P L D 1970 Lahore 470 (PLP)
KHALID MAHMOOD AND ANOTHER‑ — Petitioners Versus THE STATE‑ — Respondent
| Citation | P L D 1970 Lahore 470 (PLP) |
| Forum / Court | |
| Bench Members | Muhammad Haleem, J |
| Parties | KHALID MAHMOOD AND ANOTHER‑ — Petitioners Versus THE STATE‑ — Respondent |
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in P L D 1970 Lahore 470 (PLP)?
This judgment primarily cites: statutory provisions as referenced in Pakistani case law index.
Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case P L D 1970 Lahore 470 (PLP)?
The case was heard and decided by the bench comprising: Muhammad Haleem, J.
Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?
Cite this legal precedent as: P L D 1970 Lahore 470 (PLP) (KHALID MAHMOOD AND ANOTHER‑ — Petitioners Versus THE STATE‑ — Respondent). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.
Representation
- Ch. Aziz Ahmad for Petitioners.
- Date of hearing: 10th April 1969.
Headnotes / Summary
Provisional Constitution Order, 1969, Cl. 7(i) read with Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), Ss. 1 (2) & 498‑--Bail--‑High Court's jurisdiction to grant bail by invoking S. 498 barred under Cl. 7 (i). Clause 7 (i) of the Provisional Constitution Order, which is to the following effect, also provides the bar where there is a conflict between a Martial Law Regulation and the ordinary law or where any law tends to prejudice the operation of any Martial Law Regulation made by the Chief Martial Law Administrator or by any person having authority from him to make Martial Law Regu lation: "Nothing in this Order or in any law shall prejudice the operation of any Martial Law Regulation made by the Chief Martial Law Administrator or by any person having authority from him to make Martial Law Regulations and where any Ordi nance made under Article 4, or any other law, is repugnant to such regulation, the regulation shall prevail". Thus, in view .of the' above it is absolutely clear that in the face of the above provision the High Court has no jurisdiction to grant bail by invoking section 498, Cr. P. C. Even otherwise there is a bar for the application of the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code in view of subsection (2) of section 1, Cr. P. C. The effect of this provision, was considered by a Division Bench of the Court in a case as reported in Gahena v. State P L D 1968 Lah. 1266. One of the points amongst others involved in that case was as the applicability of section 498, Cr. P. C. vis‑a‑vis the grant of bail to a person against whom proceedings were being taken under the West Pakistan Control of Goondas Ordinance, 1959. It was held in that case since a special procedure was prescribed in the Ordinance for proceeding against the person, the provisions of section 498, Cr. P. C. will not be applicable in view of subsection (2) of section 1, Cr. P. C. In view of the above state of law, the question of the application .of subsection (2) of section 5 or subsection (2) of section 29, Cr. P. C. cannot arise as the applicability of the provisions of the Code has been excluded. The question as to whether the High Court is not included within the meaning of the words `criminal Courts' can also not be of any avail as section 498, Cr. P. C. is a provision in the Code and in view of the fact that the provisions of the Code have been excluded, section 498, Cr. P. C. cannot be taken out of the context and invoked for the purpose of seek ing the relief for the grant of bail. Reliance on sub‑clauses (a) and (b) of clause 5 of the Proclamation is also not relevant as there is no dispute either with regard to the continuance of the ;laws or the jurisdiction of the Courts. Gahena v. The State P L D 1968 Lah. 1266 rel. Gul Muhammad v. The State P L D 1959 Pesh. 49 distinguished.
Judgment & Decree
"(3) Martial Law Regulations may‑ (a) provide for setting up Military Courts for the trial and, punishment of any offence for the contravention of Martial Law Regulations or Orders and of offences under the ordinary law, (b) prescribe any special penalties for offences under the ordinary law, (c) authorise ordinary Courts to try and punish the contravention of any Martial Law Regulation or Order, (d) bar the jurisdiction of ordinary Courts from trying any offence specified in this behalf." In pursuance of sub‑clause (a) of clause (3) of the said Proclama tion Martial Law Regulations Nos. 1, 2 and 3 were promulgated besides others as well. Martial Law Regulation No. 2 deals with the classification of Special Courts which have been empowered to try and punish any person for contravention of Martial Law Regulations or Orders or for offences under the ordinary law. It also provides for convening of Special and Summary Military Courts for the trial of any offence including an offence under the ordinary law. The procedure applicable to such trial is that as prescribed by the Pakistan Army Act, 1952 and the rules made thereunder. Martial Law Regulation No. 3, which is very pertinent for the decision of these petitions is as under:‑ "Notwithstanding anything contained in these Regulations the criminal Courts as by law established shall continue to exercise jurisdiction over persons accused of‑ (a) offences other than offences created by these Regulations. Clause (a) of this .Regulation authorises the criminal Courts to try offences other than offences created by Martial Law Regulations. The bar as contemplated by sub‑clause (d) of clause (3) of the Proclamation of Martial Law was provided by clause (a) of Martial Law Regulation No.
3. Accordingly, the trial of offences created by Martial Law Regulation was outside the jurisdiction of the criminal Courts as for the trial, a specific procedure was prescribed by Martial Law Regulation No. 2.
6. Martial Law Order No. 3 as promulgated by the Martial Law Administrator, Zone A has provided for the functioning of three Special Military Courts for the trial of offences under the Martial Law Regulations and Orders or such cases as may be brought before them. Thus, there is a complete set of procedure prescribed and the Courts have also been constituted to function by virture of the Martial Law Regulations and Orders.
7. Clause 7(i) of the Provisional Constitution Order, which is to the following effect, also provides the bar where there is a conflict between a Martial Law Regulation and the ordinary law or where any law tends to prejudice the operation of any Martial Law Regulation made by the Chief Martial Law Administrator or by any person having authority from him to make Martial Law Regulations:‑ "7(i)‑Nothing in this Order or in any law shall prejudice the operation of any Martial Law Regulation made by the Chief Martial Law Administrator or by any person having authority from him to make Martial Law Regulations and where any Ordinance made under Article 4, or any other law, is repugnant to such regulation, the regulation shall prevail." Thus, in view of the above it is absolutely clear that in the face of the above provision the High Court has no jurisdiction to grant bail by invoking section 498, Cr. P. C.
8. Even otherwise there is a bar for the application of the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code in view of subsection (2) of section 1, Cr. P. C. The effect of this provision, was considered by a Division Bench of this Court in a case as reported in Gahena v. State (1). One of the points amongst other involved in that case was as to the applicability of section 498, Cr. P. C. vis‑a‑vis the grant of bail to a person against whom proceedings were being taken under the West Pakistan Control of Goondas Ordinance, 1959. It was held in that case since a special procedure was prescribed in the Ordinance for proceeding against the person, the provisions of section
498. Cr. P. C. will not be applicable in view of subsection (2) of section 1, Cr. P. C. I respectfully agree with the view as taken by the Division Bench. In view of the above state of law, the question of the application of subsection (2) of section 5 or subsection (2) of section 29, Cr. P. C. cannot arise as the applicability of the provisions of the Code has been excluded. The question as to whether the High Court is not included within the meaning of the words `criminal Courts' can also not be of any avail as section 498, Cr. P. C. is a provision in the Code and in view of the fact that the provisions of the Code have been excluded, section 498, Cr. P. C. cannot be taken out of the context and invoked for the purpose of seeking the relief for the grant of.bail. Reliance on sub‑clauses (a) and (b) of clause (5) of the Proclamation is also not relevant as there is no dispute either with regard to the continuance of the laws or the jurisdiction of the Courts.
9. The learned counsel had also referred to me a decision reported in P L D 1959 Pesh. 49 for the purpose of showing that the High Court has jurisdiction to grant bail under section 498, Cr. P. C. There the position was entirely different as the case was pending for trial in an ordinary Court which is not the position here.
10. Since the offences under the Penal Code have been committed in the course of the same transanction it will not be worthwhile to consider the grant of bail in respect of those offences when no bail can be granted in respect of offences created by Martial Law Regulations. In Criminal Miscellaneous No. 1902/69 my learned brother Muhammad Afzal Khan, J., has also held that the High Court has got no jurisdiction to grant bail in similar circumstances.
11. The upshot of the above discussion is that the High Court has no jurisdiction to grant bail under section 498, Cr. P. C. in respect of the offences created by a Martial Law Regulation. In the result, I would dismiss both these petitions. K. B. A. Petition dismissed.