1984 PLP 1702 (CLC)
Sheikh GULZAR AHMAD‑Petitioner Versus ADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE, SARGODHA AND 3 OTHERS — Respondents
| Citation | 1984 PLP 1702 (CLC) |
| Forum / Court | Lahore |
| Bench Members | Ghazanfar Ali Gondal, J |
| Parties | Sheikh GULZAR AHMAD‑Petitioner Versus ADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE, SARGODHA AND 3 OTHERS — Respondents |
| Primary Law | (b) West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance (VI of 1959)‑, JUDGMENT, (a) West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance (VI of 1959)‑ |
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 1984 PLP 1702 (CLC)?
This judgment primarily cites: (b) West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance (VI of 1959)‑, JUDGMENT, (a) West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance (VI of 1959)‑ as referenced in Pakistani case law index.
Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 1984 PLP 1702 (CLC)?
The case was heard and decided by the Lahore bench comprising: Ghazanfar Ali Gondal, J.
Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?
Cite this legal precedent as: 1984 PLP 1702 (CLC) (Sheikh GULZAR AHMAD‑Petitioner Versus ADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE, SARGODHA AND 3 OTHERS — Respondents). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.
Laws Cited
Representation
- Ch. Hamid‑ud‑Din for Petitioner.
- Nemo for Respondents Nos. 1 and 2.
- Raja Muhammad An war and Malik Muhammad Nawaz for Respondents
- Dates of hearing : 20th, 23rd, 25th January; 20th February, 1982 and 27th February, 1983.
Headnotes / Summary
‑‑ S. 13‑Application seeking ejectment of tenant from shop for extension of business‑Landlord himself tenant in a shop in another locality‑Location of disputed shop suitable to intended extension of business‑Contention that landlord owned two shops in other part of city ‑Held : Fact that landlord owned two shops occupied by tenants would be of no avail as landlord would still be justified in making choice and seeking eviction of tenant from shop for personal requirement. Haji Muhammad v. Muhammad Rafiyue 1980 S C M R 2 ref. ‑‑ S. 15‑Civil Procedure‑Code (V of 1908), O. XLI, r. 31‑Judgment Additional District Judge hearing appeals under S. 15 of Ordinance, 1959 a persona designata and did not constitute a Court under Civil Procedure Code‑Not bound by any provision of C. P. C. for writing judgments in accordance with O. XLI, r. 31‑Sufficient to ensure that he has applied his mind to facts and circumstances of case in light of evidence on record, not bound to discuss evidence as a civil Court -Appellate Authority dealing with valuable civil rights of citizens under Rent Restriction Ordinance, held, it is necessary that it should appear from judgment of such authority that it applied its mind to entire facts of case in light of evidence on record‑Additional District Judge appearing to have read through whole of evidence, taken note of main points of evidence and recorded same in judgment, and cannot be said to have not applied its mind to evidence on record.‑[Judgment]. Nos. 3 and
4. In this case Muhammad Irshad and Ikram Ilahi, respondents filed on 28‑9‑1979, an application for ejectment of the petitioner from the premises of Shop No. 1‑S‑34, situate in Block No. 1, Muhammadi Bazar, Sargodha, on the ground of personal ‑ need. It was specifically stated in paragraph 2 of the application that the respondents/landlords who ate themselves tenants in another shop in Phoolanwali Gali, Sargodha are dealing in the whole sale business of Gur, Shakkar and Desi sugar and that they wanted to extend their business on account of which they needed the shop in question. It was further alleged in the application that Muhammadi Bazar in which disputed shop was situate was a Karyana Market and that for the purposes of the other business of grocery which they wanted to start in the disputed shop, the respondents had no shop in the said market except the one in dispute.
2. In the written statement the petitioner controverted the averments made in this ejectment application. A preliminary objection was raised that the respondents owned two shops numbered as 46‑A, Satellite Town, Sargodha which they had rented out after April, 1979. He also controverted the claim of the said respondents for personal requirement of the shop in question on the ground that the said respondents were already conducting extensive business in the shop taken by them on rent in Phuloonwali Gali and that the said shop is more than sufficient for their requirements and was situate in the market in which the disputed shop was situate.
3. On the pleadings of the parties, the following issues' were framed:‑
. "(1) Whether the petitioners own other shops in the city which had been rented out to different tenants, if so, its effect. (2) Whether the petitioners require in good faith the disputed shop for their personal need. (3) Whether the applicants own no shop in Muhammadi Bazar, if so, its effect." Both the parties led oral and documentary evidence in support of their respective contentions.
4. On Issue No. 3, the learned Rent Controller came to the conclusion that the respondents/landlords owned no shop in Muhammadi Bazar, Sargodha, except the one in dispute. On Issue No. 1, he held that the petitioner/tenant had failed to prove that the respondents/landlords own two shops in Satellite Town, Sargodha. On this very issue he further held that even assuming that the respondents owned two shops in Satellite Town, Sargodha, still this gave no benefit to the petitioner/tenant as the said two shops according to the stand of petitioner himself were occupied by tenants and the law laid down in Haji Muhammad v. Muhammad Rafique (1980 S C M R 2), was that where other shops owned by landlords are all occupied the landlords are justified in seeking eviction from the shop for their personal requirement. On Issue No. 21 learned Rent Controller came to the conclusion that the disputed shop was situate in Muhammadi Bazar which is suitable for business of grocery which the landlords intended to start and the shop in question was required by them in good faith for their personal use. On the basis of these findings the learned Refit Controller by his order, dated 16‑7‑1980, directed the ejectment of the petitioner from the premises of the shop in question.
4. The petitioner filed an appeal against the said eviction order. That came up for hearing before the Additional District Judge, Sargodha, who rejected the same by his order, dated 8‑12‑1980. The learned Additional District Judge recounted in detail the pith of the evidence led by the parties and came to the conclusion that the respondents were carrying on their business in a rented shop and that they own no other shop except the, shop in dispute. On the basis of these conclusions be affirmed the findings of the learned Rent Controller on all the issues.
5. Learned counsel for the petitioner has challenged the order of the Additional District Judge on the ground that the appellate Court had not recorded any finding on issue No. 2 with regard to personal need of the respondents. He has also contended that the evidence on the record had not been discussed and the order of the appellate Court was no judgment in the eye of law as it was not a speaking order.
6. I have given my anxious thought to points raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner. I do not think that the learned Additional District Judge had not given any finding on Issue No.
2. As already stated the learned Additional District Judge had recited the pith of evidence of each witness who had appeared before the Rent Controller and having gone through and considered the same had come to the conclusion that respondents landlords are carrying on their business in a rented shop and that they own no other shop except the disputed shop. It is thereafter that he affirmed the findings of the learned Rent Controller on all the issues including Issue No.
2. In my opinion, therefore, when he affirmed the findings of the learned Rent Controller on all the issues, he by implication gave a finding that the shop in question was needed by the respondents landlords bona fide for their personal use.
7. I have also considered the point that the learned Additional District Judge should have discussed the evidence and without discussion of the same the judgment of the Additional District Judge is no‑ judgment in the eye of law. I am afraid, I cannot accept this contention. The plea of the learned counsel is based upon Order XLI, rule 31, C. P. C. which lays down that the Court of appeal is bound to record in the judgment the points for determina tion and decisions thereon and reasons for the decision. However, as held in Khadim Mohy‑ud‑Din, Mrs. S. Mahmud v. Ch. Rehmat Ali Nagra and Mst. Aziz Begum (P L D 1965 S C 459), the Additional District Judge is persona designata. He is at any rate an upper tier of the Special Tribunal and, therefore, does not constitute a Court under the Civil Procedure Code. He is not, therefore, bound by any provision of the C. P. C. and is not under compulsion to write the judgment in accordance with the said provision of law. 1t is sufficient to ensure that be has applied his mind to the facts and circumstances of the case in the light of the evidence on the record. In my opinion he is not bound to discuss the evidence in the manner in which a civil Court is to do so while writing its judgment. However, since the appellate authority deals with the valuable civil rights of citizens as granted to them in, the Punjab Urban Rent. Restriction Ordinance, it is necessary that it should appear from the judgment that be had applied his mind to the entirety of the facts of the case in the light of evidence on record. The learned Additional District Judge appears to have read through the whole of the evidence, taken note of the main points of the evidence of each one of the witnesses and recorded the same in his judgment. It is thereafter that he came to the conclusion that finding of the Rent Controller on all the three issues was correct. It cannot, therefore, be said that he had not applied his mind to the evidence on record. In view of this there appears to be no force in this contention and the same is repelled.
8. Learned counsel for the petitioner has next challenged the finding of the learned Rent Controller on Issue No. 1 on the ground that the finding of the Rent Controller that the petitioner bad failed to prove that the respondents owned no shop in Satellite Town Sargodha is based on misreading of the record. 1 think 1 need not go into the question as it is admitted in evidence and it is the stand of the petitioner in his written statement that the said two shops stood rented out to other tenants and the Rent Controller bad taken note of the said fact and had relying upon the law as declared in Haji Muhammad v. Muhammad Rafique held that since the said shops were in possession of other tenants, the respondents/landlords were justified in seeking eviction from the present shop for their personal requirements, It was also noted that the said two shops are admittedly situate at a distance of 1 miles from Muhammadi Bazar and it has not been shown by anyone of the witnesses that the Bazar in which said two shops are situate is a market of grocery. The learned Rent Controller was, therefore, correct in holding that assuming that the said two shops in Satellite Town were owned by the respondents/landlords the said respondents were justified in making a choir and seeking the eviction of the petitioner from the disputed shop on the ground that it was situate in a grocery market.
9. The next point raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Rent Controller had come to the conclusion that the shop presently occupied by the respondents on rent is insufficient for their need and this was totally against the pleadings of the parties wherein the insufficiency of accommodation in the shop presently occupied by the respondents/landlords had not been raised. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, the Rent Controller had been misled due to the said misapprehension in giving a finding of fact that the respondents/landlords required the shop in question for their personal use.
10. I have looked into the said point raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner. I am afraid, I cannot accept this too. The respondents had stated in their eviction application that they were doing the business of Gur, Shakkar and Desi sugar in Phoolonwali Gali, Sargodba and that they wanted to extend their business further and that the disputed shop was situate in Muhammadi Bazar, which was a Karyana market and that they, apart from the business they are presently doing, wanted to start business of Karyana merchant in the disputed shop situated in Muhammadi Bazar for which they bad no other shop in the said Bazar, except the disputed shop. It is clear from reading of two averments together that what the respondents were saying in their eviction application was that there was not sufficient space in the shop which they are presently running in Phoolonwali Gali for extension of their business. Learned counsel states that extension means the extending of the same business, while Karayana merchant was a different business. In my opinion, however, the pleadings in the cases under the Rent Restriction Ordinance should not be construed so strictly. Even otherwise, Gur, Shakkar and Desi sugar are part of the grocery (Karyana). It had come in the evidence of A. W. 1 that the shop, the respondents are presently running is of the dimension of 8' x 10'. The Rent Controller was, therefore, not incorrect in saying that the shop which they are presently running was insufficient for the needs of the respondents/landlords.
11. After going through the entire record, in my opinion no case is made out for holding that the findings of the Rent Controller especially the one relating to the personal requirements of the shop in question by the respondents for their personal use is vitiated by any jurisdictional defect.
12. For the foregoing reasons, there is no merit in this writ petition and the same is dismissed. There will, however, be no order as to costs. The petitioner is however, granted two months time to make arrangements to vacate the premises in dispute. M. B. A. Petition dismissed.
Judgment & Decree
In this case Muhammad Irshad and Ikram Ilahi, respondents filed on 28‑9‑1979, an application for ejectment of the petitioner from the premises of Shop No. 1‑S‑34, situate in Block No. 1, Muhammadi Bazar, Sargodha, on the ground of personal ‑ need. It was specifically stated in paragraph 2 of the application that the respondents/landlords who ate themselves tenants in another shop in Phoolanwali Gali, Sargodha are dealing in the whole sale business of Gur, Shakkar and Desi sugar and that they wanted to extend their business on account of which they needed the shop in question. It was further alleged in the application that Muhammadi Bazar in which disputed shop was situate was a Karyana Market and that for the purposes of the other business of grocery which they wanted to start in the disputed shop, the respondents had no shop in the said market except the one in dispute.
2. In the written statement the petitioner controverted the averments made in this ejectment application. A preliminary objection was raised that the respondents owned two shops numbered as 46‑A, Satellite Town, Sargodha which they had rented out after April, 1979. He also controverted the claim of the said respondents for personal requirement of the shop in question on the ground that the said respondents were already conducting extensive business in the shop taken by them on rent in Phuloonwali Gali and that the said shop is more than sufficient for their requirements and was situate in the market in which the disputed shop was situate.
3. On the pleadings of the parties, the following issues' were framed:‑
. "(1) Whether the petitioners own other shops in the city which had been rented out to different tenants, if so, its effect. (2) Whether the petitioners require in good faith the disputed shop for their personal need. (3) Whether the applicants own no shop in Muhammadi Bazar, if so, its effect." Both the parties led oral and documentary evidence in support of their respective contentions.
4. On Issue No. 3, the learned Rent Controller came to the conclusion that the respondents/landlords owned no shop in Muhammadi Bazar, Sargodha, except the one in dispute. On Issue No. 1, he held that the petitioner/tenant had failed to prove that the respondents/landlords own two shops in Satellite Town, Sargodha. On this very issue he further held that even assuming that the respondents owned two shops in Satellite Town, Sargodha, still this gave no benefit to the petitioner/tenant as the said two shops according to the stand of petitioner himself were occupied by tenants and the law laid down in Haji Muhammad v. Muhammad Rafique (1980 S C M R 2), was that where other shops owned by landlords are all occupied the landlords are justified in seeking eviction from the shop for their personal requirement. On Issue No. 21 learned Rent Controller came to the conclusion that the disputed shop was situate in Muhammadi Bazar which is suitable for business of grocery which the landlords intended to start and the shop in question was required by them in good faith for their personal use. On the basis of these findings the learned Refit Controller by his order, dated 16‑7‑1980, directed the ejectment of the petitioner from the premises of the shop in question.
4. The petitioner filed an appeal against the said eviction order. That came up for hearing before the Additional District Judge, Sargodha, who rejected the same by his order, dated 8‑12‑1980. The learned Additional District Judge recounted in detail the pith of the evidence led by the parties and came to the conclusion that the respondents were carrying on their business in a rented shop and that they own no other shop except the, shop in dispute. On the basis of these conclusions be affirmed the findings of the learned Rent Controller on all the issues.
5. Learned counsel for the petitioner has challenged the order of the Additional District Judge on the ground that the appellate Court had not recorded any finding on issue No. 2 with regard to personal need of the respondents. He has also contended that the evidence on the record had not been discussed and the order of the appellate Court was no judgment in the eye of law as it was not a speaking order.
6. I have given my anxious thought to points raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner. I do not think that the learned Additional District Judge had not given any finding on Issue No.
2. As already stated the learned Additional District Judge had recited the pith of evidence of each witness who had appeared before the Rent Controller and having gone through and considered the same had come to the conclusion that respondents landlords are carrying on their business in a rented shop and that they own no other shop except the disputed shop. It is thereafter that he affirmed the findings of the learned Rent Controller on all the issues including Issue No.
2. In my opinion, therefore, when he affirmed the findings of the learned Rent Controller on all the issues, he by implication gave a finding that the shop in question was needed by the respondents landlords bona fide for their personal use.
7. I have also considered the point that the learned Additional District Judge should have discussed the evidence and without discussion of the same the judgment of the Additional District Judge is no‑ judgment in the eye of law. I am afraid, I cannot accept this contention. The plea of the learned counsel is based upon Order XLI, rule 31, C. P. C. which lays down that the Court of appeal is bound to record in the judgment the points for determina tion and decisions thereon and reasons for the decision. However, as held in Khadim Mohy‑ud‑Din, Mrs. S. Mahmud v. Ch. Rehmat Ali Nagra and Mst. Aziz Begum (P L D 1965 S C 459), the Additional District Judge is persona designata. He is at any rate an upper tier of the Special Tribunal and, therefore, does not constitute a Court under the Civil Procedure Code. He is not, therefore, bound by any provision of the C. P. C. and is not under compulsion to write the judgment in accordance with the said provision of law. 1t is sufficient to ensure that be has applied his mind to the facts and circumstances of the case in the light of the evidence on the record. In my opinion he is not bound to discuss the evidence in the manner in which a civil Court is to do so while writing its judgment. However, since the appellate authority deals with the valuable civil rights of citizens as granted to them in, the Punjab Urban Rent. Restriction Ordinance, it is necessary that it should appear from the judgment that be had applied his mind to the entirety of the facts of the case in the light of evidence on record. The learned Additional District Judge appears to have read through the whole of the evidence, taken note of the main points of the evidence of each one of the witnesses and recorded the same in his judgment. It is thereafter that he came to the conclusion that finding of the Rent Controller on all the three issues was correct. It cannot, therefore, be said that he had not applied his mind to the evidence on record. In view of this there appears to be no force in this contention and the same is repelled.
8. Learned counsel for the petitioner has next challenged the finding of the learned Rent Controller on Issue No. 1 on the ground that the finding of the Rent Controller that the petitioner bad failed to prove that the respondents owned no shop in Satellite Town Sargodha is based on misreading of the record. 1 think 1 need not go into the question as it is admitted in evidence and it is the stand of the petitioner in his written statement that the said two shops stood rented out to other tenants and the Rent Controller bad taken note of the said fact and had relying upon the law as declared in Haji Muhammad v. Muhammad Rafique held that since the said shops were in possession of other tenants, the respondents/landlords were justified in seeking eviction from the present shop for their personal requirements, It was also noted that the said two shops are admittedly situate at a distance of 1 miles from Muhammadi Bazar and it has not been shown by anyone of the witnesses that the Bazar in which said two shops are situate is a market of grocery. The learned Rent Controller was, therefore, correct in holding that assuming that the said two shops in Satellite Town were owned by the respondents/landlords the said respondents were justified in making a choir and seeking the eviction of the petitioner from the disputed shop on the ground that it was situate in a grocery market.
9. The next point raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Rent Controller had come to the conclusion that the shop presently occupied by the respondents on rent is insufficient for their need and this was totally against the pleadings of the parties wherein the insufficiency of accommodation in the shop presently occupied by the respondents/landlords had not been raised. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, the Rent Controller had been misled due to the said misapprehension in giving a finding of fact that the respondents/landlords required the shop in question for their personal use.
10. I have looked into the said point raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner. I am afraid, I cannot accept this too. The respondents had stated in their eviction application that they were doing the business of Gur, Shakkar and Desi sugar in Phoolonwali Gali, Sargodba and that they wanted to extend their business further and that the disputed shop was situate in Muhammadi Bazar, which was a Karyana market and that they, apart from the business they are presently doing, wanted to start business of Karyana merchant in the disputed shop situated in Muhammadi Bazar for which they bad no other shop in the said Bazar, except the disputed shop. It is clear from reading of two averments together that what the respondents were saying in their eviction application was that there was not sufficient space in the shop which they are presently running in Phoolonwali Gali for extension of their business. Learned counsel states that extension means the extending of the same business, while Karayana merchant was a different business. In my opinion, however, the pleadings in the cases under the Rent Restriction Ordinance should not be construed so strictly. Even otherwise, Gur, Shakkar and Desi sugar are part of the grocery (Karyana). It had come in the evidence of A. W. 1 that the shop, the respondents are presently running is of the dimension of 8' x 10'. The Rent Controller was, therefore, not incorrect in saying that the shop which they are presently running was insufficient for the needs of the respondents/landlords.
11. After going through the entire record, in my opinion no case is made out for holding that the findings of the Rent Controller especially the one relating to the personal requirements of the shop in question by the respondents for their personal use is vitiated by any jurisdictional defect.
12. For the foregoing reasons, there is no merit in this writ petition and the same is dismissed. There will, however, be no order as to costs. The petitioner is however, granted two months time to make arrangements to vacate the premises in dispute. M. B. A. Petition dismissed.