2025 P Cr (PLP)

Raza Ali Khan, J.

The captioned appeal arises from the judgment dated 14.06.2024, delivered by the Shariat Appellate Bench of the High Court (hereinafter referred to as the High Court) in Criminal Appeal No. 411/2019.

2. The essential facts for adjudication of the present appeal are that, at the instance of complainant-Abdul Ghani, an FIR bearing No. 95/13 under Sections 324/337-A, 147/148, 149/109 of the Azad Penal Code (APC), was lodged against the accused-appellants at Police Station Pallandri on 22.06.2013. Following the registration of the case, the concerned police initiated an investigation. Upon its completion, a challan under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedime (Cr.P.C.), for offences under Sections 324/337-A(i), 337/F(5) (1), and 109 P.P.C., was submitted before the trial court on 20.08.2013. Thereafter, the statements of the accused-appellants under Section 242 of the Cr.P.C. were recorded on 12.11.2013, wherein, they denied the alleged offences. Subsequently, the prosecution was directed to produce its evidence. After recording the statements of eight prosecution witnesses out of twelve, while the case was scheduled for recording the statements of the accused under Section 342 Cr.P.C., the accused-appellants moved an application under Section 249-A Cr.P.C. on 07.03.2019. The trial court, after hearing the parties, allowed the application under Section 249-A Cr.P.C. and acquitted the accused-appellants, extending them the benefit of the doubt through its order dated 17.09.2019. Feeling dissatisfied by this order, respondent No. 1 filed an appeal before the High Court. After due proceedings, the High Court accepted the appeal, set aside the trial court's order dated 17.09.2019, and remanded the case to the trial court for a fresh decision via the impugned judgment dated 14.06.2024.

3. Mr. Asghar Ali Malik, the learned Advocate, representing the appellants, contended that the impugned judgment of the High Court is contrary to law, facts, and established legal principles. He argued that the trial court meticulously reviewed the evidence and judiciously analyzed the record before concluding that there was no probability of the accused's conviction. Consequently, the trial court lawfully acquitted the accused under Section 249-A Cr.P.C. He emphasized that the prosecution failed to present compelling evidence to establish the guilt of the accused-appellants. Furthermore, he submitted that continuing the trial despite no likelihood of conviction would amount to a waste of judicial resources and unnecessarily burdening the court and the accused-appellants. He stressed that the acquittal order was passed after hearing all relevant parties, including the State Prosecutor, ensuring that no substantive issue remained unresolved. He also pointed out that Muhammad Irshad, one of the accused listed in Column 2 of the challan, was acquitted in the same order, and since he was not impleaded in the High Court appeal, his acquittal attained finality. He argued that the trial court was well within its authority to acquit the accused-appellants at any stage if it found no probability of conviction. He finally prayed for acceptance of the appeal.

4. Conversely, Mr. Muhammad Waheed Arif, the learned Advocate, representing the complainant-respondent No. 1, vehemently opposed the arguments advanced by the appellants' counsel. He submitted that the impugned judgment of the High Court is quite in accordance with law and warrants no interference. He argued that the trial court misinterpreted Section 249-A Cr.P.C., which mandates the court to ensure that there is absolutely no probability of conviction based on the evidence. In the present case, the prosecution had adduced sufficient evidence to warrant a full trial, but the trial court prematurely acquitted the accused without adequately assessing the prosecution's case. He contended that the trial court failed to provide sound reasons for disregarding the prosecution's evidence and acted beyond its jurisdiction by acquitting the accused at such a preliminary stage, he further submitted that the High Court rightly set aside the trial court's order after appropriately interpreting the relevant legal provisions. He concluded by praying for the dismissal of the appeal.

5. Raja Mazhar Waheed Khan, the learned Additional Advocate General, representing the State, endorsed the arguments advanced by the complainant's counsel and fully supported the impugned judgment of the High Court.

6. We have carefully considered the arguments put forth on behalf of the parties and meticulously examined the record. Upon reviewing the record, it is evident that the case originated from a complaint lodged by one Abdul Ghani. Based on this complaint, an FIR bearing No. 95/13 was registered at Police Station Pallandri on 22.06.2013, citing offences under Sections 324/337-A, 147/148, 149/109 of APC. Following the registration of the FIR, the police initiated an investigation into the matter. Upon the conclusion of their investigation, a challan under Section 173 of Cr.P.C. was submitted to the trial court on 20.08.2013. The challan specified that the accused are charged with offences under Sections 324/337-A(i), 337-F(5)(1), and 109 APC. During the course of the trial, the accused-appellants submitted an application for acquittal under Section 249-A of Cr.P.C. on 07.03.2019. The trial court, after hearing the parties, allowed this application under Section 249-A, Cr.P.C., and acquitted the accused-appellants by extending the benefit of the doubt through the order dated 17.09.2019.

7. In our assessment, the trial court appears to have misconstrued the purpose and scope of Section 249-A of the Cr.P.C. A plain reading of the said section indicates that it empowers a court of competent jurisdiction to acquit an accused at any stage of the proceedings if it is evident from the case record and the evidence that there is no probability of the accused being convicted or if the charge against the accused is found to be groundless. The fundamental objective behind granting such powers is to prevent unnecessary and fruitless trials that waste judicial resources. In this case, however, the trial court extended the benefit of doubt to the accused-appellants while deciding their application under Section 249-A, Cr.P.C.

8. Such an approach is inconsistent with the scope and intent of the said section. The benefit of doubt is a principle that typically applies at the conclusion of a full trial, when the prosecution has failed to establish its case beyond a reasonable doubt. It is not a ground for acquittal under Section 249-A of Cr.P.C. In light of this, we find that the grounds relied upon by the trial court in passing the acquittal order are alien to the provisions of Section 249-A, Cr.P.C. The High Court, therefore, rightly set aside the acquittal order of the trial court. We find no error or infirmity in the High Court's judgment. The learned High Court correctly interpreted the Section 249-A, Cr.P.C., and judiciously decided the matter in accordance with the law. In view of the foregoing, this appeal is devoid of merit and is hereby dismissed. Consequently, the impugned judgment of the High Court is upheld. The trial court is directed to expectively proceed with the trial and render a decision on the matter within one month from the date of communication of this judgment. JK/10/SC(AJ&K) Appeal dismissed.