P L D 1969 Supreme Court 582 (PLP)

SAJJAD AHMAD, J.‑In this appeal by special leave the dispute relates to a plot of `Bhada Land' (an unalienated Government Land) bearing Survey No. 634 measuring 1.26 acres situated in village Chakarwah on the right bank of a minor canal called Dakhi. The appellant claimed the grant of this land in `Mohagdar Rights' being owner of 5 acres and 8 ghuntas of land in Survey Nos. 483 and 637 in the same village, the former being contiguous to the `Bhada Land` in question. The Barrage Mukhtiarkar accepted the appellant's claim on payment of full rates, notwithstanding the objection as regards the smallness of the appellant's holding being less than a subsistence holding which was condoned by the Assistant Revenue Officer. In the records‑of‑rights between 1956 and 1961 Survey No. 634 continued to be 'recorded as an unalienated Government Land appearing in the khata of the appellant as its Mohagdar and the land revenue for it was also being realised from him which he paid for the period between 1955‑

59. On the 27th of January 1960, the appellant was informed that the disputed land had been granted to Fakir Muhammad, respondent, in the year 1956, who had also claimed it as a Mohagdar on the basis of his ownership of lands bearing Survey Nos. 856/1 and 856/2 situated in Deh Bellawah on the left bank of Dakhi Canal. It appears that the grant in his favour was made on the 17th of May 1956, by the Assistant Revenue Officer without any notice or offer to the appellant. The appellant represented against it to the Colonization Officer, Sukkur Barrage, on which he was advised to file a proper appeal, which he did before the Additional Commissioner, Khairpur, who dismissed it on the 28th of July 1961, on the main ground that this land had already been granted to Fakir Muhammad in 1956 anti that it was not proper to disturb him after three years. The learned Additional Commissioner, however, remarked in his order that according to the sketch, the `Bhada Land' in question was in the `Mohag' of Survey No. 483 which belonged to the appellant. It was also pointed out that in the case of `Bhada Land' the Mohagdars were necessarily to be consulted, but it appears that in this case the appellant was not consulted by the Barrage Office either by design or by negligence. The appellant then filed a revision petition before a Member, Board of Revenue, West Pakistan, which was summarily rejected on the 31st of March 1962 in limine, without any notice or hearing afforded to the appellant. The appellant learnt about the fate of his revision on the 14th of April 1963, when he was informed by a letter of the Reader to the learned Member, Board of Revenue, in response to his application, dated the 8th of April 1963, to know the result of the Revision, that it had been dismissed on the 28th of March 1962. The appellant, thereafter, filed a review petition before the Board of Revenue within 90 days of his knowledge of the revisional order as intimated to him by the Reader to the Member, Board of Revenue. The review petition was dismissed by Mr. A. M. Khan Leghari, Member, Board of Revenue, on the 21st of August 1964, on the ground that it was time‑barred having been filed beyond the period of limitation of 90 days from the date of the order as provided by section 8 (2) of the Board of Revenue Act. It was stated that the limitation runs from the date of the order and not from the date of the communication of the order. Another reason for the dismissal of the Review as contained in the order is that the respondent, Fakir Muhammad claimed to have expended a large sum of money in reclaiming the Thada Land' and it was not proper to disturb him at that stage. The learned Member also mentioned that in his interim orders, dated the 5th of October 1963, 30th of January 1964, and the 19th of March 1964, he had dealt with several unsatisfactory features of this case, including the fact that the appellant had preferential `Mohag Rights' to the disputed `Bhada Land' and that the respondent had surreptitiously obtained the grant in his favour in violation of the stringent Government instructions that all Bihada pieces of this type should be given to Mohagdars after wide publicity. The learned Member, Board of Revenue has further observed as follows :‑ "Had I dealt with this case in appeal or revision I would have set aside the grant in the respondent's favour and accepted the petitioner's prayer. Since this is a review application, I do not feel that interference is called for." The appellant challenged the decision of the Revenue Authorities by a Writ Petition under Article 98 of the Constitution which was summarily dismissed for the reason shat the Additional Commissioner had refused to give this land to the appellant as he did not have a. "subsistance holding" even inclusive of the land in question, if it were granted to him. The High Court did not consider that it was a fit case for its interference after a lapse of almost 9 years, merely because that no publicity was made to invite offers in respect of this land. Leave to appeal was granted by this Court on the 9th of December 1965, to consider the correctness of the order of the learned Member, Board of Revenue holding the review petition to be barred by time, although it was within time, if the starting point of limitation was to be taken from the date of the appellant's knowledge of the order. The scope of the powers of the Member, Board of Revenue in the exercise of review jurisdiction also required an examination. On the question of limitation it was submitted by the learned counsel that the appellant had learnt about the decision of his revision petition from the intimation received from the Reader to the learned Member, on the 14th/15th of April 1963, in response to his application; dated the 8th of April 1963, submitted in this behalf. At the conclusion of the arguments we asked the learned counsel to file a copy of the aforesaid application. He has now submitted a petition saying that the copy has not been furnished as the original application is missing from the record of the revision petition. The formal application form for a copy which has been submitted along with the petition contains a remark by the Officer Incharge of the Copying Agency that some of the pages of revision file are missing. It cannot, however, be denied that the Reader to the learned Member, Board of Revenue, in his letter, referred to above (copy placed on the record), acknowledged the receipt of appellant's application and had informed him in response thereto, that his revision petition was dismissed on the 28th of March 1962. It is clear from this circumstances that the appellant did not know about the result of his revision petition which was decided behind his back until the intimation received from the Reader on the 28th of March 1963. His review application brought within 90 days from that date was, therefore, within tinge In a case where a litigant is kept in dark about the fate of his case, it is wrong to say that for a remedial action against it as provided by law, time would start, to run against him from the date of the order and not from the date when he comes to know about it. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the appellant's review petition was wrongly dismissed as time‑barred and that the learned Judges of the High Court have not taken this fact into consideration while dismissing the Writ Petition of the appellant. They have on the contrary imported an extraneous consideration in dismissing the Writ Petition on the basis of the uneconomic holding of the appellant although as observed earlier this objection about the smallness of his holding had been overruled by the Assistant Commissioner when the appellant's officer of tire grant of the disputed land to him on full rates was accepted by him. We are, therefore, of the view that the appellant was unlawfully deprived of his statutory remedy of "Review" as provided by section 8 of the West Pakistan Board of Revenue Act, 1957. In the result we accept this appeal, set aside the order of the High Court as well as of the learned Member, Board of Revenue, dated the 21st of August 1964, with the direction that the learned Member, Board of Revenue will dispose of the appellant's review petition afresh, which will be deemed to be pending before him, as within time, in accordance with law, by giving effect to his powers of review as contained in section 8 of the West Pakistan Board of Revenue Act, already mentionable above, which are exercisable inter alia for correcting any errors or mistake apparent on the face of the record. Costs will follow the event. QADEERUDDIN AHMAD, J.‑I have the advantage of having read the judgment proposed by Sajjad Ahmad, J. and regret to say that I am not able to agree to it.

2. Leave to appeal was granted in this case by a Bench of this Court as follows with the object of examining questions of law: "We are of the opinion that this petition raises several important questions of law as to the scope of the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 98 of the Constitution and as to whether the Revenue Authorities had, in the facts and circumstances of this case acted with lawful authority." Reasons for forming the above opinion are contained in the paragraph which preceded the above passage. They are as follows: "The High Court refused to interfere, even though it vas apparent that the Member, Board of Revenue, hearing the review petition had failed to notice that if limitation for the review petition was calculated from the date of knowledge it was not barred and that, in any event, he had misconceived the scope of powers in review. He had clearly failed to do justice. The High Court also failed to notice that the smallness of the holding of the petitioner had been condoned by the Revenue Authorities themselves and therefore, the Additional Commissioner hearing the appeal was not right in making that a ground for rejecting the same."

3. The facts which form the background are important. The appellant and Fakir Muhammad, who is respondent No. 1, had claimed "Mohag right" in a piece of "Bhada Land" which lies on the right bank of the canal which divides Deh Chakarwah and Deh Bellawah, Taluka Naushehro Feroze. `Mohag' means frontage and 'Mohag Right' means the right to acquire a certain proportion of the land that lies in front of the claimant's land. C `Bhada' means abandoned bank and bed of a canal. `Deh' means village. The appellant is a landlord of Deh Chakarwah and the respondent of Deh Bellawah. In 1956, respondent No. 1 claimed Bhada land in the Mohag of Survey No. 191 and B. No. 856/2‑

3. The claim was for 1.35 acres. It was accepted by the Assistant Revenue Officer on 17‑6‑1956. 1.26 acres of land were therefore, separated from a larger area and given S. No. 634‑See page 32 of the paper‑book. The appellant made no claim until the area was measured, separated and given S. No. 634 in the latter half of 1959‑See para. 3 of the paper‑book. I cannot believe that he was not aware of what was going on until the entire proceedings were completed. After the transaction was over, the appellant made a "Full rate offer" on 30‑9‑1959 which was rejected by the Assistant Revenue Officer on the ground that the land had already been transferred to, respondent No.

1. The appellant appealed to the Colonisation Officer, Sukkur Barrage, Hyderabad who rejected it on 14‑9‑1960‑See the first paragraph of the order on page 32 of the paper‑book. Another appeal of the appellant to the Additional Commissioner was rejected on 28‑7‑1961. The officer considered the offer of the appellant to be unfair and said: "It appears that the appellant registered an offer for the land in question when the S. No. had been got measured by the efforts of the respondent. His offer dated 30‑9‑1959 when the land had already been sanctioned in the name of the respondent in '

56. In fact the Barrage Mukhtiarkar should have been vigilant to see that no offer was recorded for (a) S. No. (which was) not available for disposal."

4. The Additional Commissioner has compared the claims of the parties as follows: "From the latest sketch prepared by the Barrage Officer on 28‑10‑59 it appears that there is a boundary step (stone?) lying between the S. No. of the respondent via. 856/1‑2, and 191 and the Bhada. The land of the respondent also belongs to Deh Bellahwah and (is) not in Deh Chawarwah in which the Bhada is situated though it is on the border of the 2 dehs. The appellant owns land in the same deh in which the Bhada is situated. The area of the Bhada is however small and the appellant has an area of only 5.8 acres. Even if it is granted to him it will be less than a subsistence holding. On the other hand the respondent holds 15.0 acres of lard. (He) has been granted this nearly throe years back." His conclusion was: "It would, therefore, not be feasible to disturb him after so much time. The appellant was not satisfied with the result and sent by post, on 1‑9‑1961 a revision petition dated 12‑8‑1961 to the Board of Revenue, West Pakistan which petition was dismissed in March 1962 by Mr. S. M. Ikram, Member (Land Utilization), Board of Revenue, because in the opinion of the Member "no case" was "made out for interfering with the order of the Additional Commissioner".

5. The appellant's stand about the order is that it was not communicated to him until he made an application about it to the Board of Revenue, in reply to which the Reader of the Member, wrote to him on 15‑4‑1963 as follows: "I am directed to refer to your application dated 8th April 1963, addressed to the Secretary, Board of Revenue, West Pakistan, Lahore and state that your revision petition dated 12‑8‑1961 had already been rejected on 28‑3‑1962 by the learned Member (Land Utilization), Board of Revenue, West Pakistan, Lahore. A copy of the Order had already been sent to you through the Mukhtiarkar Naushahro Feroze." A copy of the application which was sent by the appellant to the Board of Revenue has not been annexed to this appeal so that its contents could be ascertained nor has any stand been taken by the appellant with respect to the statement contained in the above quotation that "a copy of the order had already been sent" to him‑See paragraph 10 of the petition for Leave to Appeal and paragraph 7 of the Concise Statement. Moreover, there is no explanation at all as to why the appellant did not make any inquiry for one year and seven months about the result of his revision petition after posting it in September 1961 until the 8th of April 1963. This part of the appellant's case is the least convincing; therefore, at the conclusion of the arguments of counsel for the appellant, we asked him to produce a copy of the petition which was sent by the appellant to the Board of Revenue, but this has not been done on the excuse that the original petition is missing from the record of the Board of Revenue.

6. Counsel has stated that a review application to the Member (Land Utilization), Board of Revenue, West Pakistan, was made on 1‑5‑1963 which, according to him, was within time because the order in question was received by him on 15‑4‑1963. Mr. A. M. Khan Leghari, Member, Board of Revenue, West Pakistan rejected it on 21‑8‑1964. The reason was that according to him the review application was barred by time and that respondent No. 1 had reclaimed the 13hada land which is an expensive job. Moreover, the app4icant's claim was delayed‑See page 42 of the paper‑book. The Member was angry at the success of respondent No. 1 and wrote: "Had I dealt with this case in appeal or revision I would have set aside the grant in the respondent's favour and accepted the petitioner's prayer. Since this is a review application, I do not feel interference is called for." He, however, found the means of appeasing his anger by ordering that: "the petitioner be made to pay the correct rates for the land. A copy of the order should, however, be forwarded to the C. O. for charge‑sheeting the Barrage Official and for deterrent action for failure to dispose of the Bhada piece, after wide publicity as required in Standing Order No. 10."

7. The appellant was not satisfied with the above decision and filed a petition under Article 98 of the Constitution of 1962 in the High Court of West Pakistan at Karachi. It was summarily dismissed because the High Court agreed with the Additional Commissioner Mr. S. M. Kazi, and Mr. S. M. Ikram, Member of the Board of Revenue, West Pakistan that the present appellant‑ "had merely 5.8 acres of land and the Additional Commissioner observed that the grant of the disputed piece which measure only 1.35 acres would not together constitute a subsistence holding. That is one of the considerations which has been taken into consideration according to the standing orders of the Government in making the grant. That being so, we do not consider it fit to interfere now with this grant after the lapse of almost nine years of the grant (made in 1956) merely Upon the ground that no publicity was made inviting offers in respect of it."

8. Leave to appeal to this Court from the above order was granted as explained in the first paragraph of this judgment. In pursuance of it four questions are to be examined‑ (i) When did the period of limitation for review under subsection (2) of section 8 of the West Pakistan Board of Revenue Act, 1957, commence? (ii) What is the scope of the powers of review under sub section (1) of section 8 of the West Pakistan Board of Revenue Act, 1957? (iii) Whether the disqualification of the appellant arising from the smallness of his holding was condoned? and (iv) What is the scope of Article 98 of the Constitution of 1962?

9. The provision which confers the jurisdiction on the Board of Revenue to review its own orders is contained in section 8 of the West Pakistan Board of Revenue Act, 1957. It is as follows:‑ 8. (1) Any person considering himself aggrieved by a decree or order made by the Board and who, from the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or the order was made, or on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record (or for any other sufficient reason) desires to obtain a review of the decree passed or order made against him, may apply to the Board for a review of judgment and the Board may, after giving notice to the parties affected thereby and after hearing them, pass such decree or order as the circumstances of the case require. (2) Every application for a review of a decree or order under subsection (i) shall be made within ninety days from the date of that decree or order." Under subsection (2) of the above section, the period of limitation of 90 days runs from the date of the decree or order which is sought to be reviewed. This raises the question of n ascertaining the date of the decree or order which may be sought to be reviewed. It may arise in varied situations. For instance, no date on which the decree or order was written may be mentioned on it but the decree or order may be announced on a certain date. In such circumstances will the date of announcement be its date or will it be a decree or order without any date at all? If there is no date, will there be no period of limitation? Further, does the absence of such a date mean no limitation or no review? A legalistic argument is conceivable to the effect that review is contemplated only within a certain period of time and not without it; therefore, there can be no review if there is no ascertainable term of limitation.

10. But the above does not appear to be a reasonable interpretation because in reality the date of announcement will be the date of the decree or order in such a case. Again imagine a decree or order on which a date was written with invisible ink. How will the period of limitation be computed? Applying the same principle as above, the answer will be from the date of the knowledge of the decree or order. Similarly, in the case now before us if the order was not known to the party concerned, then its date for purposes of limitation should be taken to be the date on which the party concerned came to know of it, and the period of limitation should be computed from that date. Any other date written on it is a misnomer unless the party's ignorance of it was the result of its own fault.

11. But it is not enough for the party concerned to plead absence of knowledge, because the next question which arises is: On what date knowledge was acquired? The appellant wrote a letter to the Board of Revenue and in reply he was informed that information of the decision together with a copy of the order was sent to him. The appellant has said nothing about it, nor has he produced a copy of his long delayed application to the Board of Revenue in order to disclose to this Court whether he had asked for another copy, pleaded forgetfulness or asked for information about the decision. His excuse is that his application is missing from the official record, but it is obvious that nobody beside himself was interested in that application. The respondent who might possibly have been another interested person is not in the picture. He is so weak as a contestant that he is not even represented in these pro ceedings. The situation about the allegation of the appellant's ignorance is on the whole unsatisfactory. I, therefore, would not disagree from the view of the Member of the Board of Revenue expressed on the 21st of August 1964, that the review application was barred by time.

12. The scope of the powers of review was narrower than at present until the words "for any other sufficient reason" were inserted in 1964 by an amendment of subsection (1) of section 8 of the West Pakistan Board of Revenue Act, 1957. Since the amendment, the powers are the same as conferred by Order XLVII, rule 1, C. P. C. Now a decree or order can be reviewed under the said section on account of‑ (i) the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within the appellant's knowledge or could not be produced when the decree or the order was made, or (ii) on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, or (iii) for any other sufficient reason. But the appellate powers of the Board of Revenue are not restricted by the above considerations. They are expressed in general terms in subsection (2) of section 5 of the Board of Revenue Act, 1957 as follows: "The Board shall be the highest Court of appeal and revision in revenue cases in the Province." The words "for any other sufficient reason" do not confer unlimited powers and have been interpreted with reference to, Order XLVII, rule 1, C. P. C. In Chitaley's Commentary on C. P. C. we find the gist of the interpretations as follows: "In Chajju Ram v. Neki A I R 1922 P C 112: 3 Luck 127 : 49 I A 114 (P C) their Lordships of the Privy Council, after reviewing the case‑law, declared that the expres sion should be interpreted as meaning a reason sufficient on grounds at least analogous to those specified immediately previously. (See in this connexion Note 7 on the Preamble). There is still a great diversity of opinion as to what is and what is not, a reason `analogous' to the reason specified. According to the High Court of Rangoon, the word `analogous' is distinguishable from the expression `ejusdem generis' and the former word, as used by the Privy Council, is wider than the expression `ejusdem generis' A I R 1928 Rang. 31 (32) 5 Rang.

675. The want of uniformity in the decisions on this subject even after the Privy Council decision is due to the fact that, in most cases, it is a matter for argument whether any reason is analogous to the reason specifically mentioned in the rule."

13. The member of the Board of Revenue was, therefore, quite right in drawing a distinction between appeal and review. In this connection the points of distinction jotted down in Chitaley's Commentary on rule 1 of Order XLVII, C. P. C., may be referred to for convenience. They are as follows: "A review is not the same thing as, or a substitute for, an appeal. The two proceedings differ in very many particulars: (i) The primary intention of a review is the reconsideration of the subject of the suit by the same Judge under certain conditions, while an appeal is a rehearing by another tribunal. (ii) A point which may be a good ground of an appeal may not be a good ground for an application for review. Thus, an erroneous view of evidence or of law is no ground for a review though it may be a good ground for an appeal. (iii) A review does not, of necessity, re‑open questions already decided between the parties. The matter in issue is only re‑opened when the application for review is accepted, while in the case of an appeal, the matter is re‑opened as soon as an appeal is admitted." I am not approving every word of the above quotation, but only emphasising that the appellate jurisdiction of the Board of' Revenue is wider than its jurisdiction of review, and that an erroneous view of evidence or of law is ordinarily not a goody ground for review.

14. In this case, the area of the appellant's holding was only 5.8 acres as against 15.0 acres of respondent No.

1. The appellant's land did not constitute a subsistence holding which is 12‑0 acres‑See Kalandar Bux and another v. Meenhal (P L D 1963 W P (Rev.) 78). Moreover, respondent No. 1 was in possession of the land for a number of years, and had spent money on reclaiming the Bhada land. On the top of this all, the review application was barred by time. I have, therefore, no doubt that Mr. A. M. Khan Leghari was right in declining to interfere, in exercise of his powers of review, with the decision of the Additional Commissioner, which was upheld in revision by Mr. S. M. Ikram as a Member of the Board of Revenue.

15. The appellant has tried erroneously to create an impression that the disqualification which arose from the smallness of his holding in comparison with respondent No. 1, was condoned by the Mukhtiarkar with the sanction of the Assistant Revenue Officer, and that thereafter it had ceased to be a valid consideration. The seventh ground of his petition for leave to appeal to this Court contains the first part of this idea as follows: "That, their Lordships did not appreciate that as early as June 1959, after enquiries from Mukhtiarkar, Naushero Feroze, that the land was still an unalienated Government land, available for disposal, the Barrage Mukhtiarkar had accepted and recorded a full rate offer of the petitioner, after obtaining sanction from the Assistant Revenue Officer, and condoning the smallness of his holding and thereby recognised the right of the petitioner, directly and indirectly repudiating all other grants." The second part of the idea is expressed by him in ground number four, and in paragraph No. 15 of his petition. In the latter paragraph, he has gone to the length of mis‑stating facts as follows: "In this way, their Lordships (of the High Court) made the new point (of smallness of holding) a basis of their decision and thereby substituted their own finding on a fact never given any importance by the Revenue Authorities." The appellant has repeated the above idea of the introduction of a new ground by the High Court in Ground No. III of his concise statement.

16. But smallness of the appellant's holding was an important consideration before the revenue authorities and had weighed heavily against the appellant‑See paragraph 4 above. Let me note here that the smallness of the appellant's holding in competition with respondent No. 1, was a disqualification according to the appellant himself, because he has stated that it was condoned for him, but I am unable to accept his allegation, of condonation because he has not produced a copy of any, order by which the disqualification was condoned, nor is there any mention in his petition for leave to appeal or in his concise statement of any date of such an order. Moreover, it is not believable that high revenue officers like the Additional Commissioner and Members of the Board of Revenue should have failed to notice the condonation of his disqualification particularly because the appellant was twice heard at length once by Mr. S. M. Kazi and then by Mr. A. M. Leghari. I am inclined to believe that the applicant has not taken care to correctly state facts in this Court.

17. He has shown an inclination to be inaccurate. For example, in ground No. 7 which has been reproduced above, he has alleged‑ "that the land (in dispute) was still unalienated Government land available for disposal, the Barrage Mukhtiarkar had accepted and recorded a full rate offer of the petitioner." whereas the Additional Commissioner has rebuked the Mukh tiarkar for doing so by saying that‑ "the Barrage Mukhtiarkar should have been vigilant enough to see that no offer was recorded for S. No. not available for disposal." Another example is his allegation in paragraph 5 of his petition for leave to appeal‑ "that the transfer (in favour of respondent No. 1) being illegal, no mutation was carried out in the name of respondent, No. 1 in the record‑of‑rights during 1956 and 1961." Actually the delay was not the result of illegality. The true facts are that 1.35 acres were to be separated from a larger area and given a new number. This required time as well as effort. The Additional Commissioner has referred to this aspect when he said, as pointed out above, that the appellant made his offer in 1959 after respondent No. 1 got the land, which was transferred to him in 1956, measured and separated by his effort in 1959. My conclusion, therefore, is that smallness of the appellant's holding was a disqualification when considered in competition with the claim of respondent No. 1 and that it was not condoned whether with sanction or without sanction.

18. Let me‑pause here and reflect on the equities of the claim of the appellant. An impression was created on the mind of the Bench which granted leave to this appeal that the Member of the Board of Revenue who dismissed the application for review "had clearly failed to do justice". That was the result firstly of one‑sided statements made by the appellant, in his petition for leave to appeal and in his concise statement without due care for accuracy, and secondly of the strictures which Mr. A. M. Khan Leghari recorded against the Additional Commissioner as well as respondent No. 1 in the order by which he rejected the review application of the appellant. I have given a couple of examples of the mis‑statements made by the appellant. In order to illustrate the adverse remarks made by the Member, I quote the following three sentences: "In my interim orders dated 5‑10‑1963, 30‑1‑1964 and 19‑3‑1964, I have dealt with several unsatisfactory features of this case. The learned Additional Commissioner has merely glossed over the facts by denying that the petitioner had preferential Mohag rights to the petty Bhada piece from his S. No. 483, which the respondent admits belongs to the petitioner. It seems clearly that the respondent has been able to play fast and loose on the petitioner, with his superior Mohag claim, by obtaining the grant in 1956 surreptitiously and in violation of the stringent Government instructions that all Bhada pieces of this type should be granted to Mohagdars after wide publicity."

19. I do not know with what unsatisfactory features he dealt with in his interim orders but the language suggests that he straightened things by doing so, and has written the first sentence of the above quotation only as a warning to the Department that he could do so. In the second sentence he has criticised the Additional Commissioner for holding that the present appellant did not enjoy a preferential Mohag right "to the petty Bhada piece from his S. No. 483" because "the respondent admits (that it) belongs to the petitioner". But mere ownership of the survey number could not settle the question of comparative entitlement. He has himself observed later that the respondent's (unrebutted) claim was that he had spent a large sum of money in reclaiming the Bhada and that it was not proper to disturb his holdings at that late stage. In the third sentence, the Member has condemned respondent No. 1 because the transfer was made in his favour without "wide publicity". The High Court has hold, as a matter of fact that‑ "It does not appear that there was no publicity given regarding the grant of this land which was made to the respondent on 17‑6‑1956." and additionally that it was not a fit case for interference after a lapse of nine years, merely on the ground that no publicity was given to the invitation for offers. I can find no fault with this view, if it is correct, as I believe it is, that for a good few reasons, the appellant did not enjoy a preferential Mohag right. Mr. A. M. Khan Leghari has perhaps dispensed higher justice by administering rebukes while doing justice according to law, though in truth man can successfully administer justice only according to law, justly understood. An attempt by any Tribunal however so high to do perfect justice is vanity. In the words of Justice Story: "Perfect justice belongs to one judgment sent only‑to that which is linked to the throne of God."

20. Lastly, I may refer to Article 98 of the Constitution of 1962. Its scope has been considered in several judgments, though its full depth had not been reached, and its wide span has not been completely traversed in seven years, and now it stands abrogated as a part of a "late constitution". But in so far as this appeal goes, nothing has come to my notice to suggest that the High Court's order transgressed the scope of the Article. A passing reference was made by counsel for the appellant to absence of opportunity for the appellant of being heard in revision by Mr. S. M. Ikram. He merely cited Muhammad Farooq Imam v. Claims Commissioner, Lahore and others (P L D 1964 S C 585). It was a case under section 7 (3) of the Registration of Claims (Displaced Persons) Act, 1956. The Court held :‑ "There is little doubt in our minds that the appellant was not avoiding appearance and there may have been some misapprehension. It has not been explained why copies were not given to the appellant of the orders passed. Had that been done, the appellant may have been in a position to move the Claims Commissioner at' once for a further hearing. We are unable to hold that the ex parte decision of the case is due to default on the part of the appellant. Under the circumstances we are of the opinion teat the appellant is entitled to an opportunity of being heard before the case is decided." The said subsection is as follows :‑ 7. (1) . . . . . (2) . . . . . (3) A Claims Commissioner may suo motu call, within the prescribed period for the record of any case which has been decided by a Claims Officer, a Deputy Claims Commissioner or an Additional Claims Commissioner under his jurisdiction for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any order passed therein and may pass such order in relation thereto as he thinks fit: Provided that the Claims Commissioner shall not under this subsection pass an order revising or modifying any order affecting any person without giving such person ate opportunity of being heard."

21. In the present case, the relevant provision is section 211 of the Sind Land Revenue Code, 1879. Its relevant parts are as follows a: "The Provincial Government and any Revenue Officer, not inferior in rank to an Assistant or Deputy Collector or a Superin tendent of Survey, in their respective Departments may call for and examine the record‑ of any inquiry or the proceedings of any subordinate revenue office, for the purpose of satisfying itself or himself as the case may be as to the legality or propriety of any decision or order passed, and as to the regularity of the proceedings of such officer. . . . . . If in any case, it shall appear to the Provincial Government or to such officer aforesaid, that any decision or order or proceedings so called for should be modified, annulled or reversed it or he may pass such order thereon as it or he deems fit." . . . . . There is no provision for granting a hearing to a party in the above section. It is, however, a requirement of the Natural Principles of Justice that an opportunity of being heard be given to the party against whom any order or decision may be made. Bu as indicated in the University of Dacca and another v. Zakir Ahmed (P L D 1965 S Q 90) important peculiarities of each case ought to be taken into consideration. The nature of inquiry, the rules of a tribunal, the kind of procedure and the subject‑matter of inquiry ate some of the important considerations. I can safely add to them the conduct of the party concerned. K. S. Gupte had reproduced in his commentary on section 209 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, which is exactly the same as section 209 of the Sind Land Revenue Code, the following extract from the debate of the Bombay Legislative Council held in 1932 at the time of the addition of a proviso to the section to dispense, in certain circumstances, with the requirement of recording reasons for decisions given in appeals: "Revenue Officers receive an enormous number of appeals, some of them require the most careful consideration, while others require practically no consideration at all. When an appeal is made to the Provincial Government, the Commis sioner, or the Collector if and when Government or the Commissioner or Collector upset the order of the authority below, it generally happens that they record their reasons because they wish the authorities below to understand what it is, but when they are merely rejecting appeals then it is pure waste of time for them to make any attempt to write a judgment."

22. Commenting on the revisional powers conferred by section 211 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, which are exactly the same as section 211 of the Sind Land Revenue Code, Chagla, C. J., has observed in State of Bombay v. Chhrganlal Gangaram Lavar (A I R 1955 Bom. 1) that‑ "It is not any and every order that Government can revise or modify. It is only those orders which according to Government are illegal or improper, because the power to revise only arises provided the Government wishes to satisfy itself as to the legality or propriety of a decision or the regularity of a proceeding of a subordinate officer." Further: "Now, we should like to say this, that however these powers might have been exercised in the past, we do expect from our present democratic Government that they would exercise these very wide powers with a sense of responsibility and that they would try and see that no hardship is caused in the exercise of those powers."

23. I respectfully concur with the above observation but would like to point out that in this case there is neither any question of hardship to the appellant nor did he ask for a bearing, nor even complain in respect of it when he was heard in review by Mr. A. M. Khan Leghari and later by the High Court, because there is no mention of any such grievance in their order. The appellant had sent by post his revision petition and did not make enquiries about it for more than a year and a half. In this Court also, counsel's reference to that contention was so cursory that it finds no place in the judgment of my learned brother, Sajjad Ahmad, J. Keeping in view the above circumstances, and the principle that a party who omits to urge an objection before competent authorities should not be allowed, without special reasons, to prolong litigation by urging them subsequently, and thus, at his choice, undoing the work concluded by those authorities at the cost of their and the opposite‑party's time and energy; for to allow him to do so amounts to permitting him, by conducting himself as if every Court was the first Court for him where he could start afresh, to wash away his previous omissions and later tergiversations.

24. I would, in conclusion, dismiss the appeal with no order as to costs, since the respondent has been absent. In accordance with the view of the majority we accept this appeal, set aside the order of the High Court as well as of the learned Member, Board of Revenue, dated the 21st of August 1964, with the direction that the learned Member, Board of Revenue, will dispose of the appellant's Review Petition afresh, which will be deemed to be pending before him, as within time, in accordance with law, by giving effect to his powers of review as contained in section 8 of the West Pakistan Board of Revenue Act, which are exercisable inter alia for correcting any error or mistake apparent on the face of the record. Costs will follow the event. K. B. A. Appeal accepted.