1993 PLP 237 (PLC)

‑‑‑‑S. 25‑A‑‑‑Grievance notice‑‑‑Grievance notice admittedly given by employee to employer after three years of accrual of cause of action clearly was beyond prescribed time and thus could not sustain. Muhammad Latif for Appellants. Sabahuddin Khattak for Respondents. The appellants feel dissatisfied with the decision of the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Peshawar dated 24‑1‑1991 whereby their grievance petition was dismissed, therefore, they have prayed for its reversal in this appeal

2. The relevant facts giving rise to the controversy between the parties is that initially the appellants were inducted into service as work charge employees but on completion of the required period they were made permanent workmen and their services were regularised per Office Order No.1.05.05, dated 9‑5‑1987. However, when the petitioners came to know that their services prior to the above office order were not counted towards the service benefits they made a request to the respondents to consider it. On the failure of the respondents to accede to the request, the petitioners submitted a grievance notice but no reply was given. The petitioners were, therefore, obliged to file the grievance petition, which was dismissed through the impugned order.

3. The learned counsel arguing for the appellants submitted that no evidence has been recorded in this case and, therefore, the points of limitation and jurisdiction involved in the case have not been correctly decided as in absence of relevant evidence such points cannot be legally determined. He was also of the view that the decision on question of jurisdiction has also not been resolved in accordance with law. It was also stressed that for want of evidence finding on the merits involved in the grievance petition was not correct. These submissions were controverted by the learned counsel pleading for the respondents.

4. I went through the record in the light of the points agitated by the counsel of either side.

5. The relevant section of the Standing Orders Ordinance which prescribes the extent of the applicability of the Ordinance is section 1(41 and the first proviso to this section lays down that "provided that nothing in this Ordinance shall apply to industrial and commercial establishments carried on by or under the authority of the (Federal) or any Provincial Government, where statutory rules of service, conduct or discipline are applicable to the workmen employed therein". The observation in the impugned judgment "in exercise of this power the Government of N.‑W.F.P. was pleased to make Provincial Urban Development Board Service Rules, 1978" was not opposed by the counsel appearing for the appellants. Therefore, in presence of the statutory rules of the respondents their employees could not have resort to the Standing Orders Ordinance for redress of their grievance. Moreover, as the preamble of the N.‑W.F.P. Urban Planning Ordinance, 1978 suggests that this organization is not meant for conducting business for profit, therefore, it was also not qualified as industrial or commercial establishment. The grievance notice was given after three years of accrual of the cause of action; therefore, it was clearly beyond the prescribed time. The objection that these points could not be determined without examination of evidence in the peculiar circumstances of this case would not hold good as the disputed facts are patent on record and it needed no evidence for its determination.

6. This appeal has no merit and is accordingly dismissed with no order as to costs. H.B.T./152/Lb.N???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? Appeal dismissed