1995 PLP 554 (PLC)

4. On the other hand, Mr. Munawar Ghani, learned counsel for the respondents 3 and 4 has contended that the appellant as C.B.A., was not competent to serve grievance notice on behalf of the workers or to present and file a petition under the above provisions on their behalf.

5. Before proceeding with the above contentions on merits, we may refer to subsections (1) to (4) of section 25‑A of the I.R.O., which have direct bearing on the controversy in issue. The above subsection read as follows: ‑‑ Subsection (1) of section 25‑A of the I.R.O. "25‑A. Redress or individual grievance.‑‑‑(1) A worker may bring his grievance in respect of any right guaranteed or secured to him by or under any law or any award or settlement for the time being in force to the notice of his employer in writing, either, himself or through his shop steward or collective bargaining agent, within three months of the day on which cause of such grievance arises. (2) Where a worker himself brings his grievance to the notice of the employer, the employer shall, within fifteen days of the grievance being brought to his notice, communicate his decision in writing to the worker. (3) Where a worker brings his grievance to the notice of his employer through his shop steward or collective bargaining agent the employer, shall within seven days of the grievance being brought to his notice, communicate his decision in writing to the shop steward or as the case may be the collective bargaining agent. (4) If the employer fails to communicate a decision within the period specified in subsection (2) or as the case may be subsection (3), or if the worker if dissatisfied with such decision, the worker or shop steward may take the matter to his collective bargaining agent or the Labour Court or as the case may be the collective bargaining agent may take the matter to the Labour Court and where the matter is taken to the Labour Court, it shall give a decision within seven days from the date of the matter being brought before it as if such matter were in an industrial dispute: Provided that a worker who desires to take the matter to the Labour Court shall do so within a period of two months from the date of the communication of the employer or as the case may be from the expiry of the period mentioned in subsection (2) or subsection (3) as the case may be."

6. A perusal of the above‑quoted subsection (1) of section 25‑A of the I.R.O. indicates that a worker may bring his grievance in respect of any right guaranteed or secured to him by or under any law or any award or settlement for the time being in force to the notice of his employer in writing either himself or through his shop steward or C.B.A. within 3 months of the day on which the case of such grievance has arisen, where subsection (2) lays down that where a worker himself brings his grievance to the notice of his employer, the employer shall, within 15 days, of the grievance being brought to his notice communicate his decision in writing to the worker. It may further be noticed that subsection (3) contemplates that where a worker brings his grievance to the notice of his employer through his shop steward or C.B.A. the employer shall within 7 days of grievance being brought to his notice communicate his decision in writing to the shop steward or as the case may be, the C.BA. It may also be noticed that subsection (4) provides that if the employer fails to communicate a decision within the periods mentioned in subsection (2) or subsection (3), as the case may be or if the worker is dissatisfied with such decision the worker. or the shop steward may take the matter to his C.B.A. or the Labour Court or as the case may be the C.BA. may take the matter to the Labour Court who shall give a decision within 7 days from the date of the matter being brought it as if such matter were an industrial dispute. It may also be pointed out that the proviso to subsection (4) lays down that where a worker desires to take the matter to the Labour Court, he shall do so within a period of two months from the date of communication of the decision of the employer or as the case may be from the expiry of the periods mentioned in subsection (2) or subsection (3) as the case may be.

7. Mr. Ali Amjad, in support of his above submission has referred to a recent judgment of this Court in the case of Karachi Pipe Mills Employees' Union, Karachi v. Karachi Pipe Mills Ltd. (1992 SCMR 36), which was an appeal with the leave of this Court, against the judgment of a Full Bench of the High Court of Sindh reported in 1984 PLC 1359, wherein while dealing with a question whether C.BA. was empowered to make an application on behalf of its workers for enforcement of rights guaranteed to them under section 47 of the Factories Act, could file an application under section 34 of the I.R.O., has also dilated upon the scope of section 25‑A of the I.R.O. as follows: "

17. In case of an individual grievance of a worker in respect of predetermined rights an application is to be made under section 25‑A of the Ordinance. The procedure laid down in this provision has to be complied with before moving the Labour Court. The C.BA. has also been authorised to move the Labour Court in case of individual grievance if the worker has brought his grievance to the notice of his employer through his collective bargaining agent. Where the law has empowered the CBA to move an application to the Labour Court it has specifically stated so in the law itself. A construction of the law has to be made which is reasonable and is in consonance with the spirit of law. A foreign element cannot be brought into simply to make it more convenient to litigants.

18. The learned counsel for the appellants submitted that if any law is given restricted meaning then the words `law' settlement or award' become redundant. He argued that there are many laws which confer rights on workers therefore `any law' is a wide word and is used to cover the rights of workers under any law. He stated that any law mentioned in section 34 covers all laws. This contention is contrary to the provisions of sections 25‑A and 34 of the Ordinance. In section 34 the expression used is right guaranteed to it under any `law'. As such there must be specific laws conferring rights on C.BA. On the other hand the language used in section 25‑A is under any law for the time being in force. The scope is much wider. It covers all laws, which have guaranteed rights to workers. The expression `any law' in two provisions has been used differently."

8. A perusal of the above‑quoted extract from the above judgment shows that a distinction has‑been made between an application under section 25‑A and an application under section 34 of the I.R.O. inasmuch as it has been held that under section 34 of the I.R.O., a C.B.A. can file an application if it wishes to enforce a right guaranteed to it under any law, whereas, under section 25‑A of the I.R.O., the right which is to be enforced is guaranteed or secured to a worker by or under any law or any award or any settlement for the time being in force. It has also been held that even a C.BA. can move an application to the Labour Court under section 25‑E1 of the I.R.O.

9. Mr. Munawar Ghani has referred to the above judgment of the Full Bench of the High Court of Sindh, which has been upheld by this Court through the above judgment in the case of Karachi Pipe Mills Employees' Union (supra). The above judgment in fact does not support the case of the respondents Nos. 3 and

4. On the contrary it goes against them as is evident from the following portion of the judgment: "There is no doubt that the Collective Bargaining Agent under section 22(12)(b) of the Ordinance has a right to represent all or any workman in any proceeding and in fact section 25‑A (4) of the Ordinance itself also give right to the Collective Bargaining Agent to take the grievance of a worker to the Labour Court but the scope of proceeding under sections 25‑A and 34 of the Ordinance are quite different. They have also different implications. Therefore, merely because the Collective Bargaining Agent has a right to represent all or any workman would not give it a right to take matters covered under section 25‑A of the Ordinance to the Labour Court under section 34 of the Ordinance for then the provisions of section 25‑A would become redundant and the conditions or limitations provided in section 25‑A of the Ordinance would also disappear, for under section 34 of the Ordinance no such conditions or limitations are provided. It could not be the intention of the Legislature that when an individual takes his grievance to Labour Court he has to comply with the conditions or subject himself to the limitations provided therein but when the Collective Bargaining Agent takes the grievance to the Labour Court under section 34 of the Ordinance, it is not subject to those conditions or limitations. Indeed as already stated subsection (4) of section 25‑A of the Ordinance itself gives a right to the Collective Bargaining Agent to take the matter under section 34 to the Labour Court it can do so only after the worker or workers have fulfilled the conditions mentioned in subsection, (1) of section 25‑A of the Ordinance and not otherwise."

10. In the present case, grievance notice was served by the appellant, which contained the names of the workers. The above grievance has been relied upon in the petition under section 25‑A of the I.R.O. and therefore, it became part of the above petition.

11. We are therefore inclined to hold that in terms of subsection (4) of section 25‑A of the I.R.O., the appellant's above petition under section 25‑A on behalf of the workers was competent.

12. We would, therefore, allow the above appeal and set aside the judgments of the Courts below and would remand the case to the learned Labour Court concerned with the direction to proceed with the petition on merits. However, there will be no order as to costs. A.A./P‑268/S Case remanded