PTD 1971

1971 PLP 826 (PTD)

BALCHAND Versus INCOME‑TAX OFFICER, SAGAR

Jurisdiction / Court
Supreme Court India
Decided Date
Civil Appeal No. 640 of 1966, decided on 19th August 1968.
Honorable Judges
J. C. Shah and V. Ramaswami, JJ
Case Reference Summary (AEO Optimized)
Citation 1971 PLP 826 (PTD)
Forum / Court Supreme Court India
Bench Members J. C. Shah and V. Ramaswami, JJ
Parties BALCHAND Versus INCOME‑TAX OFFICER, SAGAR
💡 Quick Legal QA & Summary / سوال و جواب خلاصہ
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 1971 PLP 826 (PTD)?

This judgment primarily cites: statutory provisions as referenced in Pakistani case law index.

Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 1971 PLP 826 (PTD)?

The case was heard and decided by the Supreme Court India bench comprising: J. C. Shah and V. Ramaswami, JJ.

Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?

Cite this legal precedent as: 1971 PLP 826 (PTD) (BALCHAND Versus INCOME‑TAX OFFICER, SAGAR). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.

Representation

  • N. D. Karkhanis, Senior Advocate (A. G. Ratnaparkhi, Advocate with him) for Appellant.
  • D. Narasaraju, Senior Advocate (T. A. Ramchandran and R. N. Sachthey, Advocates with him) for Respondent.

Headnotes / Summary

(Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order of the Madhya Pradesh High Court, dated September 2, 1965, in Miscellaneous Petition No. 92 of ,1964). Incometax‑--Re‑assessmentNotice‑Defective in preamble but assessment year clearly specified in body‑Whether notice invalid‑Jurisdiction‑Voluntary return filed after original assess ment‑Whether bar to initiation of re‑assessment proceedings Indian Incometax Act, 1922, Ss. 22(3) & 34‑Incometax Act, 1961, S.

148. After the appellant had been assessed to tax under sec tion 23(3) of the Incometax Act, 1922, for the assessment years 1945‑46 and 1946‑47, the Incometax Officer issued a notice under section 34 on June 24, 1959, the preamble of which recited "Whereas I have reason to believe that your income assessable to incometax for the assessment years 1946‑47, 1945‑46 has (a) escaped assessment . . . I therefore propose to assess the said income"; but in the body of the notice it was clearly stated that the appellant was called upon to deliver a return of his total income assessable to, the year ending March 31, 1946. On August 17, 1959, the appellant filed a return for the assessment year 1946‑

47. The appellant was informed that he was called upon to submit a return for 1945‑46 and on March 22, 1960, he tiled a fresh return for the year 1945‑46 admitting that he had "misunderstood the notice" served upon him. 'thereafter on March 14, 1963, the officer issued another notice under sec tion 148 of the incometax Act, 1961, in respect of the assessment year 1946‑

47. Thereupon the appellant moved the High Court for an order quashing the notices dated June 24, 1959 and March 14, 1963, claiming (i) that initiation of re‑assessment pro ceedings pursuant to the notice dater: June 24, 1959, for the year 1945‑46 was incompetent, and (ii) that so long as the return submitted by the appellant in August 1959, for the year 1946‑47 was not considered and disposed of, the Incometax Officer was not competent to issue a notice for the year under either sec tion 34 of the 1922‑Act or section 148 of the 1961‑Act. The High Court rejected the appellant's petition. On appeal to the Supreme Court: Held, dismissing the appeal, (i) that the negligence in drawing up of the preamble to the notice dated June 24, 1959, did not affect the validity of the notice, for the appellant was clearly informed thereby that he had to file a return of income assessable for the year ending March 31, 1946. A demand for a return of income assessable for the year ending March 31, 1946, could obviously be for the assessment year 1945‑46 and not for 1946‑47. (ii) That the appellant could not file a voluntary return after the original assessment under section 23 was completed, and the return filed on August 17, 1959, did not deprive the Income tax Officer of his jurisdiction to initiate re‑assessment proceedings in respect of the assessment year 1946‑

47. The principle in Commissioner of Incometax v. Ranchhoddas Karsondas (1959) 36 I T R 569 (S C) and Commissioner of Income tax v. S. Raman Chettiar (1965) 55 I T R 530 (S C) that the Incometax Officer cannot ignore a voluntary return filed by the assessee and issue, a notice of re‑assessment under section 14 of the Incometax Act, has no application to cases where a return has been filed by the assessee and issue a notice of assessment made thereon and there after, apprehending proceedings under section 34, the assessee files another return. Unless a notice of re‑assessment is issued by the Incometax Officer, the assessee cannot after an order of assessment is made submit a return of his income for the year for which he is already assessed and call upon the Incometax Officer to assess his income. Such a proceeding would be futile. It is true that a notice under section 34 is also a notice of assessment, but relying upon section 22(3) the assessee may furnish a revised return pursuant to‑ a requisition under section 34; he cannot seek to rectify his return on which assessment has already been made. The Incometax Act does not provide for any machinery for dealing with voluntary returns field by an assessee after assessment of the income for the year of assessment is completed. Such a voluntary return does not operate as a bar to the Incometax Officer issuing a notice of re‑assessment. Balchand v. Incometax Officer, Sagar (1966) 61 I T R 656 affirmed.

Judgment & Decree

SHAH, J.‑

The Incometax Officer, Sagar, assessed the appellant to pay under section 23(3) of the Incometax Act, 1922, tax on his income computed for the assessment years 1945‑46 and 1946‑

47. On June 24, 1959, the Incometax Officer issued a notice of re‑assessment under section 34 of the Incometax Act, 1922, reciting that the income of the appellant had escaped assessment and requiring the appellant to submit a return of his total world income assessable for the year ending March 31, 1946. On August 17, 1959, the appellant filed a return for the assessment of his income for the year 1946‑

47. The appellant was informed by the Incometax Officer that he was called upon to submit a return of his income for the assessment year 1945‑46 and not for the assessment year 1946‑

47. The appellant on March 22, 1960, filed a fresh return for the assessment year 1945‑46, admitting that he had "misunderstood the notice" served upon him, In his return he admitted that he had a third share in a firm styled "Sheoprasad Shobharam". On March 14, 1963, the Incometax Officer issued another notice under section 148 of the Incometax Act, 1961, calling upon the appellant to submit a return of his income for the assessment year 1946‑47 on the ground that income of the appellant had escaped assessment. The appellant then moved the High Court of Madhya Pradesh for an order quashing the notices dated June 24, 1959, and March 14, 1963, and for a writ of mandamus or prohibition restraining the Incometax Officer from continuing the proceedings of assessment under the two notices. The High Court rejected the writ petition. Against the order of the High Court, the appellant has appealed to this Court with special leave. The appellant contended that by the notice dated June 24, 1959, he was called upon to file a return for. the assessment year 1946‑47 and initiation of proceedings on that notice for reassess ment, of income for the assessment year 1945‑46 was incompetent. In the preamble of the notice it is recited: "Whereas I have reason to believe that your income assessable to incometax for the assessment years 1946‑47, 1945‑46 has‑(a) escaped assess ment . . . . . I therefore propose to assess the said income", but in the body of the notice it is clearly recited that the appellant was called upon to deliver a return of his total world income assessable for the year ending March 31, 1946. A demand for return of income assessable for the year ending March 31, 1946, could obviously be for the assessment year 1945‑46 and not for 1946‑

47. By his letter dated March 22, 1960, the appellant admitted that he was called upon to file a return for the assessment year 1945‑46 and he had "misunder stood" the notice anti had filed a return for the assessment year 1946‑

47. There was apparently some negligence in drawing up the preamble to the notice, but that does not affect the validity of the notice, for the appellant was clearly informed that he had to file a return for the year ending March 31, 1946. The appellant then contended that, in any event, on August 17, 1959, the appellant had submitted a return for the assessment year 1946‑47 and even if no notice for the assessment year 1946‑47 calling upon him to submit a return for that year' was issued, a notice under section 34 bf the Incometax Act, 1922, or under section 148 of the Incometax Act, 1961, was incompetent so lung as the return submitted by the appellant in August 1959, for the assessment year 1946‑47 was not considered and disposed of. Reliance in support of this contention was placed upon two decisions of this Court Commissioner of Incometax v. Ranchhoddas Karsondas ((1959) 36 I T R 569) and Commissioner of Incometax v. S. Raman Chettiar ((1965) 55 I T R 630 (S C)). Under section 22(1) of the Incometax Act, 1922, the Income tax Officer was required before the 1st day of May in each year to give notice, by publication in the press and by publication in the prescribed manner, calling upon every person whose total income during the previous year exceeded the maximum amount not chargeable to incometax to furnish within such period not being less than sixty days as may be specified in the notice; a return in the prescribed form. Subsection (2) authorised the Incometax Officer to serve a notice upon any person whose total income was in the opinion of the Incometax Officer of such an amount as to render such person liable to incometax, requiring him to furnish within such period, not being less than thirty days, as may be specified in the notice, a return of his total income during the previous year. Subsection (3) provided: "If any person has not furnished a return within the time allowed by or under subsection (1) or subsection (2), or having furnished a return under either of those subsections, discovers any omission or wrong statement therein, he may furnish a return or a revised return, as the case may be, at any time before the assessment is made." Section 34 of the Act authorised the Incometax Officer to serve a notice on the assessee for assessment or re‑assessment if (a) the Incometax Officer had reason to believe that by reason of the omission or failure on the part of an assessee to make a return of his income under section 22 for any year or to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for his assessment for that year, income, profits or gains chargeable to incometax have escaped assessment for that year, or have been under assessed, or assessed at too low a rate, or have been made the subject of excessive relief under the Act, or excessive loss or depreciation allowance has been computed, or if (b) in cases not mentioned in clause (a) the Incometax Officer had in consequence of information in his possession reason to believe that income, profits or gains chargeable to incometax had escaped assessment for any year, or had been under‑assessed, or assessed at too low a rate, or had been made the subject of excessive relief under the Act or that excessive loss or depreciation allowance had been computed, and to proceed to re‑assess the income of the assessee. The appellant was already assessed to incometax for the years 1945‑47 and 1946‑47 under the Act of 1922. Counsel for the appellant concedes that the appellant did not comply with the notice dated June 24, 1959, and filed first a return for the assess ment year 1946‑47 and thereafter a return for the assessment year 1945‑

46. He, however, submits that even if the return was not demanded, since the return for 1946‑47 was filed by the appellant the Incometax Officer was bound to consider that return according to law and to pass appropriate orders of assessment thereon and so long as he did not do so, he was incompetent to issue a notice of reassessment either under section 34 of the Incometax Act of 1922, or section 148 of the Incometax Act, 1961. We are unable to accept that contention. The Act does not provide for any machinery for dealing with voluntary returns filed by an assessee after the assessment of income for the year of assessment is completed. Such a voluntary return does not operate as a bar to tile Incometax Officer issuing a notice of re‑assessment. This Court has held in Ranchoddas's case that where no return has been filed by the assessee within the period prescribed by section 22(I) of the Incometax Act, 1922, the assessee is entitled in law to submit a voluntary return in answer to the general notice under section 22(1) before assessment is completed, for a return in answer to the general notice can under section 22(3) be filed at any time before assessment and for filing such a return there is no limit of time, and when such a voluntary return is filed, the Incometax Officer cannot ignore that return voluntarily filed and issue a notice of re‑assessment under section 34 of the Incometax Act, 1922. A notice of reassess ment before the voluntary return is disposed of is therefore invalid. But the principle of Ranchhoddas's case only applies to cases where no assessment of the income of the assessee has been made. Where the income of the assessee has been assessed to tax, it is not open to the assessee on coming to learn or apprehending that proceedings under section 34 of the Act will be taken against him to file a voluntary return and avoid the issue of a notice under section 34 against him. In S. Raman Chettiar's case also a Hindu undivided family had not filed any return for the assessment year 1944‑

45. The Incometax Officer issued a notice under section 34 of the Indian Incometax Act, 1922, in April 1948, calling upon the assessee to file a return of income, and the assessee complied with the notice and filed a return on September 4, 1948. In the course of the proceeding, it was discovered that the notice under section 34 was invalid, because the Commissioner's sanction was not obtained. The Incometax Officer then issued a fresh notice on February 27, 1953, in respect of the assessment year 1944‑45 and passed an order of assessment in respect of the income which had not been assessed. This Court held that the return submitted on September 4, 1948, by the assessee in response to the invalid notice under section 34 was a return within the meaning of section 22(3) of the Act, and the Incometax Officer could not ignore it and issue a notice under section 34 on the assumption that there bad been omission or failure by the assessee to make a return of his income under section 22, and on that account the assessment under section 34 was invalid. In that case also no return had been filed by the assessee pursuant to section 22 and no order of assessment of the income of the assessee for the year 1944‑45 was recorded. The principle of Ranchhoddas's case and S. Raman Chettiar's case has, in our judgment, no application to cases where a return has been filed by the assessee and assess ment made and thereafter apprehending proceedings under sec tion 34 of the Indian Incometax Act, 1922, the assessee files another return. Unless a notice of re‑assessment is issued by the Incometax Officer, the assessee cannot, after an order of assess ment is made, submit a return of his income for the year for which he is already assessed and call upon the Incometax Officer to assess his income. Such a proceeding would be futile. It is true that a notice under section 34 is also a notice of assessment, but relying upon section 22(3) the assessee may furnish a revised return to rectify an omission or wrong statement, or furnish a return pursuant to a requisition under section 34, but he cannot seek to rectify his return on which assessment has already been made. The return filed on August 17, 1959, therefore, did not deprive the Incometax Officer of his jurisdiction to start pro ceedings under section 34 of the Indian Incometax Act, 1922, against the assessee. There is no dispute that after the repeal of the Act of 1922, it was competent to the Incometax Officer to issue a notice under section 148 of the Incometax Act, 1951, for the assessment of income of the assessee if no proceeding for assessment had been commenced prior to April 1, 1962. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.