1993 PLP 805 (PLC)

Rights of employer and employees should primarily be regulated through settlement amicably arrived at between the parties, unless its terms are found repugnant to any law. Besides, necessary precaution should be taken by forum prescribed under law to make minimum interference under any agreement concerning pay or allowance mutually brought about amongst the parties to any dispute. (c) Industrial Relations Ordinance (XXIII of 1969)‑‑‑ ‑‑‑‑S. 50‑‑‑Waiver‑‑‑Failure to demand previous benefits would clearly amount to conscious relinquishment of known right constituting waiver. Riaz Hussain Baluch for Applicant. S.M. Yakoob for Respondent. Date of hearing: 6th July, 1993. Relevant farts briefly stated are that on 20th March, 1993 Agriauto Progressive Labour Union (C.B.A.) filed an application under section 50 of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 praying for interpretation of clause 4 relating to Confirmation of the Objects and Assurance of C.B.A. The relief claimed is reproduced below:‑ "It is therefore prayed that this Honourable Tribunal may be pleased to interpret the settlement dated 4‑9‑1990, in the context of Balochistan Special Allowance, Ordinance, 1990 and be further pleased to hold that the respondent‑Management is liable to pay Rs.200 per month with effect from 1‑12‑1990 to every permanent worker under the Balochistan Employees Special Allowance Ordinance, 1990." Respondent has filed counter‑affidavit on 15‑5‑1993 repudiating the claim. According to assertions made by respondent agreement for which clarification was sought had expired with effect from 31‑12‑1991 much prior to the institution of present proceedings besides fresh agreement considering charter of new demands had been arrived at between applicant Union and respondent on 18‑10‑1992 therefore, petition was ex facie incompetent. Arguments were addressed by Mr. Riaz Hussain Baluch, Advocate for petitioner and Mr. S.M. Yakoob, Advocate for respondent. It is an admitted feature of the case that agreement in dispute had been executed between the parties on 4‑9‑1990 and was operative for two years commencing from 1‑1‑1990 till 31st of December, 1991. It has been strenuously canvassed that considerable doubt exists in the interpretation of following clauses of agreement:‑‑ Learned counsel for petitioner emphasised that workers were not granted rise in the cost of living as contemplated by law. The aims and objects and preamble about settlement and relevant law was being completely misconstrued by employers necessitating clarification. Whereas on the other hand learned counsel for respondent opposing the petition argued that period within which agreement, clarification whereof has been sought already stands expired, therefore, academic discussion for interpretation or resolution of doubt is meaningless. He argued that new agreement taking into consideration charter of demands issued by employees had been arrived at between the parties on 18th October, 1992, therefore, any demand relatable to previous agreement had no sanctity. Learned counsel further argued that applicant being fully conscious about its legal rights had arrived at subsequent settlement dated 18‑10‑1992, as such grievance raised in the petition is deemed to have been waived. It was stressed that terms of agreement being unambiguous, provisions of section 50, I.R.O. were not attracted. I have carefully considered, arguments advanced by learned counsel for parties in the light of relevant law. Evidently provisions of section 50, I.R.O. presuppose that jurisdiction can be invoked only when terms and conditions of settlement or award entertain difficulty or doubt in the interpretation of its terms. Mere anxiety of any party to stretch clear terms and conditions towards his own benefit or express refutation of other side, would not provide justification for invoking provisions of section 50, Industrial Relations Ordinance. Bare perusal of agreement dated 4‑9‑1990 executed between the parties discloses that same was operative for two years from' 1‑1‑1990 till 31‑12‑1991. It was agreed that during subsistence of said agreement applicant's union would refrain from claiming increase in pay or allowances except when made by Federal Government or Provincial Government, after permitting set off to the extent enhancement already allowed through settlement dated 4‑9‑1990. Factually terms of above‑referred agreement are simple, straight and capable of clear interpretation, therefore, proceedings initiated by the petitioner under section 50, I.R.O, appear to be misconceived. It may, however, be seen that prima facie petitioner are demanding benefit which accrue to the employees under Balochistan Employees Special Allowance Ordinance, 1991 as amended from time to time. Admittedly allowances covered by said enactment, after proper adjustment and set‑off, do not exceed the pay and allowances already granted by respondent through agreement dated 4‑9‑1990. Thus, claim which petitioner‑Union is attempting to put forth is ex facie incompetent, and self‑destructive to terms of settlement. It is an accepted principle that rights of employer and employees should primarily be regulated through settlement amicably arrived at between the parties, unless its terms are found repugnant to any law. Besides, necessary precaution should be taken by forum prescribed under law to make minimum interference under any agreement concerning pay or allowance mutually brought about amongst the parties to any dispute. It is pertinent to note here, that not only terms and conditions of agreement dated 4‑9‑1990 are crystal clear, but same have been duly implemented. Additionally after expiry of stipulated period a charter of demands was presented by applicant‑Union, whereafter fresh agreement has been validly drawn between the parties on 18‑10‑1992. Now unnecessary efforts is being made to create ambiguity which factually does not exist in the agreement dated 4‑9‑1990. It is strange when new charter of demands, did not contain claim put‑forth through present petition how applicant can ask for adjustment of amount accruing from previous agreement. Applicant‑Union is precluded by their own conduct to raise new demand subsequent to fresh settlement. Even otherwise failure to demand previous benefits would clearly amount to conscious relinquishment of known right constituting waiver. Therefore, on this score as well‑present petition is not maintainable. For the above reasons I do not find any substance in the petition, which is dismissed. Parties are left to bear their own costs. M.B.A./33/Lb.B Petition dismissed.