PLD 1969

P L D 1969 Supreme Court 57 (PLP)

ZAMIRUDDIN AHMAD‑ — Appellant Versus HAVAS KHAN‑ — Respondent

Jurisdiction / Court
Decided Date
Civil Appeal No. K‑15 of 1966, decided on 24th January 1969.
Honorable Judges
Muhammad Yaqub Ali and Abdus Sattar, JJ
Case Reference Summary (AEO Optimized)
Citation P L D 1969 Supreme Court 57 (PLP)
Forum / Court
Bench Members Muhammad Yaqub Ali and Abdus Sattar, JJ
Parties ZAMIRUDDIN AHMAD‑ — Appellant Versus HAVAS KHAN‑ — Respondent
💡 Quick Legal QA & Summary / سوال و جواب خلاصہ
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in P L D 1969 Supreme Court 57 (PLP)?

This judgment primarily cites: statutory provisions as referenced in Pakistani case law index.

Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case P L D 1969 Supreme Court 57 (PLP)?

The case was heard and decided by the bench comprising: Muhammad Yaqub Ali and Abdus Sattar, JJ.

Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?

Cite this legal precedent as: P L D 1969 Supreme Court 57 (PLP) (ZAMIRUDDIN AHMAD‑ — Appellant Versus HAVAS KHAN‑ — Respondent). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.

Representation

  • Iqbal H. Kazi, Advocate Supreme Court instructed by K. A. Ghani for Appellant.
  • Date of hearing: 13th January 1969.

Headnotes / Summary

(On appeal from the judgment and order of the High Court of West Pakistan, Karachi Bench, Karachi, dated the 17th August 1964, in Civil Revision Application No. 370 of 1963). (a) Interpretation of statutes‑Word susceptible to more than one meaning‑Resort to other word, with which ambiguous word associated, permissible for ascertaining meaning. When two or more words which are susceptible of analogous meaning are coupled together noscuntur a sociis, they are understood to be used in their cogent sense. They take, as it were their colour from each other, that is the more general is restricted to sense analogous to the less general. The word "contracts" in subsection (1), section B, Part I of Schedule to the Conciliation Courts Ordinance, 1961, has been used along with other words "receipts or other documents". The context in which the word "contracts" has been used in the said provi sion, therefore, can be said to indicate written contracts only. Maxwell on "Interpretation of Statutes", 10th Edn., p. 332 ref. (b) Conciliation Courts Ordinance (XLIV of 1961), S. 3(1)(a) read with Sch., Part I, Section B‑Expression "suits for the recovery of money due on contracts" in Section B, Part 1 of Schedule‑Word "contracts" contemplates only written contracts Suit founded on oral contracts‑Not hit by provision of S. 3(l)(a). Where the question was whether the word "contrasts" in subsection (1), section B, Part I of Schedule to the Concilia tion Courts Ordinance. 1961, includes both oral and written contracts: Held, the word "contracts" in subsection (1), section B of Part I of the Schedule to the Conciliation Courts Ordinance, 1961, has been used along with words receipts or other documents". There are authorities for the proposition that "when two or more words which are susceptible of analogous meaning are coupled together noscuntur a sociis, they are understood to be used in their cogent sense". "They take, as it were their colour from each other, that is, the more general is restricted to a sense analogous to the less general". Therefore, the context in which the word contracts has been used in the said provision clearly indicates that written contracts are only meant. Muhammad Nurul Islam alias Yurm Islam v. Anent Rain Sarma P L D 1965 Dacca 288 and Reference No. I of 1965 P L D 1966 Dacca i65 not approved. Respondent in person (absent).

Judgment & Decree

ABDUS SATTAR, J.

Leave to appeal was granted in this case to consider whether the word "contracts" occurring; in Part t, Section B of the Conciliation Courts Ordinance, 1961 means "written contracts" only and does not include "oral contracts". The respondent filed a suit in the Small Causes Court, Karachi against the appellant for the recovery of a sum of Rs. 60J due to him as salary in connection with the services rendered by him to the appellant. The suit was decreed ex parte and the respon dent applied for execution of the decree. The appellant filed an objection claiming that the decree had been passed without jurisdiction and therefore was a nullity. The contention raised was that as the claim of the respondent was based on a contract and the same was for an amount less than Rs. 1,000, the Small Causes Court, Karachi, had no jurisdiction to entertain it in view of section (3) (1) (a) read with Part I, Section B of the Conciliation Courts Ordinance. The learned Judge, Small Causes Court, Karachi, rejected the contention of the appellant on the ground that the claim made in the suit being founded on an oral contract the same did not come within the; mischief of the provision of the. Conciliation Courts Ordinance referred to above. The learned Judge came to the conclusion that the words "suits for the; recovery of money due on contracts, receipts or other docu ments" occurring in Part T, Section 0 of the Schedule to the Ordinance clearly‑ indicate that the contracts contemplated therein are written contracts. This interpretation found favour with a learned Single Judge of the High Court of West Pakistan, who dismissed the revision application filed by the appellant against the decision of the learned Judge, Small Causes Court, Karachi. Section B of Part I of the Schedule relates to civil case. Subsection (1) of the said section gives jurisdiction in respect of "suit for the recovery of money due on contracts, receipts or other documents" to the Union Council if the amount claimed does not exceed Rs. 500 and to the Union and Town Committees when tile amount claimed does not exceed Rs. 1,

000. It is therefore, evident that if the claim in question fell within sub section (1) of section 13 then the Small Causes Court at Karachi had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The question that arises, therefore, is whether the word "contracts" in the said subsection includes both oral and written contracts or written contracts only as has been held by the Courts below. The learned counsel for the appellant has contended that as there is no qualifying word before the word "contracts" in the provision in question and further as contract within the meaning of the Contract Act means both oral and written contracts, the Courts below were wrong in taking the view that only written contracts were meant in the provision in question. The word "contracts" has been used along with "receipts or other docu ments". There are authorities for the proposition that "when' two or more words which are susccptih1c of analogous meaning are coupled together noscanture a soeiis they arc. understood to be used in their cogent sense". "They take, as it were their A colour from each other, that is, the more general is restricted to a sense analogous to the less general". (See Maxwell on The Interpretation of Statutes, 10th Edition p. 332). Crawford in the Construction of Statutes, p. 325 says :‑ "In order to ascertain the meaning of any word or phrase that is ambiguous or susceptible to more than one meaning, the Court may properly resort to the other words with which the ambiguous word is associated in the statute. Accordingly, if several words are connected by a copulative conjunction a presumption arises that they are of the same class, unless, of course, a contrary intention is indicated." The learned counsel for the appellant has drawn our attention to two decisions of the East Pakistan High Court wherein suits based on oral contracts were found to be exclusively triable by Conciliation Court. These decisions are reported as Muhammad Nurul Islam alias Nurul Islam v. Anant Ram Sarma (P L D 1965 Dacca 288) and Civil Reference No. 1 of 1965 (P L D 1966 Dacca 465). We may point out that in these cases the question whether the word "contracts" in subsection (1) of Section B of Part I of the Schedule includes both oral and written contracts were not specifically raised. I our view the context in which the word contracts has been used in the said provision clearly indicates that written contracts are only meant. During the hearing of this appeal it occurred to us that it was not perhaps permissible for the appellant to challenge the decree in the execution proceedings on the ground taken by him. As, however, this question was not raised in the Courts below and the respondent did riot appeal before us we do not think it is necessary to decide this point in this case. In the result the appeal is dismissed but as the respondent has not appeared there will be no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.