SCMR 2008

2008 PLP 383 (SCMR)

GHULAM FAROOQ TARAR — Petitioner Versus RIZWAN AHMAD and others — Respondents

Jurisdiction / Court
Supreme Court of Pakistan
Decided Date
Criminal Petition for Leave to Appeal No.436-L of 2001, decided on 18th July, 2005.
Honorable Judges
Khalil-ur-Rehman Ramday and Tassaduq Hussain Jillani, JJ
Case Reference Summary (AEO Optimized)
Citation 2008 PLP 383 (SCMR)
Forum / Court Supreme Court of Pakistan
Bench Members Khalil-ur-Rehman Ramday and Tassaduq Hussain Jillani, JJ
Parties GHULAM FAROOQ TARAR — Petitioner Versus RIZWAN AHMAD and others — Respondents
Primary Law Copyright Ordinance (XXXIV of 1962)
💡 Quick Legal QA & Summary / سوال و جواب خلاصہ
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 2008 PLP 383 (SCMR)?

This judgment primarily cites: Copyright Ordinance (XXXIV of 1962) as referenced in Pakistani case law index.

Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 2008 PLP 383 (SCMR)?

The case was heard and decided by the Supreme Court of Pakistan bench comprising: Khalil-ur-Rehman Ramday and Tassaduq Hussain Jillani, JJ.

Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?

Cite this legal precedent as: 2008 PLP 383 (SCMR) (GHULAM FAROOQ TARAR — Petitioner Versus RIZWAN AHMAD and others — Respondents). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.

Laws Cited

Copyright Ordinance (XXXIV of 1962)

Representation

  • Raja Mehmood Akhtar, Advocate Supreme Court with Ahud-ul-Islam, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioner.
  • M. Ashraf Wahla, Advocate Supreme Court with M.A. Qureshi, Advocate-on-Record for Respondents Nos.1 to 3.
  • Date of hearing: 18th July, 2005.
  • S.D. Qureshi, Advocate Supreme Court for the State.

Headnotes / Summary

(On appeal from the order of the Lahore High Court, dated 7-5-2001 passed in Criminal Appeal No.787 of 1999).

S. 66-A

Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss.420/468/482/471

Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S.249-A

Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.185(3)

Accused acquitted under S.249-A, Cr.P.C.

Validity

Accused in his application moved under S.249-A, Cr.P.C. had not specifically denied the publication by him of the two books in question

Court undoubtedly could acquit the accused under S.249-A, Cr.P.C. if in its opinion either the charge was groundless or there was no probability of the accused being convicted of any offence, but if the allegations levelled in the complaint supported by the preliminary evidence were admitted to be true, probability of conviction of accused at such stage could not be ignored

Trial Court had acted in haste in passing the order of acquittal which was not sustainable and the same was consequently set aside by converting petition for leave to appeal into an appeal, with the direction to Trial Court to proceed with the complaint in accordance with law. S.D. Qureshi, Advocate Supreme Court for the State.

Judgment & Decree

TASSADUQ HUSSAIN JILLANI, J.

Petitioner seeks leave to appeal against the judgment, dated 7-5-2001 passed by a learned Judge of the Lahore High Court vide which petitioner's appeal against order, dated 17-7-1999 passed by the learned trial Court acquitting the respondent under section 249-A, Cr.P.C. was dismissed.

2. Facts in brief are that petitioner filed a private complaint alleging that he was the owner of Kiran Publications: that he published two books namely "Kiran English Grammar and Composition and Kiran Fawaid Insha Pardazi" and had been supplying those books to different educational institutions. It was further alleged by the complainant that it came to his notice that the respondent-accused had published the afore-referred books without proper authorization and, therefore, he committed an offence under section 66-A of the Copyright Ordinance, 1962 read with sections 420, 468, 482, 471, P.P.C. Statements of four witnesses were recorded as preliminary evidence whereafter the learned trial Court summoned the accused-respondents. On an application filed by them under section 249-A, Cr.P.C. they were acquitted by the learned trial Court on the ground that the complainant had not got his trade-mark duly registered and that there was nothing in evidence to show that the accused had installed a Printing Press. This order of acquittal was affirmed by the High Court while dismissed petitioner's appeal.

3. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the learned trial Court acted in haste invoking section 249-A, Cr.P.C. that there was sufficient material to proceed against the respondent-accused and that the order of acquittal is inconsistent with the order of summoning the accused on the same set of evidence. The learned counsel for the respondent defended the impugned judgments by submitting that in the face of preliminary evidence recorded there was no probability of conviction of the respondent-accused and the learned trial Court rightly acquitted them.

4. It is alleged in the private complaint that petitioner-complainant is owner of Messrs Kiran Publications which stands registered under the Companies Ordinance. The complainant while appearing as P.W.1 has specifically alleged that the two books in question were being published by his publishing company. Two fake purchasers were sent to the shop of the respondent-accused who purchased the books in question which it was alleged in evidence had been published by the respondent. It was on the basis of this preliminary evidence that the learned trial Court found that the complainant had a prima facie case pursuant to which the respondent-accused under section 249-A, Cr.P.C., the same Court acquitted the respondents by invoking section 249-A, Cr.P.C. without recording the prosecution evidence or forming the charge.

5. We have gone through the contents of the application moved by the respondent-accused under section 249-A, Cr.P.C. and note that the allegation that they got published the two books in. question had not been specifically denied. There is no cavil to the proposition that a Court can acquit the accused under section 249-A, Cr.P.C. if after hearing the Public Prosecutor it "considers that the charge is groundless or that there is no probability of the accused being convicted of any offence". If the allegations levelled in the complaint supported by the preliminary evidence are admitted to be true, it cannot be said at this stage that there is no probability of conviction of the respondent-accused. In the afore-referred circumstances, we are of the view that the learned trial Court acted in haste in passing the order of acquittal which is, therefore, not sustainable. Resultantly, this petition is converted into an appeal and allowed. The order of the trial Court dated 17-7-1999 and that of the High Court dated 7-5-2001 are set aside. The case shall be deemed to be pending before the trial Court which shall proceed with the same in accordance with law and will ensure that the same is concluded preferably within 5 months of the receipt of this order. N.H.Q./G-65/SC Case remanded. ***