2011 PLP (C (PLC(CS))

SHAHID ANWAR BAJWA, J.

For reasons to be recorded, this Constitutional Petition was dismissed as not being maintainable. Following are our reasons for the short order:

2. In March, 2005 the petitioner was appointed on ad hoc basis for a period of six months as Sub-Engineer at Sheikh Zayed Islamic Centre, University of Karachi. Vide order dated 25-2-2006 the petitioner was confirmed in appointment. Vide Office Order January 14, 2008 the petitioner's employment was terminated and he was given one month's notice pay in lieu of period of notice. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that action was initiated against the petitioner under the Removal from Service (Special Powers) Ordinance, 2000 in that he was issued show-cause notice and thereafter he was also issued order of inquiry. Learned counsel submitted that thereafter termination has been resorted to and it is therefore a mala fide act on the part of the respondent-Organization. He further submitted that letter of termination caused stigma on the petitioner and therefore it could not have been issued without resorting to due disciplinary process.

3. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent No.3 argued that respondent No.3 does not have statutory rules of service and therefore in view of the dictum laid down by the honourable Supreme Court in the case of Pakistan International Airlines Corporation v. Tanweer-ur-Rehman PLD 2010 SC 676 the Constitution Petition is not maintainable.

4. Learned counsel for the petitioner in response submitted that the action against the petitioner is in violation of basic norms of justice and therefore, the petition is maintainable. He however conceded that there are no statutory rules in the respondent-establishment.

5. We have considered the submissions made by the learned counsel and have gone through the record.

6. As far as contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that initially action was initiated under the Removal from Service (Special Powers) Ordinance, and thereafter instead of completing that action employment was terminated by giving pay for the notice period according to terms and conditions of employment and therefore act of termination was mala fide is concerned, a complete answer is given in the case of Ehsan Elahi v. WAPDA, 1988 SCMR 1247 in the following words: "(3) In support of this appeal it is contended that after the appellant had been served with a charge-sheet a departmental inquiry should have been held so that he could clear his position, and that, in the circumstances, it was not open to the respondent to take recourse to the provision of section 17(1-A) in order to remove him from service. This contention is clearly untenable. A similar contention as raised in Water and Power Development Authority v. Muhammad Ali 1987 SCMR 261 and was rejected; it was held that where the law provided the competent authority with two different modes of terminating the services of its employees, the mere fact that it had, to begin with, elected to act under one mode would not in the absence of any bar in the law preclude it from taking resort to the second mode at a later stage. This view was based on two earlier judgments of this Court reported as Abdul Karim v. West Pakistan Province PLD 1956 SC 298 and Secretary, East Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation v. Sekandar Mian 1970 SCMR 398."

7. Observations to the same effect have also been made by the honourable Supreme Court in the case of Pakistan Water and Development Authority v. Malik Ahmad Nawaz and another, 1986 SCMR 571.

8. It is conceded by the learned counsel for the petitioner that respondent-establishment does not have statutory rules. The honourable Supremo Court of Pakistan, and it is correctly argued by learned counsel for the respondent, in Pakistan International Airlines Corporation v. Tanweer-ur-Rehman, PLD 2010 SC 676 has categorically held that even if an Organization is owned or controlled by the Federal Government or Provincial Government and therefore is a person within contemplation of Article 199 of the Constitution, if it does not have statutory rules of service, employees of such an Organization cannot maintain writ petition in respect of any grievance that they might have relating to their employment or termination thereof. Contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the termination has caused stigma may be available to him before a competent Court but as far as exercise of jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution is concerned, since the respondent Organization does not have statutory rules, this writ petition is not maintainable and is consequently dismissed as such. Listed application is also disposed of. S.A.K./A-100/K Petition dismissed.