1980 PLP 588 (SCMR)

4. The plaintiff/petitioner has come up in a petition for special leave to appeal against the same to this Court. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and from their arguments as also after going through the judgment under appeal, we notice that the case involves substantial questions of law and fact namely: ‑ (i) under what circumstances a contract of agency of the kind involve in this case could be cancelled or revoked by a principal; (ii) whether section 202 of the Contract Act was applicable to the fact of this case and what is true construction and scope of that section. (iii) whether the plaintiff/petitioner is entitled to continue the agency an or claim damages from the principal on the pleadings as made by hi in his plaint and if so to what ultimate relief he will be entitled on the facts and in the overall circumstances of the case. (iv) whether the plaintiff/petitioner had not submitted his account to the principal in terms of the contract and whether he was justified in with holding the same on any legal ground; and. (v) whether the termination of contract in this case was lawful or not. 5: These are all substantial questions of law and fact and since the involve a careful study and scrutiny after leading of appropriate evidence therefore the High Court was not justified to refuse grant of a temporary injunction as prayed for at this stage. In the circumstances we are inclined to grant leave to appeal to the petitioner and converting this petition into an apeal accept the same and hold that this was a fit case in which a temporary injunction ought to have been granted on terms.

7. Consequently we grant a temporary injunction to the plaintiff/peti tioner against the defendant on the following terms which we think would meet the ends of the justice and maintain the interests of both sides: ‑ (i) petitioner would render accounts for six months i. e. July, August, September, October, November and December, 1979, to, the Naazar of High Court within four weeks and thereafter within a period of fort nightfurnish Bank guarantee for the amount found due by the Naazar. (ii) respondent should also furnish Bank guarantee within six, weeks for Rs. 40,00,000 (Forty lacs) (iii) current business with effect from 1-1‑1980 should continue under the terms of contract.

8. Needless to state that neither the order of the High Court nor the present order is to be considered expression of any opinion on the merits of the le case or pleadings and averments of the parties which obviously are still sub-judice and will be decided by toe High Court after due trial of the case. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the High Court has virtualy decided the main suit against him by passing the impugned order which con tains final expression of opinion on various disputed aspects of the case. This is not correct. The view of the High Court was only tentative, being of an interim nature meant for the purpose of issuing or not issuing a temorary injunction and the petitioner will be entitled to persuade the High Court to examine the matter in further detail with reference to the relevant facts and law in the light of the 'material or any additional material brought or to be brought on record. We have passed the present order just in the interest of both parties to regulate their conduct and dealings ad interim and have left the scope of the whole case as open, as was also the purported intention of the High Court order as well.

9. In the above context it will be just and fair that this case and a cross suit of the defendant on the same subject, which are sub judice in the High Court are decided on preferential basis within a period of six months. Order accordingly. There shall be no order as to costs.