1989 PLP 3044 (MLD)
ASGHAR ALL-Petitioner Versus ADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE and others — Respondents
| Citation | 1989 PLP 3044 (MLD) |
| Forum / Court | Lahore |
| Bench Members | Falak Sher, J |
| Parties | ASGHAR ALL-Petitioner Versus ADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE and others — Respondents |
| Primary Law | (a) Muslim Family Laws Ordinance (VIII of 1961), (b) Constitution of Pakistan (1973) |
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 1989 PLP 3044 (MLD)?
This judgment primarily cites: (a) Muslim Family Laws Ordinance (VIII of 1961), (b) Constitution of Pakistan (1973) as referenced in Pakistani case law index.
Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 1989 PLP 3044 (MLD)?
The case was heard and decided by the Lahore bench comprising: Falak Sher, J.
Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?
Cite this legal precedent as: 1989 PLP 3044 (MLD) (ASGHAR ALL-Petitioner Versus ADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE and others — Respondents). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.
Laws Cited
Representation
- Nasrullah Khan for Petitioner.
Headnotes / Summary
S.10--Suit for recovery of dower--Wife, whose marriage was dissolved on ground of Khula, filed suit for recovery of dower amount--Husband contested suit, by producing document alleged to have been executed by wife, contending that wife had relinquished her claim in respect of dower amount--Alleged document having been proved to be spurious and manufactured one, no credence thus could be attached to same--Suit for recovery of dower amount for payment of which husband had voluntarily agreed at time of Nikah, was rightly decreed by Court.
Art.199--Constitutional jurisdiction, exercise of--Concurrent findings of fact, recorded by two Courts below, held, would not call for any interference in Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court.
Judgment & Decree
(5) Whether the defendant imputed adultery to the plaintiff? OPP (6) Whether the defendant compelled the plaintiff to lead immoral life? OPP (7) Whether the dower of Rs.35,000 alongwith ornaments weighing 4-1/2 tolas has not been paid to the plaintiff? OPP (8) Whether the agreement dated 20-4-1987 was validly executed? OPD (8/A) Whether the defendant is entitled to decree for restitution of conjugal rights? OPD (8/B) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to decree for dissolution of marriage on the basis of khula? If so, on what terms and conditions? OPP (9) Relief.
2. The learned trial Court on the basis of evidence adduced by the parties, while deciding issues Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 against the respondent, and issues Nos. 7, 8 and 8-A against the petitioner, dismissed the latter's suit for restitution of conjugal rights and decreed the respondent's suit for dissolution of marriage on the ground of khula, as well as the suit for recovery of dower amount of Rs. 25,000 vide judgment dated 5-5-1988. Against which though petitioner preferred two appeals, but during the course of arguments, appeal emanating out of the suit for restitution of conjugal rights was not pressed while the appeal against judgment and decree awarding dower was dismissed on merits, side the impugned judgment dated 18-12-1988, hence the present petition.
3. It is contended that evidence has been misread by both the Courts below regarding the dower amount, which should have been treated as consideration for khula; and, lastly, the amount of dower is too excessive.
4. With the assistance of the learned counsel, I have gone through the entire evidence that has been placed on record. The respondent's evidence is comprised of four witnesses, viz. Abdul Ghani PWl, Khushi Muhammad PW2, Allah Ditta PW 3, while she herself appeared as PW
4. In her testimony the respondent categorically deposed that at the time of Nikah, dower was fixed both in cash and kind, i.e. Rs. 25,000 cash and 4-1/2 Tolas of jewellery worth Rs.10,
000. She further testified that initially the parties lived together for 2 days, whereafter she went to her parental place and upon return she spent 5 or 6 days, during which period petitioner manifested intense disliking towards her, by saying that she is neither a "male or female", thus would not like to keep her, instead showed inclination to marry her sister. That during this period, petitioner, at pistol point, procured her thumb-impression on a document Ex. D-I tending to depict relinquishment of her claim to dower of Rs. 25,000, whereafter she was turned out of the matrimonial home while all valuables and articles of jewellery were retained by the petitioner. The respondent was corroborated on material particulars by the remaining witnesses.
5. On the other hand, petitioner in addition to his own testimony produced Ibrar Hussain DW 1 and Muhammad Shaft DW
2. The former deposed that 2; 3 weeks after the marriage at the instance of the parties, he drew up Ex.D-I, while, the latter denying the allegations levelled against the petitioner stated that it is possible for the parties to live together as spouses. The petitioner deposed that the respondent has already received the dower in kind viz. 4-1/2 Tolas of jewellery, whereas claim to dower in cash has been relinquished by virtue of Ex.D-I. 5-A. Since petitioner's stance of having already paid the dower in kind stands categorically rebutted by the respondent in unequivocal terms, therefore, learned counsel did not press this argument any further.
6. The contention as to relinquishment of the respondent's. right to dower of Rs.25,000 does not inspire confidence. The sheet-anchor of this argument hinges around Ex. D-I, which seems to be a conveniently manufactured document, inter alia, for the reasons, that Ibrar Hussain DW-1 claiming to be the author thereof has deposed that it was drawn up 2/3 weeks after the marriage, while, according to the date inscribed therein it was executed on 20-4-1986 i.e. within a week of the marriage. Not only that, but also, even the venue of its execution is in controversy viz. according to the respondent, her thumb impression was procured by the petitioner at pistol point in the house, whereas Ibrar Hussain DW-1, claimed that it was executed at his place; while the other marginal witness has not been produced. Independent thereof, it is insufficiently stamped. Furthermore, since the matrimonial cordiality between the parties only subsisted for a couple of days, therefore, it does not appeal to reason that the respondent, during currency of estranged relationship would have voluntarily executed the deed of relinquishment. Therefore, in my opinion, it appears to be a spurious document and no credence could be attached to the same.
7. Regarding the last contention as to excessiveness of the dower amount, it suffices to mention that, admittedly, petitioner, having voluntarily agreed thereto at the time of the Nikah, cannot be allowed to reprobate the same at this juncture. In -view of the aforegoing, concurrent findings of facts recorded by the two Courts below do not call for any interference in this extraordinary jurisdiction. There is no merit in the petition which is dismissed in limine. H.B.T./A-645/L Petition dismissed.