P L D 1980 Lahore 637 (PLP)

The only question in this case is about the meaning of the word `fortnight' used in the order dated 1-10-1979, passed in R. S. A. No. 231/79. The said appeal was filed by the petitioner and was allowed. The matter was remanded to the first appellate Court to determine certain other questions. However, a proviso was added to the following effect: "The appellants shall make up the deficiency in this Court as well as in the lower appellate Court within a period of a fortnight, failing which the appeal shall stand dismissed."

2. The respondent later submitted an application before the High Court bearing No. C. M. 5870/C-79 on 27-10-79 complaining that the petitioners had not complied with the said order and had not deposited the court-fee within the time fixed. This application was dismissed ore. the .ground that it was open to the learned first appellate Court to decide the question raised in that application. The learned lower appellate Court held that the word `fortnight' meant 14 days only and as such the court-fee stamp papers should have been tiled in Court by the 15th of October, 1979. Since they were actually filed on the 16th, a day later, the second appeal stood dismissed and, consequently, there. was no remand order existing. 3.. Hence this revision,

4. The learned counsel submitted that the word `fortnight' has been used ire English-Urdu dictionary as meaning pandhrwara which means fifteen days, This argument is without force as we have to see standard dictionaries to determine the exact sense in the word `fortnight' is used. In Stroud's Judicial Dictionary a "fortnight's" notice was held to mean 14 clear slays. Reference in this behalf is made to Labouchere v. Wharnclie (1) In the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, the word `fortnight' is shown to mean 14 nights with reference to ancient German method of reckoning by nights.. However, it is further explained that this expression also means two weeks.

5. The learned counsel argued that. a day is to be excluded while calculating the hi days. Similarly, a night also should be excluded for calculating 14 nights.. This argument is without force. The order having been passed on the Ist Octobers 1979 during, day tine, there can be no such exclusion because whole of the forthcoming night was given to the petitioner ;t9 the first night. Looked at from ibis point of view, it is clear that the period of a fortnight came. to an end on the 15th. The petitioner was duty bound to make the deposit of court-fee by the 15th at the latest. The finding o: the learned first Appellate Court is, therefore, unexceptionable.

6. The :earned counsel further submitted that it is open to this Court to extend the time.. In my view no extension is possible. The. petitioner has already n given sufficent extension although, once it was held trust the court-fee paid on more appeal was deficient, he could be thrown out of Court on the basis of bar of limitation. But the Court allowed hire as opportunity to make the deposit. The language used by the Court in the ultimate order left on any jurisdiction with the Court to give a further extension. It is clearly stated in that order that if the deposit is not made within a fortnight, the appeal shall stated dismissed. In view of the language used in the order, the Court has become functus officio and cannot extort the period- Even otherwise,, it is seat open to this Court to extend the time while exercising. revisional jurisdiction against the order of a District Judge same the Court's function is limited tot deciding whether the case, is rowed bar either of the three clauses given in section 115, C, P. C. Any extension of the period would be beyond the ;ambit of the grounds given in section 115, C. PR C. and would be extraneous. The petition is, therefore, dismissed in limine. ???? Petition dismissed: (1) 13 Ch. D-353