P (PLP)

MUHAMMAD SHARIF, J.‑This Letters Patent appeal has arisen out of execution proceedings. A dairy farm was purchased by Allah Bakhsh & Sons. The whole of the consideration not having been paid, a compromise decree for Rs. 20,000 was obtained by Jaishi Ram on 13th of January 1939 from the Court of Mr. Tek Chand Sethi, Subordinate Judge, 1st Class, Lahore. Some property which included a house in Almora, was also hypothecated. On 17th of January 1939, the decree‑holder applied for transfer certificate for the sale of the house at Almora. This was done, On 8th of August 1939 an application for execution of the decree was presented to the Court which had passed it. On 22nd of February 1940 by order of the District judge, dated 14th of February 1940, the execution file was transferred to the Court of Mr. P. N. Joshua. On 24th of February 1940 Jaishi Ram decree holder sold his decree to Muhammad Saeed, respondent for Rs. 10,000 and applied for certification of the transfer. This was done on 4th of April 1940. On 14th of June 1940 the dairy farm was sold for Rs. 7,200 and the decree was satisfied to that extent. It is undisputed that the proceedings were perfectly in order up to 14th of June 1940. On 24th of March 1943, an application was made to the Court of the District judge in which it was mentioned that the decree was passed by Mr. Tek Chand Sethi and that it had been satisfied in part in the Court of Mr. P. N. Joshua, and it was prayed that the application be sent to the Court of Mr. Tara Chand Aggarwal, who had succeeded Mr. P. N. Joshua. The necessary order was made. The proceedings continued in the Court of Mr. Tara Chand Aggarwal till 13th of May 1943 when the application was consigned to the record room. On 1st of August 1944 an application was made direct to Mr. J. N. Kapur, the successor‑in‑office of Mr. Tara Chand Aggarwal, but this was returned on the ground that that was not the Court which had passed the decree and could not, therefore, execute it. This application does not appear to have been re‑filed. On 24th of May 1945, an application was made to the District Judge of Lahore in terms of the earlier application of 24th of March, 1943, and the application was sent to the Court of Mr. J. N. Kapur as prayed for. This was got dismissed by the decree holder himself on 25th of May.1945. On 28th of May 1945 the decree‑holder made another applica tion to the District Judge. It was sent to the Court of Mr. J. N. Kapur, who issued warrants of attachment and fixed 22nd of June 1945 for hearing. The property was attached on 31st of May. The judgment‑debtors filed objections under section 47 read with section 151 Civil Procedure Code. Pleading (1) that the applications made to the District judge were out of order and could not be considered as steps‑in‑aid of execution and (2) that a notice under Order 21, rule 22, Civil Procedure Code was not served. Without any order from the Court, a new objection petition was put in on 19th of June 1945 in which it was stated (1) that the Court of Mr. Tek Chand Sethi which had passed the decree, never cased to exist and the decree could not, therefore, be properly transferred to the Court of Mr. J. N. Kapur and he could not execute the same and (2) that the order of attachment was without jurisdiction. The objections were disallowed by Mr. J. N. Kapur, Commercial Subordinate Judge, Lahore, on 26th of July 1945. An appeal against the same was heard by a learned judge in Chambers, who agreed with the conclusions of the trial judge and dismissed the appeal on 12th of November 1946. It is against this order that the judgment‑debtors have filed a Letters Patent appeal. The main contentions of the appellants are that the application for execution of the decree could be made only to the Court which passed it, under section 38 of the Civil Procedure Code, that the various applications beginning with 24th of March 1.943 and ending with 28th of May 1945, made direct to the District judge, were wholly illegal and could not rank as steps‑in‑aid of execution and that the time spent to prosecute these applications could not be excluded for the purposes of limitation. It is true that under section 38, Civil Procedure Code, a decree maybe executed either by the Court which passed it or by the Court to which it is sent for execution. This would clearly include the Court to which the decree on transfer has been sent for execution under section 24 of the Civil Procedure Code. Section 39,subsection (1), Civil Procedure Code, deals with‑cases where the Court which passed the decree had, on the application of the decree‑holder, sent it for execution to another Court in any of the circumstances referred to in the section. The execution is still retained by the Court which passed the decree and all applications relating thereto must, therefore, be made to it. The learned judge in Chambers was of the view that the applications presented to the District judge and made over to the Court of Mr. P. N. Joshua or his successors‑in‑office, were fully covered by section 34 of the Punjab Courts Act, 1918, which empowers a District judge to direct by written order, that any civil business cognizable by his Court and the Courts under his control shall be distributed among such. Courts in such manner as he thinks fit. It might be added that the District judge had sent the first application for execution to Mr. P. N. Joshua and the subsequent ones to his successors‑in- office. Apart from section 34 of the Punjab Courts Act, the full effect of the order of the District judge, dated 14th of February 1940, transferring the execution of the decree to the Court of Mr. P. N. Joshua, has not been appreciated. As already observed, an appli cation for execution of the decree was put in the Court which had passed it, on 8th of August 1939. The District judge transferred the pending proceedings to the Court of Mr. P. N. Joshua. This was and could be only under section 24 of the Civil Procedure Code. There is no dispute whatsoever that the Court of Mr. P. N. Joshua was not in any way incompetent to proceed ‑with the execution of the decree: On 24th of February 1940, the following order from the Court of Mr. P. N. Joshua, Commercial Sub‑Judge, 1st .Class, Lahore, is addressed to the Civil Nazir, Lahore :‑ The above‑noted case has on transfer come to this Court: The parties and their counsel should be informed to attend on 2nd of March 1940." The real question for consideration is ; whether the application for execution pending in the Court of Mr. Tek Chand Sethi was, by the order of the District judge, dated 14th of February 1940, alone sent for disposal to the Court of Mr. P. N. Joshua, or whether the decree itself was transferred for execution to that Court? There is on the record nothing to suggest that the decree was not made over to the Court of Mr. P. N. Joshua for, execution.) This Court was, therefore, after the transfer of the proceedings, the proper Court which could execute the decree and to which successive applications for execution should have been made. It is needless to point out that under section 150 of the Code of Civil Procedure, where the business of any Court is transferred to any other Court, the Court to which the business is so transferred shall have the same powers and shall perform the same duties as those respectively conferred and imposed by or under this Code upon the Court from which the business was so transferred. The transferee Court had now taken the place of the Court which had passed the decree and could execute it in the same manner as the transferor Court. In this view of the case, the presentation of applications for execution to the District judge with a request to make them over to the Court of Mr. P. N. Joshua or his) successors, was wholly unnecessary. These applications could be presented direct to the Court to which the decree had already been) sent for execution. The order by the District Judge was a mere surplus age, and the moment the applications reached the Court of Mr. P. N. Joshua, they were perfectly in order, and at the worst may be taken to have been presented on the date when they were registered in the transferee Court. The Court acquired the right to act upon the applications not by virtue of the order of the District judge but by the fact that it was seized of the decree itself. Reference in this connection might be made to A. I. R. 1934 Lahore

728. It was held that " where however a decree is transferred for execution without any limitation, the original Court has no longer the power to execute the decree until and unless the decree is returned by the transferee Court with a certificate of non‑satisfaction." The learned counsel for the appellant relied upon 73 C. L. J. 351, A. I. R. 1939 Cal. 651; A.

1. R. 1922 Cal. 41, A. I. R. 1942 Cal. 321, A. I. R 1921: Pat. 152; 71 P. R. 1885 and 9 P. R. 1901. The Calcutta and the. Patna cases refer to the assignment of business by the District judge and are of no help in determining the point where the decree had been transferred for execution to another Court. 71 P. R. 1885 concerned itself with the effect of an order for the distribution of civil business within a district passed under section 35 of the Punjab Courts Act. It was held that such an order was meant to regulate the distribution of business between several Courts having jurisdiction to entertain it, but it could not affect the jurisdiction of the Court. 9 P. R. 1901 simply laid down that a Court to which a decree was sent for execution would have no jurisdiction to execute it where it was in excess of its pecuniary limits. The above discussion would show that the Court td which successive applications for execution were sent by the District judge, was the Court to which the decree had already been sent for execution under section 24 of the Civil Procedure Code. It was not a case falling under section 39, nor was it a case where the transferee Court was required to certify to the Court which had passed the decree, as to what had happened to it. The trans feree Court was fully competent to proceed with the execution of the decree. The contentions of the appellant have, therefore, no force, and the appeal is dismissed with costs. K. M. A./A.H. Appeal dismissed.