1981 PLP 932 (PLC(CS))
EMPLOYEES' UNION Versus PREMIER TOBACCO INDUSTRIES LTD., KARACHI
| Citation | 1981 PLP 932 (PLC(CS)) |
| Forum / Court | Labour Appellate Tribunal Sind |
| Bench Members | Z. A. Channa, Appellate Tribunal |
| Parties | EMPLOYEES' UNION Versus PREMIER TOBACCO INDUSTRIES LTD., KARACHI |
| Primary Law | Industrial Relations Ordinance (XXIII of 1969)‑, DECISION |
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 1981 PLP 932 (PLC(CS))?
This judgment primarily cites: Industrial Relations Ordinance (XXIII of 1969)‑, DECISION as referenced in Pakistani case law index.
Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 1981 PLP 932 (PLC(CS))?
The case was heard and decided by the Labour Appellate Tribunal Sind bench comprising: Z. A. Channa, Appellate Tribunal.
Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?
Cite this legal precedent as: 1981 PLP 932 (PLC(CS)) (EMPLOYEES' UNION Versus PREMIER TOBACCO INDUSTRIES LTD., KARACHI). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.
Laws Cited
Representation
- Abdul Hakim for Appellant.
- Mehmood Abdul Ghani for Respondent:
- Date of hearing : 5th February, 1981.
Headnotes / Summary
‑‑‑ Ss. 6 (2) (a), 22 (12) & 32 (I‑A)‑Industrial dispute, raising of by Collective Bargaining Agent ‑ Trade Union of Workers of Factory as well as Head Office‑Factory closed down under orders 8f Labour Court under S. O. 11‑A of West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 and services of all employees of Factory terminated‑Trade Union as Collective Bargaining Agent, in circumstances, held, could not be treated as representing employees of Factory since employees ceased to be workmen. The appellant‑Union, which claims to be the Collective Bargaining Agent in the Premier Tobacco Industries, the respondents herein, made an application under section 32 (1‑A); I. R. O. for adjudication of the demands detailed in its charter of demands, appended to the main application. The learned Labour Court has dismissed the appellant Unions application on the ground that the respondents factory at Karachi has since been closed by order of the learned Labour Court, dated 22nd April, 1980, and service of all the employees in the factory had been terminated pursuant to the said order. . The appellant union has, accord ingly, come up in appeal to this Tribunal against the said decision.
2. It was not disputed by Mr. Abdul Hakim, the learned counsel fox the appellant‑Union, that the Karachi, factory of the respondent industries has been closed down and the service of all the employees in the factory have been terminated in pursuance of the order of the learned Labour, Court dated 22nd April, 1980, made under Standing Order 11‑A. He, however, contended that the appellant‑Union was not only Collective Bargaining Agent of the workers employed in the Karachi factory of the respondents but also of the employees in the Head Office of the respon dents. The contention of the learned counsel finds support from the letter, dated 29th October, 1980, of the Registrar of Trade Union, stating that the appellant Union now remains Collective Bargaining Agent only in respect of the employees working at the Head Office of the Premier Tobacco Industries.
3. Subsection (2) (a) of section 6, I. R. O., provides that ad essential requirement for registration of a union is that all Members should be workmen actually engaged or employed in the industry with which the trade union is connected. Since the services of the employees in the Karachi factory of the respondents have been terminated they can no lon ger be considered to be engaged or employed in the respondent indus tries, and consequently are not entitled and in fact cannot be or continue to be Members of the appellant union. Moreover, as provided in sub section (12) of section 22, I. R. O., the collective bargaining agent in respect of an establishment is entitled to undertake collective bargaining with the employer on matters connected with employment, non‑employ ment and the terms of employment or the conditions of work and to represent all or any of the workmen in any proceedings. Since the ser vices of the employees in the Karachi factory have been terminated and in fact the factory has been closed, the appellant union can neither be said to be the Collective Bargaining Agent in respect of the factory, which was a separate establishment from the Head Office, nor can it any longer represent the employees in the factory who have ceased to be workmen for the purposes of the I. R. O. This position was not seriously challeng ed by Mr. Abdul Hakeem, the learned counsel for the appellant union in view of the provisions of law in this behalf.
4. Mr. Abdul Hakim, however, sought to press his appeal only in respect of the employees in the Head Office of the respondent establish ment. As the learned Labour Court has dismissed the appellant Union's application on the ground that h was not maintainable by reason of the closure of the factory of the respondent, and has not examined the demand of the appellant‑Union on merits, the case has to be remanded to it for adjudication upon the said demand in respect of the workmen employed in the Head Office of the respondent Industries. It was however, submitted by Mr. Mehmood Ghani, the learned representative for the respondent‑Company, that the Head Office of the respondent‑Company was not in respect of its Karachi factory but is in respect of its factories in Pakistan. He, accordingly, submitted that the appellant‑Union was not entitled to represent the employee in the Head Office or to make demands in respect of them. In fact, the learned representative challeng ed the very existence and composition of the appellant by reason of the closure of the Karachi factory of the respondents. This however, is a matter which the respondent‑Company could appropriately take with the Registrar of Trade Union, who could consider what is the effect on the continuance of the appellant, its registration and its status as C. B. A. of the closure of the Karachi factory, and take appropriate stop as may be provided under the law. Orders accordingly.
Judgment & Decree
Abdul Hakim for Appellant. Mehmood Abdul Ghani for Respondent: Date of hearing : 5th February, 1981. The appellant‑Union, which claims to be the Collective Bargaining Agent in the Premier Tobacco Industries, the respondents herein, made an application under section 32 (1‑A); I. R. O. for adjudication of the demands detailed in its charter of demands, appended to the main application. The learned Labour Court has dismissed the appellant Unions application on the ground that the respondents factory at Karachi has since been closed by order of the learned Labour Court, dated 22nd April, 1980, and service of all the employees in the factory had been terminated pursuant to the said order. . The appellant union has, accord ingly, come up in appeal to this Tribunal against the said decision.
2. It was not disputed by Mr. Abdul Hakim, the learned counsel fox the appellant‑Union, that the Karachi, factory of the respondent industries has been closed down and the service of all the employees in the factory have been terminated in pursuance of the order of the learned Labour, Court dated 22nd April, 1980, made under Standing Order 11‑A. He, however, contended that the appellant‑Union was not only Collective Bargaining Agent of the workers employed in the Karachi factory of the respondents but also of the employees in the Head Office of the respon dents. The contention of the learned counsel finds support from the letter, dated 29th October, 1980, of the Registrar of Trade Union, stating that the appellant Union now remains Collective Bargaining Agent only in respect of the employees working at the Head Office of the Premier Tobacco Industries.
3. Subsection (2) (a) of section 6, I. R. O., provides that ad essential requirement for registration of a union is that all Members should be workmen actually engaged or employed in the industry with which the trade union is connected. Since the services of the employees in the Karachi factory of the respondents have been terminated they can no lon ger be considered to be engaged or employed in the respondent indus tries, and consequently are not entitled and in fact cannot be or continue to be Members of the appellant union. Moreover, as provided in sub section (12) of section 22, I. R. O., the collective bargaining agent in respect of an establishment is entitled to undertake collective bargaining with the employer on matters connected with employment, non‑employ ment and the terms of employment or the conditions of work and to represent all or any of the workmen in any proceedings. Since the ser vices of the employees in the Karachi factory have been terminated and in fact the factory has been closed, the appellant union can neither be said to be the Collective Bargaining Agent in respect of the factory, which was a separate establishment from the Head Office, nor can it any longer represent the employees in the factory who have ceased to be workmen for the purposes of the I. R. O. This position was not seriously challeng ed by Mr. Abdul Hakeem, the learned counsel for the appellant union in view of the provisions of law in this behalf.
4. Mr. Abdul Hakim, however, sought to press his appeal only in respect of the employees in the Head Office of the respondent establish ment. As the learned Labour Court has dismissed the appellant Union's application on the ground that h was not maintainable by reason of the closure of the factory of the respondent, and has not examined the demand of the appellant‑Union on merits, the case has to be remanded to it for adjudication upon the said demand in respect of the workmen employed in the Head Office of the respondent Industries. It was however, submitted by Mr. Mehmood Ghani, the learned representative for the respondent‑Company, that the Head Office of the respondent‑Company was not in respect of its Karachi factory but is in respect of its factories in Pakistan. He, accordingly, submitted that the appellant‑Union was not entitled to represent the employee in the Head Office or to make demands in respect of them. In fact, the learned representative challeng ed the very existence and composition of the appellant by reason of the closure of the Karachi factory of the respondents. This however, is a matter which the respondent‑Company could appropriately take with the Registrar of Trade Union, who could consider what is the effect on the continuance of the appellant, its registration and its status as C. B. A. of the closure of the Karachi factory, and take appropriate stop as may be provided under the law. Orders accordingly.