PLD 1966

P L D 1966 Dacca 488 (PLP)

ABDUR RAZZAK BHUIYA AND OTHERS‑Petitioners Versus NARAYANGANJ MUNICIPAL COMMITTEE AND ANOTHER‑Respondents

Jurisdiction / Court
Decided Date
Petition No. 284 of 1964, decided on 29th March 1965
Honorable Judges
Abdus Sattar and Salahuddin Ahmad, JJ
Case Reference Summary (AEO Optimized)
Citation P L D 1966 Dacca 488 (PLP)
Forum / Court
Bench Members Abdus Sattar and Salahuddin Ahmad, JJ
Parties ABDUR RAZZAK BHUIYA AND OTHERS‑Petitioners Versus NARAYANGANJ MUNICIPAL COMMITTEE AND ANOTHER‑Respondents
💡 Quick Legal QA & Summary / سوال و جواب خلاصہ
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in P L D 1966 Dacca 488 (PLP)?

This judgment primarily cites: statutory provisions as referenced in Pakistani case law index.

Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case P L D 1966 Dacca 488 (PLP)?

The case was heard and decided by the bench comprising: Abdus Sattar and Salahuddin Ahmad, JJ.

Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?

Cite this legal precedent as: P L D 1966 Dacca 488 (PLP) (ABDUR RAZZAK BHUIYA AND OTHERS‑Petitioners Versus NARAYANGANJ MUNICIPAL COMMITTEE AND ANOTHER‑Respondents). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.

Representation

  • Dates of hearing : 26th and 29th March 1965.

Headnotes / Summary

East Pakistan Municipal Committee (Taxation) Rules, 1960, rr. 26, 27, 28, 29 & 31‑Assessment of valuation of holding made by Municipal Committee‑Cannot be enhanced by Sub‑Committee on application under r. 28‑Order of Sub‑Committee passed under r. 29‑Not appealable to Municipal Committee‑Remedy by way of petition under Art. 98, Constitution of Pakistan (1962). Sub‑rule (2) of rule 29 of the East Pakistan Municipal Committee (Taxation) Rules, 1960 clearly indicates that what the Sub‑Committee is required to do is to pass such order as it thinks fit in respect of the application, namely, the application filed under rule

28. The application contemplated by rule 28 is an application objecting to the valuation made under the provisions of rules 26 and

27. It is, therefore, clear that it' is beyond the jurisdiction of the Sub‑Committee to do anything to the prejudice of the objector under rule

28. This is exactly what the Sub‑Committee has done and it has been done without any lawful authority. The assessment is made under rule 26, by the Municipal Committee and it is published under rule 27 and unless any alteration is suggested by a competent Sub‑Committee under rule 29, the assessment made under rule 26 and published under rule 27 becomes final. Rule 30 only provides that any alteration suggested by the Sub‑Committee has to be made in the list pre pared under rule 26 and published under rule

27. Similarly the interpretation put to rule 31, we are afraid, cannot be accepted. Rule 31 is a general provision which empowers the Municipal Committee to make alteration or amendment to the assessment list prepared under rule 26 and published under rule 27 as amended by rule 30 on some specific grounds. This power of alteration of the Municipal Committee has nothing to do with the power exercised by the Sub‑Committee under rule

29. It is wrong to think that against an order passed under rule 29 by a Sub‑Committee there is an appeal to the Municipal Committee under rule

31. This provision, therefore, cannot be invoked for the purpose of defeating the present application (under Art. 98, Constitution of Pakistan, 1962).

Judgment & Decree

ABDUS SATTAR, J.‑The original petitioner in this case was Abdur Rahman Bhuiya and on his death, his heirs have been sub stituted in this application under Article 98(2) of the Constitution. The order passed by a Sub‑Committee appointed under Rule 29 of the East Pakistan Municipal Committee (Taxation) Rules, 1960 has been called in question. The facts which are not in dispute may shortly be stated as follows: At the quinquinnial assessment of holdings under the Narayanganj Municipality, holding No. 30 was valued at Rs. 89,421 on the basis of annual rental of Rs. 51,080 and the value of the covered area of 45,136 sq. ft. The covered area was classed into three classes, namely, 1st Class (Pucca) of 7,762 sq. ft. at the rate of Rs. 1/25 paisa per sq. ft., second class (Semi‑Pucca) of 20,992 sq. ft. at the rate of Re. 0/75 paisa per sq. ft. and third class (Kutcha) of 26,990 sq. ft. at the rate of Re. 0/50 paisa per sq. ft. On that basis the said holding was assessed to a total tax of Rs. 5,365/25 paisa per quarter. Holding No. 36 was valued at Rs. 1,37,205/00 on the basis of the annual rental of Rs. 18,140/00 and the value of the covered area of 1,67,877 sq. ft. The covered area was classed into three classes, namely, first class (Pucca) of 5,037 1. 1 at the rate of Rs. 1/25 paisa per sq. ft., second class (Semi‑'u,.:,af of 1,25,436 sq. ft. at the rate of Rs. 0/75 paisa and third class (Kutcha) o 37,404 sq. ft. at the rate of Re. 0/50 paisa per sq. ft. On that basis the said holding was assessed to a total tax of Rs. 8,232/29 paisa per quarter. The original petitioner who was the owner of these two holdings on receipt of notices of assessment filed a petition objecting to the said valuation presumably under Rule 28 of. The Rules. The two applications of the holdings came up for hearing under Rule 29 before a Sub‑Committee. The Sub‑Committee on hearing the owner directed measure ment of 'the covered area of the holding as the petitioner has challenged the measurements published in the list which was published under Rule

27. On reassessment holding No. 30 was found to contain covered area of 45,136 sq. ft. So far holding No. 36 is concerned, it was found that the second class building covered an area of 58,759 instead of 1,25,436, sq. ft. and third class 17,917 in place of 37,404 sq. ft. The Sub‑Committee accepted these measurements but increased the rate of valuation of first class building from Rs. 1/25 paisa to Rs. 1/50 paisa, for second class building from Rs. 0/75 paisa to Rs. 1/25 paisa and for third class building from Re. 0/50 paisa to Re. 0/75 paisa and on that basis the Sub‑Committee valued holding No. 30 at Rs. 88,700 and holding No. 36 at Rs. 70,800 as a result of which the owner was required to pay Rs. 5,322 per quarter for holding No. 30 and Rs. 4,248 for holding No.

36. The owner filed an appeal before the Additional Commissioner, Dacca Division but without any success. It is after this that the petitioner moved this Court and obtained the present Rule. The only point that has been urged in this case is that the Sub‑Committee appointed under Rule 29 of the Rules had no authority to increase the rate of valuation. It has been argued and in our view rightly, that all that the Sub‑Committee is required to do is to consider the merits of the objection that are made due to the increased valuation under Rule 27 and dispose. of the same. The Sub‑Committee cannot increase the valuation, nor the Sub‑Committee in any respect can fix a rate higher than the rate fixed originally under the provisions of Rules 26 and

27. Rule 29 of the Rules reads as follows:‑ "(1) (a) Applications presented under rule 28 shall be heard and determined by a sub‑committee or by such number of sub‑committees, as the Municipal Committee at a meeting may decide." Sub‑rule (2) clearly indicates that what the sub‑committee is' required to do is to pass such order as it thinks fit in respect of the application, namely, the application filed under Rule 28.' The application contemplated by Rule 28 is an application objec ting to the valuation made under the provisions of Rules 26 and

27. It is, therefore, clear that it is beyond the jurisdiction of the Sub‑Committee to do anything to the prejudice of the objector under Rule

28. This is exactly what the Sub‑Committee has done and in our view it has been done without any lawful authority. The learned Advocate for the respondent Municipality has contended that the valuation really was made by the Sub-Committee under Rule 29 and the remedy of the petitioner if he was aggrieved by the order passed by the Sub‑Committee was to file, an application under Rule

31. We are afraid this submission has been made on a total misunderstanding of the provision of the Rules. Under Rule 27 the Municipal Committee after it makes a valuation in respect of any holding is to give notice of the same to the owner or occupier of the property. In case of general assessment, however, sub‑rule (2) provides a notice of the same to the owner or occupier of the property. In case of general assessment, however, sub‑rule (2) provides that a notice thereof may be given by affixing a copy of the assessment list in the office of the Municipal Committee and at a prominent place in each Union and by announcing the fact publicly by beat of drum. After the notice is published or given in this manner any person who is dissatisfied with the assessment may within thirty days from the date of the publication of the notice may apply objecting to the valuation. It is this application which the Sub‑Committee can hear and dispose of under Rule

29. The Sub‑Committee does not assess as has been contended by the learned Advocate for the petitioner. The assessment is made under Rule 26, by the Municipal Committee and it is published under Rule 27 and unless any alteration is suggested by a competent Sub‑Committee under Rule 29, the assessment made under Rule 26 and published under Rule 27 becomes final. Rule 30 only provides that any alteration sugges ted by the Sub‑Committee has to be made in the list prepared under Rule 26 and published under Rule

27. Similarly the interpretation put to Rule 31, we are afraid, cannot be accepted. Rule 31 is a general provision which empowers the Municipal Committee to make alteration or amendment to the assessment list prepared under Rule 26 and published under Rule 27 as amended by Rule 30 on some specific grounds. This power of alteration of the Municipal Committee has nothing to do wit the power exercised by the Sub‑Committee under Rule

29. It is wrong to think that against an order passed under Rule 29 by a Sub‑Committee there is an appeal to the Municipal Committee under Rule

31. This provision, therefore, cannot be invoked for the purpose of defeating the present application. Regard being had to these facts we make this Rule absolute and declare that the order passed by the Sub‑Committee enhancing the rate of valuation of the structures in holding Nos. 30 and 36, B. Das Road within Narayanganj Municipality has been passed without any lawful authority. In view of the facts of this case, however, the parties are directed to bear their own costs. SALAHUDDIN AHMED, J.‑I agree. S. Q. Rule made absolute.