1996 PLP 724 (PLC)

"The West Pakistan Employees' Social Security Ordinance, 1965, is a beneficial or remedial legislation conceived as a means of ameliorating the lot of the working class, and as such, it would be in keeping with the accepted principle of interpretation, that it should be so construed as to advance the remedy and suppress the mischief, or else in keeping with the object of the legislation, as wide an interpretation should be placed on the terms 'employee' and 'establishment' as permissible within the language employed in the statute. Viewed in this light, the term 'establishment' as defined in clause (ii) of section 2 of the Ordinance, does not appear to be confined in the scope to merely the four‑walls of the physical premises where the notified establishment may be located. " From the above definition, it would appear that the essential test in such a case would be whether a person concerned is indeed working in connection with the work of the notified establishment. In the instant case also same concerned persons are indeed working in connection with the work of readymade garments in the same premises with a different name of establishment. Reference is also made to 1981 PLC 9, wherein Mr. Zaffar Hussain Mirza, J. (as he was then) held: "Liability to pay contribution once arising under section 20, would not cease by mere change of ownership. " Reference is also made to 1981 PLC 73 wherein Mr. B.G.N Kazi, J (as he then was) observed: "Change of name and addition of partner would not exclude application of Social Security Ordinance to notified establishment. " Reference is also made to unreported decision of Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. K‑40/1981 wherein it was held: "The employers and the employees may change their identities, may differ from time to time but as long as the establishment remained the same, the liability under the Ordinance once the requisite notification had appeared, could not be avoided either by discontinuing the services of the employees or by changing the number or the identity of the employer. " Reference is also made to another unreported judgment of this Court in M.A. 60/1983 wherein Mr. Mamoon Kazi, J. observed: "The new owner continues to be liable to make contribution under the said notification and‑no further notification would be required." All the above decided cases support the contentions of the learned counsel for respondents. In the instant case, it is not the only question of appellants' establishment being housed in the same premises where earlier childhood establishment was carrying on their business but the persons concerned, viz. Saleem Yousuf and Tayyab Yousuf who were previously working in the childhood establishment were also working in connection with ` the appellants' establishment and thereby it could not be said that the appellants' establishment was not in continuity of alleged dissolved childhood establishment. In fact, the appellants' establishment succeeded settled in the shoes of childhood establishment except that the name of the establishment and designations of employers have been changed when there has neither been change in ownership nor change in monogram or change in the nature of business, therefore, the childhood establishment could not in fact be deemed to have been closed down considering the observations made in Kohinoor Chemical Co. Ltd. v. Sindh Employees' Social Security Institution (PLD 1977 SC 197): "The said Ordinance is a beneficial or remedial legislation conceived as a means of ameliorating the lot of the working class, and as such, it would be in keeping with the accepted principle of interpretation, that it should be so construed as to advance the remedy and suppress the mischief, or else it would frustrate the legislative intent. It would appear, therefore, that, in keeping with the object of the legislation, as wide an interpretation should be placed on the terms 'employee' and I establishment' as permissible within the language employed in the statute." In the instant case also the appellants cannot be permitted to escape from the liability under the said Ordinance by merely changing the name of establishment from childhood to Munda Apparel (Pvt.) Ltd., hence the appellants would be liable to contribution arising under section 20 of the said Ordinance. So far the contentions of the learned counsel for appellants, the same have no force and the facts of the case‑law cited/reported m 1993 PLC 340 are quite different and distinguishable to the facts of the instant case except that in the instant case "Childhood" establishment is said to be non‑existent. At pag. 344 it has been observed: "The simultaneous independent existence of the said three establishments at different places, Malir, New Karachi and Landhi, with their respective independent employees and machinery was not disputed or disproved. If it is so, M/s. Aishama (Pvt.) Ltd. cannot be continuity of the dissolved firm M/s. Aishama International. The two partners of the respondent's firm were Directors of M/s. Aishama (Pvt.) Ltd. at the same time when they were also partners of M/s. Aishama International. " In the circumstances, the principle laid down in the above said precedent is not applicable to the instant case. In view of the aforesaid reasonings and case‑law cited above, the present appeal has no merit as no illegality has been pointed out m the impugned order, therefore, appeal is dismissed with no order as to costs. H.B.T./M‑86/K Appeal dismissed.