1971 PLC 179 (PLP)

(2) The Provincial Government shall, within a period of one month from the receipt of the copies of the award or decision, publish it in the official Gazette. (3) Any party aggrieved by an award given under section (1) may prefer an appeal to the Labour Appellate Tribunal with in thirty days of the delivery thereof and the decision of the Tribunal in such appeal shall be final. (4) All decisions of a Labour Court, other than awards referred, to in subsection (3) of this section, and -referred to in subsection (3) of section 36, shell be final and not be called in question in any manner by or before any Court or other authority. Section

38. Labour Appellate. Tribunal. -(1) The tribunal shall consist of one member to be appointed by the provincial Government by notification in the official Gazette: (2) The member of the Tribunal shall be a person who is or has been a Judge of a High Court, and shall be appointed on such terms and conditions as Government may determine. (3) The Tribunal may, on appeal, confirm, set aside, vary or modify the award, and shall exercise all the powers con ferred by this Ordinance on the Court, save as otherwise provided. The decision of the Tribunal shall be delivered as expeditiously as possible, within a period of sixty days follow ing the filing of the appeal; provided that such decision shall not be rendered invalid by reason of any, delay in its delivery. (4) The Tribunal shall follow such procedure as may be prescribed. (5) The Tribunal shall have authority to punish for contempt s of its authority, or that of any Labour Court subject to its appellate jurisdiction, as if it were a High Court. (6) Any person convicted and sentenced by the Tribunal under subsection (5) to imprisonment for any period, or to pay a fine exceeding fifty rupees may prefer an, appeal to the High Court. From the perusal of the above sections I find that this Court can only confirm, set aside, vary or modify an award A given by the Labour Court. It is nowhere mentioned that the same applies to a decision of the Labour Court, hence no appeal will lie against the decision of the Labour Court The learned Representative of the appellants, however, contend ed that an order passed under section 34 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 is an award and not a decision and therefore this Court has jurisdiction to entertain these appeal. Section 34 reads as follows: "Application to Labour Court Any party to an industrial dispute relating to a matter arising out of any right guaran teed or secured to an employer or workman by or under any law for the time being in force or settlement may apply to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute." According to the above section a party to an industrial dispute can apply to the Labour Court for adjudication of a dispute regarding a matter arising out of any right guaranteed or secured to an employer or workman by or under any laws for the time being in force or an award or settlement. Thus this section makes a distinction between an indus trial dispute and a dispute arising out of that industrial dispute. A party cannot move the Labour Court under section 3 to bring an industrial dispute; therefore, the decision of the Court regarding a dispute arising out of an industrial can only be termed as a decision and not an award. It mentioned that the decision of the Labour Court will be treated an award as is mentioned in section 38 of the West Pakistan Industrial Dispute Ordinance, 1968. The learned Representative of the appellants in support of his contention also cited a decision by the Appellate Tribunal West Pakistan, in the case Kohl Noor Silk Mills Workers' Union v. Messrs Kohl Noor Silk Mills Limited, Karachi (1970 P L C 336), wherein it was held that a decision under section 4 of tile Ordinance would be an award. I have gone through this decision and find that no reasons have been given in arriving at this decision. The learned Member of the Appellate Tribunal after reproducing subsections (3) and (4) of section 37 of the Industrial Disputes Ordinance, 1969, straightaway made the following observation: "The accepted position is that a decision under section 34 of the Ordinance would be an award while that under sec tion 45 of the Ordinance would be a decision." With due respects I beg to differ with the aforementioned, decision. In view of the above I find no force in the contention' of the learned Representative. Since all these appeals are against the decisions of the Labour Court passed under section 34 of the Ordinance, this Court will have no jurisdiction to entertain them. In the result all these appeals are dismissed in limine.