2005 PLP 2114 (YLR)

Respondent's suit for declaration claiming the change of his date of birth, in the record of the petitioner/Board, was allowed by the learned Civil Judge, vide judgment and decree dated 1-12-1998; appeal of the petitioner was also failed.

2. Briefly stated the facts of the case are that respondent passed his Matriculation Examination in the year 1980 under Roll No.41200 and as per record of the Board, also the date incorporated in the Matriculation Certificate, his date of birth is 1-2-1964. Respondent thereafter on 13-4-1986, applied to the Board for the correction of his date, claiming the correct one to be 25-9-1965; this application was rejected on 14-10-1986; respondent filed review on 6-11-1986, which was also dismissed on 15-11-1986. Thereafter, on 26-3-1996, respondent brought the present suit for declaration, which was contested by the petitioner/Board; issues were framed; parties were put to trial and the learned trial Court, allowed the suit, holding that because the Nikah of the parent of the respondent, took place on 18-10-1964, therefore, it is not possible that the respondent would have born on 1-2-1964; the Appellate Court, has also endorsed the same view.

3. The grievance set out in the present petition is that both the Courts below have not properly decided the issues of limitation and jurisdiction. The view of the Courts below that the orders, dated 14-10-1986 and 15-11-1986, are without jurisdiction, therefore, no limitation runs against such orders, is erroneous in the light of the judgments reported as Muhammad Raz Khan v. Government of N.-W.F.P. PI.D 1997 SC

397. Moreover, it is argued that in the light, of the bar contained in sections 29 and 31 of the Punjab Boards of Intermediate and Secondary Education Act, 1976, the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain and adjudicate the matter. In this behalf, reliance has been placed on the cases reported as Board of .Intermediate and Secondary Education, Lahore v. Mst. Sobia Chand 1999 CLC 1166 and Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education, Lahore v. Ishrat Sultana 2001 YLR 66 and Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education, Lahore v. Miss Ghazala Roohi 2002 MLD 1966.

4. Confronted with the above, learned counsel for the respondent, by relying upon the case reported as Taj Meer v. The Registrar, University of the Punjab, Lahore 1997 PLC (C.S) 799, states that it is reoccurring cause of action to the respondent and therefore, the suit could be filed at any time, on each refusal of the petitioner to accept the correct date of birth of the respondent. However, on the question of jurisdiction, it is stated that the Civil Courts had the power of judicial review and resultantly, such inherent jurisdiction could always be exercised.

5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and hold that Article 120 of the Limitation Act, is applicable to the present case; the cause of action had accrued to the respondent, at the time when he received the matriculation certificate, in which allegedly, the incorrect date of birth was mentioned, but no suit was filed. Thereafter, respondent's application was rejected on 14-10-1986; no legal action was taken; the review was dismissed on 15-11-1986, yet the respondent did not approach the Court, resultantly, the cause of action under Article 120 even considered to be reoccurring, would have arisen to the respondent, on either of the above mentioned dates, but the case was brought on 26-3-1996, which is much after six years than 15-11-1986, the date of the order rejecting his review application, resultantly, the suit is blatantly barred by time and is liable to be dismissed on this score alone.

6. The argument of respondent's side that it is void order and resultantly, no question of limitation would arise, suffice it to say that the above mentioned judgment PLD 1997 SC 397, has provided a complete answer, enunciating the rule that the void order should also be challenged within the period of limitation, which shall though commence from the date when it comes to the knowledge of the aggrieved person. In this case, as mentioned earlier, if the date 15-11-1986 is taken to be the date of knowledge, even then the suit .should have been brought within six years from that date.

7. As regards the question of jurisdiction, learned counsel for the petitioner has rightly placed reliance on the aforementioned judgment, which has considered the effects of sections 29 and 31 and has come to the conclusion that in such circumstances, particularly, pertaining to the question about the correction of the date of birth, the Civil Court had no jurisdiction. I do not find any reason to disagree with the said view. The argument of learned counsel for the respondent that the Civil Courts are the Courts of ultimate and inherent jurisdiction and thus have the power of judicial review, suffice it to say that as per section 9 of the C.P.C., the jurisdiction of the Civil Court can be expressly and impliedly barred by law and there can be no cavil with the proposition that when such jurisdiction is barred, the Civil Court, even under the rule of inherent jurisdiction, would have no authority to take cognizance of the matter. It is a case of clear and express bar of the jurisdiction. In the light of what has been stated above, by allowing this petition, the impugned judgments and decrees are set aside, the suit of the respondent stands dismissed. M.I./B-40/L Revision allowed.