P L D 1962 (W (PLP)

In this case the appellant was tried along with his father Muniruddin. The charges were under sections 307, 324 and 326 read with section 34 or 109, P. P. C. and he has been convicted under section 307, P. P. C. for two separate offences committed during the course of one transaction and has been sentenced to 7 years' R. I. in respect of each conviction, the sentences to run concurrently. The prosecution case is that Sharif, a brother of the injured Abdul Wa4eed, had been beaten by Nawab Ali. His mother went to remonstrate and she was abused. Later, Abdul Waheed and a friend Abdul Rahim (also injured) went to the shop and an altercation ensued. Nawab Ali also came out and Muniruddin told him to beat them. Thereupon the appellant went inside the house, fetched a knife and stabbed Abdul Waheed in the abdomen and Abdul Rahim in the chest. The former injury was grievous and dangerous to life, while the latter was muscle deep. There is no evidence that either Nawab Ali or Muniruddin had any injury, and I agree with the learned Magistrate, who disbelieved the defence version, that these injured persons had gone armed with sticks. Two witnesses were examined on behalf of the defence and several eye‑witnesses, including the injured persons, on behalf of the prosecution. The learned Magistrate has given good reasons for preferring the evidence of the prosecution witnesses, and I cannot see that he has erred in so doing. The learned Magistrate framed an issue: "whether the accused deliberately chose vital parts of the body to stab Abdul Waheed and Abdul Rahim." He said : "My reply is in the affirmative." Later in the judgment, he said: "The (appellant) intended to cause, or knew that the injuries caused on vital parts of Abdul Rahim and Abdul Wahid might cause their death," These passages constitute his sole findings regarding intention or knowledge. The Magistrate has not stated his finding of intention or knowledge in terms of the P. P. C. The learned A. A: G. concedes that intention to cause death is difficult to infer: had that been the intention, nothing prevented him from repeating his stabs. The Code does not define attempt : it is true that the title of section 307 cannot modify the plain grammatical meaning of the words of the section itself, but in applying the section regard should be had both to the title and the body of the section. The ordinary meaning of attempt is that an act falls short of its intended result owing to some extraneous cutting short, miscal culation, or unknown factor. Here none of these causes of failure of intention was present. The presumption is that a man intends the natural and probable consequences of his act: but that presumption, except in exceptional cases, does not extend to consequences which have not occurred. Here the man having recovered, the injury was not sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, and I see no reason in this case to presume that he intended anything beyond inflicting the injury which in fact he did inflict‑namely an injury which was not sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. It is not necessary, for me to discuss whether sufficiency to cause death is a matter of pure fact as held by the Supreme Court of India in Virsa Singh's case (AIR 1958 S C 465), or is a matter of intention as appears to be contemplated by the last sentence of illustration (b) to section 300, P. P. C. For if the former proposition is correct, then the intention in clause thirdly is qualified by the condition that in fact the injury must be sufficient, while if the latter proposition is correct, then I hold that that intention is not proved. The result therefore is that the convictions under section 307, P. P. C. are set aside, and in lieu thereof the appellant is con victed under section 326, P. P. C. and section 324, P. P. C., and sentenced to concurrent sentences of 5 years' and 4 years' R. I. S. B./A. H. Conviction altered.