1969 PLP 274 (SCMR)

HAMOODUR RAHMAN, C. J.‑This is a petition for the review of an order passed by this Court on the 29th of October 1968, dismissing a petition for special leave to appeal as being barred by 680 days. The petitioner was not a party to the writ proceedings in the High Court, which were disposed of on the 27th of January 1966, but it appears that he soon came to know about it, for, he applied for the review of the said order on the 21st of March 1966. The review application was dismissed on the 1st December 1967, but even then the petition for special leave was not filed until the 6th of February 1968. No application for condonation of the delay was filed; because, the petitioner, it was said, was advised that the period of limitation was 60 days from the date of the disposal of the petition for review, after excluding the time spent in obtaining certified copies. This was clearly wrong advice, for, this Court had, in the, case of Ahmad Din v. Mst. Rasul Bibi (PLD1968SC213), pointed out that limitation begins to run from the date of the final order of the High Court, and if a party chooses to delay a matter "over ant optional review application", he cannot get a fresh lease of limitation. In a civil matter it is a duty of the party, who is out of time, to explain each day's delay, for, by the delay a valuable right accrues to the other party who cannot be deprived of this right lightly. The petition was, accordingly, dismissed. The petitioner now seeks to have that order reviewed and for the first time he wants to contend that since he had asked for review of both the original order in the writ petition as well as the order passed on the review application, leave to appeal may be granted as against the review application only, because that was in time. This point has not been taken even in the petition for review and is now being put forward merely because in another applica tion, (C. P. S. L. A. 354 of 1968 Hussain Bakhsh v. Settlement Commissioner, Rawalpindi and another) which was clearly directed' against the order in the review, leave has been granted to consider whether the High Court had lightly declined jurisdiction to review an order passed in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 98 of the Constitution. In the present case, it has further to be pointed out that the review application filed in the High Court was itself barred by time, and even though the High Court had not dealt with this point as it had disposed of the review application on the ground of jurisdiction alone, the point would still be open, and, there fore, no useful purpose will be served even it; the petitioner was to succeed and the matter was sent back for re‑hearing of the review application. In the circumstances, we see no ground for the review of our previous order. This petition is, accordingly, dismissed. Petition dismissed.