2010 PLP 1530 (MLD)

SHAHID HAMEED DAR, J

This is an application for cancellation of bail under section 497(5), Cr.P.C. allowed to Abdul Latif respondent No.1 on 27-3-2010 passed by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Gojra, District Toba Tek Singh.

2. The brief facts of case F.I.R. No. 182 of 2010 dated 27-3-2010, under section 406, P.P.C., registered at Police Station Gojra, as stated by Muhammad Ilyas complainant, are that he worked as a technician on the power looms of Abdul Latif respondent No.1 who tempted him to join his business as a partner and he would "pay monthly profit of Rs.10,000 against an investment of Rs.100,000, whereupon, the complainant invested Rs.55,000 with him besides, transferring a plot worth Rs.55,000 in the name of respondent No.1, who left Pakistan after about 25/26 days, for a foreign country and returned to Pakistan after about one year; the petitioner-complainant contacted him and asked for return of his invested amount and the aforesaid plot but he despite having admitted his guilt in presence of the witnesses, had done nothing so far, to return the aforementioned property to the petitioner and ultimately, flatly refused to fulfil his promise; respondent No.1 had been extending threats of murder and also that of setting ablaze the house of the petitioner and his family members.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the learned Addl. Sessions Judge has granted pre-arrest bail to respondent No.1, without adverting to the facts of this case; the respondent-accused had failed to point out any mala fide intention or ulterior motive on the part of the complainant; that the evidence of extra-judicial confession had not been taken into consideration and the respondent-accused had been allowed bail in gross violation of the settled principles governing the subject; that the petitioner had filed a suit for specific performance against respondent-accused for seeking a decree to urge respondent-accused to act upon the aforementioned agreement; that a Punchayat was also convened to settle the dispute between the petitioner and the respondent-accused and the arbitrators passed a decision that the respondent-accused would return Rs.55,000 to the petitioner and also abandon the house, built on the aforesaid plot in favour of Muhammad Latif petitioner but the said arbitration/decision had not been attended to by the learned bail granting Court; that the respondent-accused had committed a criminal breach of trust under section 406, P.P.C. as well as the offences under sections 420, 506, P.P.C.; that the impugned order has been passed in a slipshod manner and it suffers from non-reading and misreading of relevant record; that the respondent- accused had been extending threats to the petitioner as he has been encouraged by the impugned order and thus, misused the concession of bail.

4. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and have perused the impugned order as well as the documents submitted by the petitioner with this application.

5. I find that no date, time and place has been mentioned by the petitioner as to when and where he allegedly invested Rs.55,000 with respondent-accused and he also failed to mention the names of the witnesses in this regard. So far as attestation of a sale deed by the petitioner in favour of respondent-accused is concerned, no such document could be submitted or pointed at by the petitioner; that after the alleged agreement of partnership, the respondent-accused left Pakistan for abroad and returned after one year but the petitioner, strangely, did not initiate any proceedings against him which reflects upon the contention of the petitioner. Besides, no specific date, time and place could be pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner as to the extension of the alleged threats of murder, etc. by the respondent-accused to the petitioner; that the impugned order passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Gojra indicates that plaint of the suit for specific performance filed by the petitioner did not entail the factum of alleged partnership, desertion of the respondent-accused to a foreign country or other allied details. In this situation, it has been rightly held in the impugned order that the case against accused (respondent No.1) is one of further inquiry as the parties were already locked in litigation.

6. The considerations for seeking cancellation of bail are altogether different from the one, required for grant/refusal of bail to an accused. Once the accused has been admitted to bail by a competent Court of jurisdiction, extraordinary circumstances are required to be shown to interfere in the said order. A bald allegation has been levelled by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the respondent-accused had been extending threats of dire consequences, after, he had been allowed pre-arrest bail but no evidence has been produced to establish that the offence of criminal intimidation allegedly committed by the respondent-accused had been reported to the police or to any Court of law. The impugned order does not suffer from any illegal defect and it has been passed in accordance with law. The long unexplained period of silence on the part of the petitioner coupled with the fact that he failed to mention the aforesaid allegations in his suit for specific performance and withdrawal of the said suit by the petitioner, are the circumstances, which hint at the mala fide intention of the complainant.

7. For what has been discussed above, I do not find that the impugned order calls for any interference by this Court. The instant cancellation petition is dismissed in limine. N.H.Q/M-336/L Petition dismissed.