SCMR 1974

1974 PLP 203 (SCMR)

NHIR AHMAD‑Petitioner Versus THE CHAIRMAN, PUNJAB ROAD TRANSPORT

Jurisdiction / Court
High Court
Decided Date
Criminal Petition for Special Leave to Appeal No. 88 of 1973, decided on 2nd October 1973.
Honorable Judges
N/A
Case Reference Summary (AEO Optimized)
Citation 1974 PLP 203 (SCMR)
Forum / Court High Court
Bench Members N/A
Parties NHIR AHMAD‑Petitioner Versus THE CHAIRMAN, PUNJAB ROAD TRANSPORT
Primary Law Constitution of Pakistan (1972)
💡 Quick Legal QA & Summary / سوال و جواب خلاصہ
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 1974 PLP 203 (SCMR)?

This judgment primarily cites: Constitution of Pakistan (1972) as referenced in Pakistani case law index.

Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 1974 PLP 203 (SCMR)?

The case was heard and decided by the High Court bench comprising: N/A.

Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?

Cite this legal precedent as: 1974 PLP 203 (SCMR) (NHIR AHMAD‑Petitioner Versus THE CHAIRMAN, PUNJAB ROAD TRANSPORT). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.

Laws Cited

Constitution of Pakistan (1972)

Representation

  • M. Dilawar Mahmood, Senior Advocate Supreme Court instructed by Rana Maqbool Ahmad Qadri, Advocate‑on‑Record for Petitioner.
  • Nemo for Respondents.
  • Date of hearing : 2nd October 1973.

Headnotes / Summary

(On appeal from the order of the Lahore High Court, Lahore, dated 29‑11‑1972, in Criminal Original No. 38/C of 1972). Art. 206‑Contempt petition‑Not substitute for execution‑Nor alternative method of getting something done which could not be done even in execution proceedings‑Purely declaratory decree being not executable, resort cannot be had to proceedings In contempt for failure to abide by decree.

Judgment & Decree

HAMOODUR RAHMAN, C. J.‑This is a petition for special leave to appeal from an order of a learned Single Judge of the Lahore High Court allowing a compromise to be entered into in a contempt application. The petitioner, it appears, had obtained a decree for a declaration that he was wrongfully removed from service. This decree was upheld right up to the Supreme Court. Thereafter the petitioner was re‑instated in service, but some dispute arose as to the correct seniority of the petitioner and as to whether he had received all the benefits of the increments to which he would have been entitled if he had not been wrongfully removed from service. There was some question also of the proper fixation of his pay in the revised junior scale. By the compromise, his salary was fixed at Rs. 530 per mensem instead of Rs. 350 which he was then drawing and it was agreed that he would be treated as the senior‑most Assistant Works Manager for purposes of seniority, provided he waived his claim to arrears of salary. The learned counsel for the petitioner accepted the offer and the contempt matter was disposed of as not requiring any further action thereon. When this matter first came up for hearing, learned counsel appearing in support of the application raised the question as to whether the counsel appearing in the contempt matter had authority to enter into such a com promise and thereby surrender rights which had accrued to the petitioner under the declaratory decree obtained by him. It was then pointed out to the learned counsel that it may not be in the best interest of his client to challenge the compromise under which he had certainly obtained certain advantages. Learned counsel then took time to consult his client because he was not. This time was granted. The petition has again come up for hearing today. Learned counsel at first wished to press this petition, but it was pointed out to him that the con tempt application itself was wholly misconceived. If the declaratory decree had not been fully given effect to and his salary had been fixed contrary to the rules relevant in that behalf, then these gave him a fresh cause of action which could not be enforced by a contempt proceeding. Learned counsel stated that even the terms of the compromise had not been fully given effect to. If this be so, then that too is a fresh cause of action which is to be enforced by a separate proceeding and not by way of contempt for non‑compliance with the order of the Court. A contempt petition is not a substitute for execution nor an alternative method of getting something done which could not be done even in a execution proceeding, because a purely declaratory decree could not be executed. When this was pointed out, learned counsel ultimately prayed for permission to withdraw this petition. He has acted wisely in doing so. This petition is accordingly dismissed as withdrawn. Petition dismissed.