1984 PLP 1692 (PLC)

MUHAMMAD ZAHOORUL HAQ, J.‑

This petition is directed against the order, dated 5th May, 1979 passed by Sind Labour Appellate Tribunal. The relevant facts are that on 12th March, 1966 a settlement was made between the petitioners and the respondent No. 2 whereby in clause (1) it was provided that there would be an increase in existing salaries of the staff at the rate of 25% according to their categories, and in clause (2) it was provided that the Company will review the existing pay scales of the staff which shall be binding upon the Union and lastly in para. (21)(c) it was stipulated that the Settlement shall come into force w. e. f. 1st January, 1976 etc. The pay scales were accordingly revised on 14th February, 1977. Dispute arose between the parties as to from what date the revised pay scales were to be enforced and the matter was taken to the Labour Appel late Tribunal, in reference under section 50 of Industrial Relations Ordi nance, who held that the Settlement was to come into effect from lst January, 1976 and hence the pay scales revised on 14th February, 1977 were given effect from 1st January, 1976. Subsequent to that two other disputes arose. One was as to what should be the percentage of increase in salary as contemplated in clause (1) of the Settlement and the other was that the increment which was to be given on 1st January, 1976 should be on the basis of the revised pay scales which were announced on 14th February, 1977 and were made effective by the Labour Court from 1st January, 1976 and not 'on the basis of the salary or scale of pay drawn by the Staff on 31st December, 1975. The petitioner took those two disputes before the. Labour Appellate Tribunal again under section 50 of I.R.O., 1969. In respect of the first dispute the respondent No.1 has held that the percentage of the increase in the existing scale was contemplated as tentative till the final pay scale was revised which was done nearly a year after the settlement. In respect of the second dispute of increment the Labour Appellate Tribunal held that the increment is never allowed in advance but it was always given at the end of the year of service and it could not be allowed at the beginning of the year before the employee has actually served for the year. Mr. Shibli learned counsel for the petitioner had submitted that the increase in salary according to 25% and 23% as agreed in the Settlement should have been allowed on the salary revised on 14th February, 1977 made effective from 1st January, 1977. However, when it was pointed out to the learned counsel that the Labour Appellate Tribunal had taken the correct view that the increase in the salary in clause (1) of the agreement was merely tentative and that the revision of pay scale on 14th February, 1977 and enforced from Ist January, 1976 was the final determination of the salary and therefore, the petitioner could not have any grievance on this score, thereupon the learned counsel fairly conceded that the order of the Appellate Tribunal in this respect was just. We ourselves are of the opinion that the view that the percentage of the increase in the existing scale in paragraph I was merely a tentative increase subject to the revision of the pay scales as provided in clause II of the Settlement and therefore, once the pay scales were revised, there could not be a question of increase in the salary again after the revision of the pay scales. Mr. Shibli contended that at least the increment in the salary should be based upon the salary which has been made effective from 1st January, 1976 and not on the salary which was paid on 31st December, 1975. The counsel elaborated that since the pay applicable to the staff on 31st December, 1976 did not exist on 1st January, 1976 therefore, the annual increment should be based on the scales of pay made applicable by the Labour Appellate Tribunal from 1st January, 1976 which were proposed by the respondent No. 2 on 14th February, 1977. The argument appears to be attractive that increased pay which is made effective from 1st January, 1976 should be the basis of the increment in the salary of the staff. But the difficulty is that in the first instance there was no settlement in respect of the basis of annual increment which had to be allowed by the management and therefore, there was hardly a dispute in respect of the settlement of 12th March, 1976 which could be resorted to by the Labour Appellate Tribunal. Moreover the word `Existing' in clause (I) as well as clause (II) of the settlement shows that the increase in salary as well as the revision of the pay scales was to be in respect of the salary which was existing on 12th March, 1976 and since the increment had already been allowed to the staff on 1st January, 1976 on the basis of the pay scales and this increment bad been drawn by the staff for the whole of the year 1976, therefore, there could be no basis for asking for an increase in the increment on the basis of the pay scales introduced on 14th February, 1977 and made effective from 1st January, 1976 by the Labour Appellate Tribunal. An increment which had been allowed on 1st January, 1976 could not be allowed to be increased again on 14th February, 1977 after the pay scales bad been revised and that too one and a half months after the last pay with increment after for the year 1976 had been drawn on 31st December, 11976. It appears to us that the Labour Tribunal had made a just and equitable order in this case although the reason given was not exactly correct. The petitioners were demanding the annual increment on the basis of the work that they had done in the previous year upto 31st December, 1975 and they were not demanding any advance increment. However, the effect of the order impugned is correct and the petition cannot be sustained as explained by us in this para. above. Mr. Nizam Ahmad for the respondent No. 2 had relied upon P L D 1974 S C 139 where it was held that a Tribunal having jurisdiction to decide a matter is competent to decide it rightly or wrongly and mere fact that decision is incorrect does not render the decision as "without lawful authority". Mr. Shibli on the other hand had pointed out that in P L D 1967 S C 513 it was held that construing of laws and legal instruments of all kinds was a special and peculiar responsibility of the superior Courts and that petition on the basis of wrong interpretation could be competent. He also relies upon P L D 1979 Kar. 709 where it was held that a High Court can review an order based on erroneous interpretation. However, in the present case before us it has not been established that the final effect) of the order of the learned Appellate Tribunal was wrong. The petition was, therefore, dismissed by us without any order as to .:.oats on 22nd March, 1984. A. E. Petition dismissed.