2004 PLP 621 (CLC)

MUMTAZ ALI MIRZA, J.

This regular first appeal has been filed by and on behalf of Federation of Pakistan and is directed against the judgment and decree, dated 31-10-1996 passed by Mr. Tahir Jamil Butt, Civil Judge 1st Class, Rawalpindi whereby he decreed the suit of the respondent against the appellants to the tune of Rs.19,93,490 with interest @ 12% till realization of decretal amount. The decree as aforesaid was passed against the appellants on 31-10-1996 but the appeal against' the decree was filed on 30-10-1997 to be prescribed after 11 months and 29 days and on the face of it is hopelessly barred by time. The appellants' learned counsel was therefore, confronted at the very outset of his arguments to satisfy us as to the competency of the appeal from the point of view of the limitation. He submitted that the appellants had no notice of the suit instituted by the respondent against it nor was any summon served on the appellants in the matter of the said suit. When questioned is to whether the decree assailed in this regular first appeal was an ex parte decree against the appellants, learned Standing Counsel replied in the negative. Thus, the question that arises in the circumstances is that if it was not an ex parte decree then how was it that the appellants claim lack of notice as to the suit filed by the respondent against the appellants and the decree having been passed without their knowledge. Learned counsel for the respondent was called upon to explain the factual position as to the stand taken by the learned Standing Counsel regarding lack of notice and non-service of summons by the learned trial Court on the appellants. Learned counsel for the respondent repudiated vehemently the stand taken by the learned counsel for the appellant and submitted that not only was the service duly affected on the appellants but that the decree was passed against the appellants after a thorough contest of the suit by it and the recording of evidence. Elaborating his submission in this behalf learned counsel for the respondent submitted that Director General Works Army, G.H.Q. Rawalpindi contested the case throughout in the trial Court and also filed written statement. It may be added that it was this officer who had signed the contract with the respondent. Now, if the appellants were represented by as high an official as Director-General Works in the learned trial-Court, we are at a loss to understand the stance taken by the learned counsel for the appellants that the appellants were not served by the learned trial Court in the matter of the suit and the same went uncontested. It is indeed also very strange that a decree which was passed against the appellants on 31-10-1996, application for a copy of the same was made on 31-10-1997, exactly after one year and the appeal was filed on 30-10-1997. Having given our anxious consideration to the submissions made in the application seeking condonation of delay, we are wholly dissatisfied with the explanation offered by the learned counsel for the appellants in the application seeking condonation of delay a; also during his arguments at the Bar. It is indeed lamenatable that the matters so serious such as in the present appeal are dealt with so casually by the concerned officials of the Government. Learned Standing Counsel submitted that it, was in fact some very senior officer of Garrison, Engineering (Army) at Hyderabad who was the concerned officer but the one who had been appearing and defending the suit from Rawalpindi was not competent to do so. When questioned as to whether the Government has taken any action against the officer who has been unauthorisedly as per the stance of the learned Standing Counsel appearing and defending the suit, the answer was in the negative. We cannot help expressing our deep sense of regret and dissatisfaction on this conduct of the Government officials. A decree to the tune of Rs.19,93,490 with interest has been passed against the Government and the Government acted so negligently as to apply for a copy of the decree for the purposes of the appeal after expiry of almost one year. Learned Standing Counsel has miserably failed to cross the first hurdle in his way i.e. of the limitation. The merits of the appeal need not be gone into as the appeal is hopelessly barred by time and is dismissed as such. The parties are left to bear their own costs. S.A.K./F-220/L Appeal dismissed.