P L D 1967 Lahore 1072 (PLP)

INAMULLAH KHAN, C. J.‑This is an application for review of our order dated 23‑1‑1967. The facts giving rise to the present application under Order XLVII, rule 1 read with section 151, C. P. C., briefly put, are these. The house in occupation of the applicant was requisitioned by the Deputy Commissioner, Lyallpur, on 3‑12‑66, under rule 119 of the Defence of Pakistan Rules. The said order was challenged under Article 98 of the Constitution. We called for a report on 10‑12‑66 from respondents Nos. 1 and 2 in respect of the contents of the petition. After the receipt of the report the matter came up before us on 23‑1‑1967,

2. Mr. Ejaz Hussain Batalvi, the learned Advocate for the applicant, raised only one point before us, namely, in respect of the bona fides of the Deputy Commissioner. It was contended before us that the order of requisition by the Deputy Com missioner was mala fade. We considered the contention of Mr. Batalvi and passed an order on 23‑1‑67 in his presence, dismissing the petition in limine.

3. The application for review was made on 26‑1‑

67. It came up before us on 27‑1‑

67. When the matter was called the learned Advocate, Mr. Raza Kazim, was busy in the Supreme Court. We took up the case in the later part of the day and heard the learned Advocate up to 12‑50 p.m. as it was Friday and adjourned the petition for today.

4. The main point for consideration is as to whether we have jurisdiction to review our order dated 23‑1‑

67. Mr. Raza Kazim, the learned Advocate, raised two points before us. He contended in the first place, that this Court has jurisdiction to review its order. In this connection we ask him to meet the case reported as Jalal Din v. Major Muhammad Akram Khan (P L D 1963 Lab. 596). Relying on paragraph 4 of this judgment, the learned Advocate submitted that Order XLVII, rule 1, C. P. C. is applicable to an order passed in exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 98 of the Constitution; the only qualification being that it would be limited to the conditions mentioned in Order XLVII, rule 1, C. P. C. There is not much force in this contention. The judgment should be read as a whole. Reading paragraphs 4 and 5 of the judgment it would appear that the Full Bench had come to the conclusion that after having passed an order on 9‑4‑63 it was functus officio and could not rectify an error, even if it was assumed that it had been committed. That this interpretation is correct is supported by the observations made by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case reported as Muhammad Khan v. Border Allotment Committee (P L D 1965 S C 623). At page 627 of the report, their Lordships observed as under:‑ "The writ petition came up for re‑hearing on the 15th of July 1963 when it was held by the Full Bench that in the case of an order in the writ jurisdiction the provisions of Order XLVII of the Civil Procedure Code cannot be invoked and, therefore, the High Court had no power to review its decisions in the writ jurisdiction even assuming that an error had been committed." Several of the Judges of this Court have followed the principle laid down by the Full Bench in the case of Jalal Din v. Major Muhammad Akram Khan. We are of the view that this Court having passed an order on 23‑1‑67 is functus officio and cannot review its order.

5. In the second place the learned Advocate very strenuously, contended that as we dismissed the petition in limine without summoning the other side, no right can be said to have accrued to the respondents and, therefore, this Court is competent to review its order on valid grounds. There is not much force in this contention. The primary question would be as to whether we are competent to review our order or not. Even though technically no right may have accrued to the other side, we cannot interfere with our order unless we review the same.

6. While disposing of this petition we would like to mention, after perusing the review application, that this is not a case of discovery of new and important matter which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within the knowledge of the applicant.

7. The learned Advocate prayed for a certificate to appeal to the Supreme Court as constitutional questions are involved. We do not think that the interpretation of any constitutional provision is involved in the case. The request is disallowed.

8. Let a copy of this order be granted to the applicant by tomorrow on payment of usual fee. A. H.