1991 PLP 757 (PLC)
GRAND FOLKS ENGLISH SCHOOL Versus EXCISE AND TAXATION OFFICER
| Citation | 1991 PLP 757 (PLC) |
| Forum / Court | Karachi High Court |
| Bench Members | Saeeduzzaman Siddiqui and Abdur Rasool Agha, JJ |
| Parties | GRAND FOLKS ENGLISH SCHOOL Versus EXCISE AND TAXATION OFFICER |
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 1991 PLP 757 (PLC)?
This judgment primarily cites: statutory provisions as referenced in Pakistani case law index.
Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 1991 PLP 757 (PLC)?
The case was heard and decided by the Karachi High Court bench comprising: Saeeduzzaman Siddiqui and Abdur Rasool Agha, JJ.
Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?
Cite this legal precedent as: 1991 PLP 757 (PLC) (GRAND FOLKS ENGLISH SCHOOL Versus EXCISE AND TAXATION OFFICER). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.
Representation
- Shahanshah Hussain for Petitioner.
- Nemo for Respondent.
- Date of hearing: 1st December, 1988.
Headnotes / Summary
Workers' Children (Education) Ordinance (XI of 1972)... ‑‑‑‑Ss. 2(b) & 3‑‑‑Industrial Relations Ordinance (XXIII of 1969), S. 2(xiv)‑‑ Establishment‑‑‑Definition‑‑‑Educational institution not an establishment as envisaged by Ordinance, 1972‑‑‑Notice‑‑‑Notice issued to School by Excise and Taxation Officer to appear before him in connection with filing of a return as required under S.3 of Workers Children (Education) Ordinance XI of 1972‑‑ School, an educational society running an educational institution did not fall within definition of establishment as given in S.2(b) of Ordinance XI of 1972‑‑ Notice issued to school, was, thus, wholly without jurisdiction and without lawful authority.
Judgment & Decree
SAEEDUZZAMAN SIDDIQUI, J.
This petition under Article'199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan is filed by the Petitioner to challenge a notice issued to the Petitioner by the Excise & Taxation Officer `P' Division, Karachi to appear before him in connection with filing of a return as required under section 3, of the Workers' Children (Education) Ordinance, 1972. The only contention raised by the learned counsel for the Petitioner in support of the petition is that the petitioner which is an Educational Society and running an educational institution does not fall within the definition of "establishment" as defined in Ordinance XI of 1972. The word "establishment" is defined in section 2(b) of Ordinance XI of 1972 as follows:-- "2 (b) "Establishment" means any office, firm, industrial unit, undertaking, shop or premise ' in which workers are employed for the purpose of carrying on any business, trade, manufacture, calling, service, employment or occupation". In support of his contention that the petitioner being an "educational institution does not fall within the definition of the establishment" as given above, learned counsel has referred to the cases of K.G. Old v. Presiding Officer, Punjab Labour Court (P. L D 1976 Lah. 1097) and Employees Union Jamya Karachi v. Registrar Trade Unions (PLD 1981 Kar. 397). The first case was decided by a learned Single Judge of the Lahore High Court (as he then was) in connection with a dispute which was brought before the Court under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. In that Ordinance section 2(xiv) defines `industry' as follows:-- "Industry" means any business, trade, manufacture, calling, service, employment or occupation". The learned Single Judge after reviewing exhaustively, the case law available on the subject finally reached the conclusion that an educational institution does not fall within the meaning of "industry" as defined in section 2(xiv) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. This case was cited with approval by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Employees Union Jamya Karachi v. Registrar of Trade Union referred to above. It would be seen that the Workers' Children (Education) Ordinance, 1972 was promulgated on 13th April, 1972 and the words `business, trade, manufacture, calling, service, employment or occupation" have virtually been lifted from the definition of `industry" as given in the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, and incorporated in the definition of "establishment" as given in Ordinance 11 of 1972. In the above referred two cases the scope of these words has been fully considered and it had been held that an educational institution does not come within the mischief of these words. There is no reason to interpret these words differently in the present case, more so when the Ordinance 11 of 1972 is also on the related field of labour laws and was enacted at a time when the Industrial Relations Ordinance was already in field. We, accordingly, hold that the petitioner does not fall within the definition of "establishment" as given in section 2(b) of Ordinance 11 of 1972 and as such the issuance of impugned notice by the -Respondent was wholly without jurisdiction. We accordingly allow this petition and declare the impugned notice as having been issued without jurisdiction and lawful authority and of no legal effect. As the respondents have not appeared and contested the petition there will be no order as to costs. M.Y.H./G-256/K Petition accepted.