2001 PLP 219 (PLC)

This appeal has arisen from the order, dated 10th September, 1999, of the Sindh Labour Court No.III, Karachi, whereby the Grievance Petition filed by the appellant was dismissed.

2. The appellant's case as stated in his Memo. of Appeal in brief is that he was employed with the respondents (M/s Mumtaz Apparels (Pvt.) Ltd.) as Maintenance Operator, since 5‑11‑1987. However, on 3‑2‑1999, he tendered his resignation from his employment, but it was not accepted by the respondents. Accordingly he continued in service until his services were verbally terminated, without assigning any reason on 15‑3‑1999. Grievance notice, dated 18‑3‑1999 was sent by the appellant to the respondents wherein he had claimed his dues to the tune of Rs.1,42,

800. As respondents failed to redress his grievance by paying Rs.l',42,800 he filed grievance petition in the Labour Court with the aforesaid result.

3. It seems the respondents filed no reply to the memo. of appeal. Even in lower Court they did not file any regular written statement but instead contended themselves with filing of Preliminary Legal objections.

4. I heard the arguments of Mr. Rafiullah for the appellants and of Mr. Rizwan Ahmed on behalf of the respondents. It also perused the relevant documents available in the case file.

5. To begin with, I regret to say that the order of the lower Court is sketchy indicating as if the learned Judge has not properly applied his mind to the dispute between the parties, and that he was in an unusual hurry. It was contended on behalf of the respondents that Labour Court had no jurisdiction in the matter and therefore, the appellant had to file his case before the Commissioner for Wages under Payment of Wages Act. On the basis of the above arguments, the learned Judge made a brief order dismissing the appellant's petition.. The relevant part of the order may be reproduced as under:‑‑ ' "Under section 25‑A of I.R.O., 1969, the Grievance was to be redressed, if rights secured or guaranteed under the law were available. In the present case there does not appear as his rights being available and secured. Since the service(s) of the applicant were not dismissed in connection with or because of any dispute. The applicant has selected a wrong forum to claim his alleged dues and this Court has no jurisdiction in the matter. The objection raised by the respondent's side is accepted. The petition is dismissed with no order as to costs. "

6. The above brief order was the entire labour undertaken by the learned Judge in his attempt to redress the grievance of the worker belonging to labour class. According to the said order, section 25‑A of I.R.O., 1969 could be invoked if 'rights were secured and guaranteed under the law. But the learned Judge has not cared to. mention the grievance which the appellant wished him to redress. In its absence he could not say which forum. was competent to deal with the same, His observation that since the said order clearly showed that the appellant was not dismissed in connection with any dispute, any rights for redressal of which he has filed petition did not arise and were not available to him. Finally he has stated in the order that the appellant had selected a wrong forum for the claim of his alleged dues, without even mentioning in the order the legal forum he should have approached for recovery of his dues. Of course in his earlier part of judgment while recording the contention of the respondent's counsel the teamed Judge has stated that the appellant had to submit his grievance before the Commissioner for Wages Under Payment of Wages Act, but in his express order he has not stated that he agreed with the learned counsel's contention that appellant should approach the said Commissioner.

7. The grievance petition has been filed under section 25‑A I.R.O., 1969. In view of the order passed by the Labour Court that the said section was not applicable, it has to be examined what requirements were to be satisfied for filing petition under section 25‑A. On close perusal of the said section it would appear that such petition could be filed only by worker in respect of any right guaranteed or secured to him by or under any law or any award or settlement for the time being in force. Reference to his grievance petition would show that he wanted the respondents to pay him his legal dues i.e. the dues admissible to him under the law. The question would arise whether the appellant was worker competent to invoke the above section. In grievance notice sent by him to the respondents and the grievance petition filed by him in the Labour Court, he has claimed himself to be a "worker". Since the respondents have filed no written reply either in lower Court or before this Tribunal, the appellant's claim to be worker remains unchallenged. Even in their brief statement of Legal Objections filed in the lower Court they have not breathed a word disputing the appellant's status as a worker. In these circumstances I am inclined to believe that the appellant's statement that he was employed in the respondent's establishment as Maintenance Operator obviously charged with duties of doing manual labour and as such he fell within the definition of workers. He has therefore, rightly invoked section 25‑A, I.R.O., 1969 for payment of his dues".

8. The learned counsel for the respondents contended that since the appellant did not pray for his reinstatement and his petition remained confined only to payment of his dues, it was not maintainable. When asked to show any law or decision of any superior Court in support of his said argument, he was unable to do so. His request for adjournment for purpose of searching for such authority was turned down because before I started the hearing of the case I asked both the learned counsel if they were ready to proceed with the case and their reply was in the affirmative. Moreover, he was not sure ii any authority was available which he could produce in support of his above argument. It did not appeal to reasonable mind that instead of two prays; namely, one for reinstatement and other for payment of legal dries, if only one prayer was made for legal dues, the grievance petition for that reason would be unsustainable.

9. The other arguments made by the learned counsel for the respondents was that the appellant should have sought his relief i.e. recovery of his legal dues under Payment of Wages Act, 1936. In reply to that argument the appellant's learned counsel swiftly referred to subsection (6) of section 1 of the said Act, arguing that the aforesaid Act would not apply in the case where the wages per month were more than 3,000 rupees. In the present case it was an admitted position that the appellant's monthly wages were 9,100 and therefore, he was not covered by the Payment of Wages of the above discussion the order, passed by the Labour supported and it is, therefore, hereby set aside. The relief claimed by the appellant is allowed and the respondent to work out all the dues admissible to him under the law and make payment thereof to him. H.B.T./21/K(L. Trib) Appeal allowed.