1998 PLP 749 (SCMR)

CH. MUHAMMAD ARIF, J.

This petition under clause (3) of Article 185 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 is directed against judgment dated 7-5-1997 of the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench. made in Writ Petition No.551 of 1997 (and Nos.867 of 1997, 304 of 1997, 437 of 1997, 695 of 1997, 838 of 1997, 697 of 1997, 703 of 1997, 704 of 1997, 705 of 1997, 804 of 1997, 429 of 1997, 432 of 1997, 936 of 1997, 55 of 1997, 403 of 1997, 742 of 1997, 916 of 1997, 702 of 1997, 701 of 1997, 664 of 1997, 749 of. 1994, and 532 of 1997) whereby all the writ petitions were dismissed.

2. The petitioners claimed to have been appointed as Assistant Directors, Inspectors and Sub-Inspectors in the Intelligence Bureau, Government of Pakistan, on regular basis as also having been placed on probation for a period of one year. It was pursuant to the decision made by the competent Authority that the services of the petitioners were terminated in the following manner: "In exercise of the powers conferred under section 11(1) of the Civil Servants Act, 1973 the Competent Authority has been pleased to terminate the services of the following Inspectors (BPS-16 with a special pay of Rs.35 p.m.) (Probationers) Intelligence Burau with effect from the afternoon of February 18, 1997. With effect from the same date and time they sever all connections with the Intelligence Bureau." Their writ petition was dismissed (alongwith other writ petitions brought by persons similarly placed as the petitioners) on the ground that being civil servants, all' matters relating to their terms and conditions of service are liable to appropriate challenges thereto in terms of the Civil Servants Act, (No.LXXI of) 1973. It was further observed that the Service Tribunal established under clause (1) of Article 212 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, does deal with the matters relating to the terms and conditions of service of civil tenants and that clause(2) of Article 212 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, effectively ousts the jurisdiction of all Courts with regard to the matters which fall exclusively within the ambit of the Tribunal.

3. Mr. Abdul Ghafoor Mangi, Advocate has appeared in support of petitioner's case to the effect that one bloc termination of their services as above and that too without affording an opportunity of hearing to them, cannot be sustained. He was of the view that the respondent-authorities had, as a matter of policy, terminated the services of the petitioners for reasons other than justifiable under the law of the land, including principles of Islam. On the contrary, Mr. K.M.A. Samdani, learned Senior Advocate Supreme Court, has specifically referred to Notification No.2/C/97-(13)/Estab-III, dated 18-2-1997 (copy available at page 98 of the paper book) to contend that termination of services of the petitioners had come about strictly in accordance with law and that the petitioners can resort to the remedy of an appeal under section 4 for Civil Servants Act. 1973 as held by the High Court in the impugned judgment. During the course of arguments and at the stage when the aforereferred Notification dated 18-2-1997 was referred to by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent-authorities. Mr. Abdul Ghafoor Mangi submitted that the remedy of appeal against-the orders of termination of the services of the petitioners has become barred by time, during the interregnum.

4. We have considered the arguments addressed at the Bar and have also gone through the available material. The well considered judgment of the High Court has not been shown to be suffering from any infirmity in law. The plea that the remedy of appeal by the petitioner has become barred by time, cannot advance the case of the petitioners in these proceedings. It is admitted position that the matter which they brought before the High Court, squarely falls within, the terms and conditions of their service. Such causes can be made the subject matter of appeal/appeals by them before' the appropriate Service Tribunal established in terms of Article 212 of the Constitution. The apprehension of the petitioners that their 'appeal' has become barred by time, need not detain us any further, in that they (the petitioners) can go ahead with challenging the impugned orders in appeal/appeals with an application seeking condonation of delay, on available grounds. The resolution of their cause in appeal/appeals is inextricably linked with the question of limitation and, if such course is chartered by them, the Appellate forum shall, no doubt, decide the same according to law. With this observation, leave to appeal is declined and this petition is dismissed. A.A./M-78/S Leave refused.