1989 PLP 649 (PLC(CS))

Nizamuddin Naumani for Appellant. Malik Hamid Mahmood for Respondent. Date of hearing: 16th January; 1989. The appeal captioned above arises from the decision dated 26-9-1988 recorded by the learned Presiding Officer, Punjab Labour Court No.

3. Lahore at Ferozewala, whereby the grievance petition of the appellant was dismissed.

2. The appellant was imposed penalty of stopping of yearly increment for one year with permanent effect (WIP). He slept over the matter and brought petition under section 34 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 after a lapse of more than two years. The learned lower Court has held that although no period of limitation is provided in section 34, but on the ground that the petition is very much belated, has dismissed it. This cannot be denied that the petition suffers from laches. A petition under section 34 can be brought within a reasonable time. Where there is an inordinate delay, it is to be satisfactorily explained. The case of the appellant is that he had fallen ill. It cannot be presumed that the appellant remained ill continuously for more than two years and was disabled to this extent that he was not in a position to lodge an application under section 34 which neither requires the issuance of any grievance notice or the presentation of the petition in person. No medical certificate was produced in support of such a long illness. If in reality he remained ill continuously, he must have taken leave but no order of sanction of leave was produced. He stated that he remained on leave for one month only. If he was in a position to perform his duties, there is no reason why he could not lodge the petition within a reasonable time. In these circumstances the learned lower Court was justified in holding that the petition suffers from laches. It appears that since the punishment was lenient, therefore, he showed indifference t it and thought of challenging the same after about two years.

3. Learned counsel for the appellant has filed written arguments also besides arguing the appeal at the Bar. He has in the written arguments urged that by quoting verse No. 20 of Soorah AI-Nissa an old woman had prevented Hazrat Umar from feting reasonable dower. No quotation from any Islamic history has been produced in- support of the fact that in reality Hazrat Umar on the intervention of a woman had desisted from fixing reasonable dower. Learned counsel appears to be under some mistake. Dower is to be fixed according to the status of the parties to the marriage and according to the monetary position of the bridegroom. Verse No. 20 of Soorah Al Nissa reads as under:- The said verse refers to Haq-ul-Mehr and besides this any other thing which a husband has given to his wife. The order of God is that nothing should be taken back from the wife out of what has been given to her, if he wishes to change one wife with the other. The Holy Quraan does not prohibit fixing of a period for bringing action, therefore, laying down a principle that actions be brought within reasonable time is not in violation of any instructions contained in the Holy Quran. Learned counsel has not cited even an Hadith which may have prohibited the fixing of period. Only in cases where a debtor has no means to pay back the debt, the esteemed order of God is that he should be given latitude till he becomes capable of discharging the debt. It means that where a debtor is in a position to pay back the debt and yet fails, it is not necessary to delay the bringing of action. So, Unless, a person satisfies that in the peculiar circumstances he was disabled from bringing the action soon, the delay may not be condoned. As discussed above, the appellant failed to prove that he remained ill for two years and that the illness was so serious that he was not in a position to bring an application under section

34. Learned counsel has also argued that for suits for possession of immovable property the limitation is ten years and for recovery of money three years, therefore, two years is reasonable time. The present case is neither a suit for possession nor a suit for recovery of money, therefore, the limitation fixed for the said suits cannot be taken to be the period within which an action challenging the order of punishment may be brought. Imposition of a punishment is a stigma and normally no one allows the stigma to stand for a long time and challenges the same very soon. I, thus do not find any force in the argument of the learned counsel that the learned lower Court erred in holding that period of two years was not a reasonable time . . . . .

4. As a result, the appeal fails and dismissed. A.E./662/Lb. P Appeal dismissed.