1995 PLP 302 (PLC)
YAQOOB and 3 others Versus DIVISIONAL SUPERINTENDENT, PAKISTAN RAILWAYS, KARACHI
| Citation | 1995 PLP 302 (PLC) |
| Forum / Court | Labour Appellate Tribunal Sindh |
| Bench Members | Ali Nawaz Budhani, Appellate Tribunal |
| Parties | YAQOOB and 3 others Versus DIVISIONAL SUPERINTENDENT, PAKISTAN RAILWAYS, KARACHI |
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 1995 PLP 302 (PLC)?
This judgment primarily cites: statutory provisions as referenced in Pakistani case law index.
Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 1995 PLP 302 (PLC)?
The case was heard and decided by the Labour Appellate Tribunal Sindh bench comprising: Ali Nawaz Budhani, Appellate Tribunal.
Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?
Cite this legal precedent as: 1995 PLP 302 (PLC) (YAQOOB and 3 others Versus DIVISIONAL SUPERINTENDENT, PAKISTAN RAILWAYS, KARACHI). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.
Representation
- Ishaque Abbasi for Respondent.
- 5. I have heard Mr. Moosa Laghari, the learned Advocate for the appellants and Mr. Ishaq Abbasi; the learned counsel on behalf of the respondent Railways and have also perused the record and proceedings of the. Case. There is an admitted position that the charge‑sheets to the appellants were issued after deductions from the salaries the amount of TA. alleged to have been wrongly paid to them. Admittedly there is no enquiry into the matter whatsoever. The sole witness of the respondent Railways had specifically admitted in his evidence that the appellants had actually performed outdoor duties and they were paid their claimed TAs. after proper certification of the competent officer. Admittedly; there is nothing on record to show that what happened to the alleged charge‑sheets issued to the appellants. Further, there is an admission on record that all the appellants had complied with legal formalities before they were paid the disputed amount towards T.A. and DA. However, Mr. Moosa Laghari, the learned Advocate for the appellants hat vehemently argued that it is a settled law that the order passed mala fide, without jurisdiction or in violation of mandatory provision of law or principle of natural justice, was a void order, thus, in such a case, period of limitation should not be counted, therefore, the impugned order cannot be sustained and liable to be set aside. I would agree with Mr. Ishaq Abbasi, the learned counsel on behalf of the respondent Railways has no legs to stand in rebuttal of the above admitted position as well as the pleadings of Mr. Laghari. I would therefore, hold that the grievance petitions of the appellants were well within time and they are fully entitled to refund of all their deducted amounts, as prayed. Thus, the impugned order cannot be maintained.
Judgment & Decree
Ishaque Abbasi for Respondent. Date of hearing: 20th August, 1987. These are four separate appeals filed by each of the appellants against a common impugned order, dated 30‑9‑1985, passed by the Sindh Labour Court No. VI, Hyderabad, who had dismissed the grievance petitions of the appellants under section 25‑A, I.R.O. 1969. As, the facts and circumstances in all these four appeals are common and similar therefore, I would also dispose of these appeals by this single decision.
2. The brief facts of the case are that the appellants claimed to have performed outdoor duties for a certain period, being permanent employees of the respondent Railways and after submission of their respective claims for TA. having been duly certified by the competent Authority, they were paid accordingly. The appellants claimed that after sometime, the already paid amount was started to be recovered from their respective monthly bills without intimation of any reason or decision therefore. However, they claimed that they served their respective grievance notices. upon the respondent Railways and thereafter the present grievance petitions were filed before the learned Labour Court for the refund of their respective deducted amounts.
3. The respondent Railways resisted the petitions mainly on the ground that the appellants did not perform any outdoor duty and such movements were never entered into the relevant registers, therefore, they were not entitled to any TA. which was being recovered from their respective monthly, salaries and further that, as the action of the respondent Railways in this behalf did not infringe any guaranteed or secured right, as it was taken after due enquiries and affording proper opportunities to the appellants, therefore, they were not entitled to maintain their respective grievance petitions which were liable to be dismissed.
4. Both the parties were examined and duly cross‑examined before the learned Labour Court, and, thereafter, it had passed the impugned common order, hence, these four appeals.
5. I have heard Mr. Moosa Laghari, the learned Advocate for the appellants and Mr. Ishaq Abbasi; the learned counsel on behalf of the respondent Railways and have also perused the record and proceedings of the. Case. There is an admitted position that the charge‑sheets to the appellants were issued after deductions from the salaries the amount of TA. alleged to have been wrongly paid to them. Admittedly there is no enquiry into the matter whatsoever. The sole witness of the respondent Railways had specifically admitted in his evidence that the appellants had actually performed outdoor duties and they were paid their claimed TAs. after proper certification of the competent officer. Admittedly; there is nothing on record to show that what happened to the alleged charge‑sheets issued to the appellants. Further, there is an admission on record that all the appellants had complied with legal formalities before they were paid the disputed amount towards T.A. and DA. However, Mr. Moosa Laghari, the learned Advocate for the appellants hat vehemently argued that it is a settled law that the order passed mala fide, without jurisdiction or in violation of mandatory provision of law or principle of natural justice, was a void order, thus, in such a case, period of limitation should not be counted, therefore, the impugned order cannot be sustained and liable to be set aside. I would agree with Mr. Ishaq Abbasi, the learned counsel on behalf of the respondent Railways has no legs to stand in rebuttal of the above admitted position as well as the pleadings of Mr. Laghari. I would therefore, hold that the grievance petitions of the appellants were well within time and they are fully entitled to refund of all their deducted amounts, as prayed. Thus, the impugned order cannot be maintained.
6. For the reasons stated by me above, I would set aside the impugned order and would allow all the four appeals. The appellants are directed to be paid back all their deducted amounts in regard to the claim of TA. as have been prayed by them in their grievance petitions under section 25‑A, I.R.O., 1969 forthwith. A.E./1087/Lb.S Appeal allowed.