P L D 1965 Dacca 361 (PLP)

ASIR, J.‑--This Rule arises out of an order ) f ad interim injunction subsequently made absolute as passed by the learned Munsiff in O/C Suit No. 94 of 1963 which was filed by the plaintiff petitioner for a declaration that the vote of no‑confidence passed against him as Chairman of Bagmara Union Committee on 18‑7‑63 was without jurisdiction, illegal and void. The suit seems to have been instituted on 22‑7‑63 and on 23‑7‑63 after giving an order for issuing a notice upon the defendants to show cause within three days from the date of service thereof why the injunction as prayed for should not be issued, granted an order of ad interim injunction as otherwise in his opinion the purpose of injunction was likely to be frustrated; In the usual course that is on 9‑9‑63 the ad interim order of injunction was made absolute after hearing the parties. Upon two appeals preferred by the respective parties the learned Additional District Judge virtually agreed with the learned Munsiff that there was some arguable case in favour of the plaintiff but in view of non‑compliance with the requirements of section 3 of Civil Procedure and Limitation (Amendment) Ordinance, 1961 (Ordinance IX of 1961) the learned Additional District Judge following a decision of this Court to which one of us was a party in the case of Dr. Ahad AU Khan and others v. Enayetullah Mandal and others (P L D 1964 Dacca 624), held that the initial ad interim order of injunction was without jurisdiction and as such the plaintiff was not entitled to get any order for temporary injunction. The appeals were allowed and the order dated 9m9‑63 as passed by the learned Munsiff was set aside. It is against the said order of the learned Additional District Judge dated 30‑5‑64 that the present Rule has been obtained. Mr. Subhan contends that both the Courts below having practically found that there was an arguable case in favour of the plaintiff, the order for temporary injunction as made absolute by the learned Munsiff ought to have been maintained and the learned Additional District Judge acted illegally in applying the principle underlying the provisions of section 3 of the said Ordinance. He, however, submits that he is agreeable to have an early hearing of the suit itself. Mr. Khan appearing for some of the contesting opposite-parties, however, contends that non‑compliance with the requirements of section 3 of the said Ordinance goes to the root of the case and it cannot be brought within the ambit of the proviso thereunder. On 23‑7‑63 when the application for temporary injunction was pressed before the learned Munsiff he actually ordered issuance of notice upon the defendants to show cause within three days from the date of service thereof why the injunction as prayed for should not be issued. After doing that the learned Munsiff gave a further order to the following effect:‑ "In the meantime as the purpose of injunction is likely to be frustrated issue ad interim injunction as prayed for. Requisites at once." This shows that the learned Munsiff intended to bring the present case within the ambit of the proviso under section 3 of the said Ordinance. He has, however, given no reasons as to how the purpose of injunction was likely to be frustrated. There is nothing to suggest that there would be any delay. There is nothing also to suggest that the principle or rule of balance of convenience or inconvenience would go against the plaintiff if injunctions were not granted. In fact it does not appear from any part of the records nor it seems to be the case of the plaintiff‑petitioner that he has got any personal interest in the subject‑matter of the suit. It is quite possible that he might be inspired to do some philan thropic work by means of claiming his right of office as Chairman in a particular Union Council. But in matters of temporary injunction one of the guiding principles as laid down in section 56(k) of the Specific Relief Act is that the applicant should have some personal interest in the matter. The learned Munsiff while issuing ad interim injunction has not indicated as to whether the plaintiff had any personal interest in the matter and if so whether such interest would suffer in the event of not issuing an order of ad interim injunction immediately. We do not feel so sure that while considering whether the object of granting injunction would be defeated by delay, if any, the principle underlying section 56 (k) of the Specific Relief Act or the rule of balance of convenience and inconvenience spay, be ignored. For all these reasons we are inclined to think that there is no error in the exercise of jurisdiction on the part of the learned Additional District Judge in so far he thought that non -compliance with the requirements of section 3 of the said Ordinance would stand in the way of granting an order of temporary injunction. We are, however, not unmindful of the fact that there are serious questions to be agitated and considered in the suit itself. Mr. Subhan is desirous of having an early hearing of the suit. The learned Senior Government Pleader as also Mr. Khan appearing for some of the opposite‑parties are agreeable to have the suit disposed of as early as possible. At the learned Advocates suggest that the suit may conveniently be heard and disposed of within two months from the date of intimation to the parties' lawyers about the arrival of the records. We are also inclined to think that subject to the convenience of the Court this suit should be heard on merits and disposed of within two months from the date of intimation to the parties' lawyers about the arrival of the records in the trial Court and we direct accordingly. Subject to the direction as indicated above this Rule is discharged with no order as to costs. SALAHUDDIN AHMED, J.‑‑-I agree. K. B. A. Rule discharged.