1978 PLP 79 (PLC)
MESSRS PAKISTAN PAPER CORPORATION LTD. Versus A. AZIZ SULAIMAN KEDVAVI
| Citation | 1978 PLP 79 (PLC) |
| Forum / Court | IVth Labour Court Sind |
| Bench Members | Abdul Hamid Baluch, Presiding Officer |
| Parties | MESSRS PAKISTAN PAPER CORPORATION LTD. Versus A. AZIZ SULAIMAN KEDVAVI |
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 1978 PLP 79 (PLC)?
This judgment primarily cites: statutory provisions as referenced in Pakistani case law index.
Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 1978 PLP 79 (PLC)?
The case was heard and decided by the IVth Labour Court Sind bench comprising: Abdul Hamid Baluch, Presiding Officer.
Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?
Cite this legal precedent as: 1978 PLP 79 (PLC) (MESSRS PAKISTAN PAPER CORPORATION LTD. Versus A. AZIZ SULAIMAN KEDVAVI). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.
Representation
- S. M. Saeed for Appellant.
- Abdul Sattar Silat for Respondent.
- ----S. 25‑A‑Word "himself" occurring in section‑Does not include an Advocate or an agent‑Presenting grievance notice through an Advocate‑Not proper presentation, hence, invalid‑Application under S. 25‑A based on such notice, held, not competent.
- Heard Messrs S. M. Saeed and Abdul Sattar, Advocates of both the parties.
- First contention of Mr. S. M. Saeed is that the respondent workman gave three notices to the Employer and first two copies are dated 19‑6‑1974 and 13‑7‑1974, Exh. 1‑E and Exh. I‑F (pages 25 and 29) and in these notices the respondent workman does not claim relief of re‑instatement but his dues. His further contention is that he served the employer with third notice dated 10‑8‑74 Exh. 1‑G, page No. 33 through an Advocate. On the other hand Mr. Abdul Sattar argues that notices Exhs. 1‑E and 1‑F are not `grievance notice' while third notice dated, 10‑8‑74 marked as Exh. 1‑G is a grievance notice within the meaning of section 25‑A of I. R. O. 1969. Now point of consideration arises whether the "grievance notice" could be given by any Advocate and whether it is valid in law. In this connection subsection (1) of section 25‑A of I. R. O., 1969 is relevant. The subsection (1) contemplates that a grievance notice can be given to an Employer in writing by persons of three categories namely (1) by workman himself, or (2) through shop‑steward (3) through a Trade Union. The, word "himself" does not include an Advocate or an agent. In this respect I1 get support from the judgment of his Lordship Mr. Justice Mir Khuda Bux Marri in a Constitutional Petition No. 1285/74 decided on 3‑3‑1975 wherein his Lordship has observed the word "himself" in section 25‑A must be interpreted strictly and it cannot be given any extended or wide , interpretation. In view of this judgment presentation of grievance notice through an Advocate by the worker does not amount as presentation himself". Therefore the notice through an Advocate is invalid and the application under section 25‑A of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 is in competent.
- Decision dictated in open Court in presence of parties and their Advocates.
Headnotes / Summary
Industrial Relations Ordinance (XXIII of 1969)
S. 25‑A‑Word "himself" occurring in section‑Does not include an Advocate or an agent‑Presenting grievance notice through an Advocate‑Not proper presentation, hence, invalid‑Application under S. 25‑A based on such notice, held, not competent.
Judgment & Decree
S. M. Saeed for Appellant. Abdul Sattar Silat for Respondent. This is an Appeal against an order dated, 23‑5‑1975 of Junior Labour Court No. II, Karachi allowing application under section. 25‑A of Industrial Relations, Ordinance, 1969 of respondent workman and reinstating him in service with full back benefit. The short facts of this Appeal are that the Respondent was appointed as Chief Accountant with the appellant‑Company at Charsada (N,‑W. F. P.) on 26‑7‑1973 on salary of Rs. 1,700 per month. The respondent through out served as such at Charsada (N.W. F. P) till the date of termination of his service on 13‑5‑1974. The appellants, alleges that the respondent does not fall within the definition of "workman" as defined in Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. He has not challenged termination of his services but only claimed relief for three months salary in lieu of notice. Subsequently he filed an application under section 25‑A of I. R. O., 1969 before Junior Labour Court on 17‑12‑1974, which was accepted hence this Appeal. Heard Messrs S. M. Saeed and Abdul Sattar, Advocates of both the parties. First contention of Mr. S. M. Saeed is that the respondent workman gave three notices to the Employer and first two copies are dated 19‑6‑1974 and 13‑7‑1974, Exh. 1‑E and Exh. I‑F (pages 25 and 29) and in these notices the respondent workman does not claim relief of re‑instatement but his dues. His further contention is that he served the employer with third notice dated 10‑8‑74 Exh. 1‑G, page No. 33 through an Advocate. On the other hand Mr. Abdul Sattar argues that notices Exhs. 1‑E and 1‑F are not `grievance notice' while third notice dated, 10‑8‑74 marked as Exh. 1‑G is a grievance notice within the meaning of section 25‑A of I. R. O. 1969. Now point of consideration arises whether the "grievance notice" could be given by any Advocate and whether it is valid in law. In this connection subsection (1) of section 25‑A of I. R. O., 1969 is relevant. The subsection (1) contemplates that a grievance notice can be given to an Employer in writing by persons of three categories namely (1) by workman himself, or (2) through shop‑steward (3) through a Trade Union. The, word "himself" does not include an Advocate or an agent. In this respect I1 get support from the judgment of his Lordship Mr. Justice Mir Khuda Bux Marri in a Constitutional Petition No. 1285/74 decided on 3‑3‑1975 wherein his Lordship has observed the word "himself" in section 25‑A must be interpreted strictly and it cannot be given any extended or wide , interpretation. In view of this judgment presentation of grievance notice through an Advocate by the worker does not amount as presentation himself". Therefore the notice through an Advocate is invalid and the application under section 25‑A of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 is in competent. Next point contended by Mr. S. M. Saeed is that the matter is barred by the limitation as services of respondent worker were terminated with effect from 13‑5‑1974 under Letter No. Ad‑R‑8844/786, dated 29‑5‑1974 page No. 21, but the application under section 25‑A of I. R. O. 1969 was filed as late as 17‑12‑1974. The application was filed beyond prescribed period of limitation. There is no explanation for the long delay of more than 4 months. The impugned order is illegal. The learned lower Court has failed to consider the above legal aspect of the case. Accordingly I allow the appeal without going into the merit of the case and set aside the impugned order. I make no order as to costs. Decision dictated in open Court in presence of parties and their Advocates. Appeal dismissed.