of the landlords is sufficient for maintaining an application for ejectment on the ground of personal use. The fact that in the application the need mentioned is that of the landlords/respondents and not one of them is hardly of any consequence when the requirement of one of them stands proved on the record. There is no force in this appeal. It is accordingly dismissed. The appellants are allowed two months time to vacate the premises. No order as to costs. A.A./M‑395/L???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? Appeal dismissed.