1997 PLP 2394 (MLD)
Messrs PLATINUM INSURANCE COMPANY through Chief Executive‑‑‑Plaintiff Versus Messrs HIGHWAYS BRIDGE, CONTRACTOR INTERNATIONAL
| Citation | 1997 PLP 2394 (MLD) |
| Forum / Court | Karachi |
| Bench Members | Rana Bhagwan Das, J |
| Parties | Messrs PLATINUM INSURANCE COMPANY through Chief Executive‑‑‑Plaintiff Versus Messrs HIGHWAYS BRIDGE, CONTRACTOR INTERNATIONAL |
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 1997 PLP 2394 (MLD)?
This judgment primarily cites: statutory provisions as referenced in Pakistani case law index.
Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 1997 PLP 2394 (MLD)?
The case was heard and decided by the Karachi bench comprising: Rana Bhagwan Das, J.
Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?
Cite this legal precedent as: 1997 PLP 2394 (MLD) (Messrs PLATINUM INSURANCE COMPANY through Chief Executive‑‑‑Plaintiff Versus Messrs HIGHWAYS BRIDGE, CONTRACTOR INTERNATIONAL). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.
Headnotes / Summary
(a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)‑‑‑ ‑‑‑‑O.XXXVII, R.3‑‑‑Suit for recovery of loan in summary jurisdiction‑‑ Objection to jurisdiction of Court at 'K'‑‑‑Cause of action‑‑‑Factual position as disclosed in plaint was that Director of defendant Company visited office of plaintiffs at ' K' and issued post dated cheque to plaintiff‑Company for amount in question‑‑‑Such material statement was not controverted by defendant by way of any rejoinder‑‑‑Issuance of cheque, signatures of Managing Director of defendant company thereon as also on promissory note having not been denied on oath, prima facie there were valid documents for maintaining suit at 'K'‑‑ Court at ' K' thus, had jurisdiction to hear and try suit. (b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)‑‑‑ ‑‑‑‑O.XXXVII, Rr. 1,2 & Sched.‑‑‑Non‑issuance of summons on specified form by Court while entertaining suit in summary jurisdiction‑‑‑Maintainability of suit‑‑‑Such mistake having been committed by Court officials, no party could be made to suffer on that account‑‑‑Defendants, however, having been served otherwise, than on specified forms, they could not be allowed to raise objection which in any event would not be fatal to maintainability of suit. (c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)‑‑‑ ‑‑‑‑O.XXXVII, Rr. 1 & 2‑‑‑Objection to maintainability of suit in a summary jurisdiction‑‑‑Defendants in absence of grant of leave to defend suit were not entitled to raise such issue at premature stage of suit‑‑‑Defendants, however, would be at liberty to agitate all grounds and contentions in their written statement after they were granted leave to defend suit‑‑‑Defendants being yet out of Court, were not entitled to question maintainability of suit on factual grounds. (d) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)‑‑‑ ‑‑‑‑O.XXXVII, R.3‑‑‑Suit in summary jurisdiction‑‑‑Court before grant of leave to defend suit could neither dismiss suit, nor reject plaint, nor pass any adverse order against plaintiffs on objection/assertions of defendant‑‑‑Such question, however, could be considered at final hearing of suit‑‑‑No case was made out for grant of unconditional leave‑‑‑Defendants were, however, granted leave to defend suit subject to furnishing bank guarantee in suit amount within specified period. Abdul Rashid for Plaintiffs. Abdullah for Defendants.
Judgment & Decree
This revision has been filed to challenge the order dated 30‑5‑1996 passed by the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Karachi (South) in Civil Suit No. 16 of 1995, whereby he granted to the applicant conditional leave to appear and‑defend the suit, filed by the respondent for recovery of Rs.3,43,319 based on six cheques issued by the applicant to the respondent. Briefly the facts appear to be that the aforesaid cheques were handed over by the applicant to the respondent towards the price of High Speed Diesel Oil supplied by the latter to the former. The cheques, however, when presented to bank were dishonoured whereupon the respondent first filed a direct complaint in the Court of AC and S.D.M., Kharadar, which complaint was dismissed and thereafter the suit was filed under the summary procedure of Order 37, C.P.C. The applicant applied for leave to appear and defend the suit on the ground that during the period between 12‑4‑1992 and 2‑6‑1992 cash payments of Rs.4,43,319 had been made by the applicant to the respondent and therefore the cheques were without consideration. Conditional leave to appear and defend the suit was granted by the impugned order on the condition that the applicant furnish security in the sum of Rs.3,50,
000. Contention of Mr. Akhtar Ali Mehmood, learned counsel for the applicant is that the applicant had disclosed good defence by producing the vouchers and receipts in respect of payments made to the respondent and therefore the leave should have been unconditional. He places reliance on the case of Messrs Kohinoor Textile Mills Ltd. v. Messrs Gharo Textile Mills Ltd. (PLD 1986 Kar. 157 (2)). In that case after setting out the circumstances under which leave to appear and defend a suit can be granted, it has been observed: "The defence raised according to the decisions of the House of Lord and according to the decisions of superior Courts in Pakistan, should not be a sham one but should raise a fair issue to be tried by a competent Court. By sham defence is meant that the facts alleged in the defence even if true would not amount to a valid defence in law, and a fair issue has been interpreted to mean a plausible issue on the sense that if the facts alleged are established there would be a tenable defence. In coming to a conclusion whether such a test is satisfied or not, the Court should take into consideration all the circumstances of the case as disclosed in the plaint and in the affidavits and other material that is available as was laid down by Boven, L.J., in Blaikerj v. Abrams (1898)77 L.T.255." The other case relied upon is that of Habib Bank Limited v. Messrs Pazhong Traders and 12 others (1986 CLC 1086). That case has also laid down the circumstances under which leave to appear and defend the suit can be granted, it has been held that: " As regards the principle that where the defendant has made out a good prima facie case, the Court should grant unconditional leave, in my view, good 'prima facie case' amounts to saying that the defendant has made out a plausible defence and to this extent, I am in respectful agreement with the learned Single Judge of the Lahore High Court." The respondent, of course denies all these payments as also the authenticity of the alleged vouchers and receipts. In the present case the applicant by letter dated 20‑5‑1992 undertook to pay the amount of the dishonoured cheques in monthly instalments of Rs.1,00,000 commencing from June, 1992. However, there is no other letter of the applicant to show that the alleged cash payments were in respect of the amount of the cheques. Further it appears from the vouchers and receipts produced alongwith the application for leave to appear and defend that most of these pertain to the period much prior to the writing of the said letter dated 20‑5‑1992. Six are of different dates of April 1992, four of May and two of June, 1992. Of these only four, dated 24‑5‑1992, 31‑5‑1992, 2‑6‑1992 relate to the period after the aforesaid letter. Apparently, therefore, these payments, at least those made before the date of the letter, had been taken into account while writing the, said letter. The amount of the vouchers and receipts pertaining to the period after the aforesaid letter total to Rs.1,45,000 and as such, it would appear that at best plausible defence can be said to have been made out only to the extent of Rs.1.d5,000 although that is not free from serious doubt as it is not in accord with the mode of payment given in the letter. In these circumstances, no fault can be found with the impugned order. However, I would give allowance to the applicant in respect of alleged payment of Rs.1,45,000 and would, therefore, reduce the amount of security from Rs.3,50,000 as directed under the impugned order to Rs.2,00,000 (rupees two lacs), to be furnished before the trial Court within one month from today. This revision is accordingly dismissed in limine and the impugned order is maintained subject to the above modifications.
2. In view of the above order, this application has become infructuous and is dismissed. A.A./S‑62/K Revision dismissed.