1987 PLP 1208 (CLC)

AKHTAR HASSAN, J.‑‑The civil miscellaneous under consideration has been moved under section 151, C.P.C. for setting aside an order dated the 2nd of February, 1986, by which R.F.A. No. 142 of 1979 was dismissed as withdrawn on the parties' statements.

2. It was an appeal preferred by the applicants of whom Muhammad Saleem and their counsel Ch. Muhammad Bashir, Advocate, were present on the said date when they made separate statements that they would not pursue the appeal and that the same may be disposed of as having been withdrawn. As a consequence the appeal was dismissed and the pre‑emption decree impugned therein was upheld.

3. In the Civil Miscellaneous moved a week later, i. e. on 10‑2‑1986 the applicants alleged that they had not authorised their counsel Ch. Muhammad Bashir, Advocate, Faisalabad, to make any statement of withdrawal of the appeal; that though Muhammad Saleem, one of them, being present in the Court did make the statement, yet he was not made to understand its implications as it was in English; that in all there being 11 appellants, they had not instructed Muhammad Saleem to make such a statement; that in fact they had replaced their counsel by engaging Mr. Irshad Ahmad Qureshi, Advocate, Lahore. who incidentally due to his professional engagements elsewhere, could not attend the Court on the said date; that due to his supersession the counsel had no authority to represent them in the appeal; that in any event the counsel did not take them into confidence and made the statement unauthorisedly as also against their interest; that the counsel in making such a statement without their consent repeated his misconduct as he had even earlier withdrawn Civil Revision No. 324‑D of 1980, which ultimately was restored by Mr. Justice Lehrasap Khan.

4. The respondents were called upon and they seriously opposed the petition.

5. Mr. Irshad Qureshi for the applicants reiterated what was taken up in the petition. We regret we were not persuaded at all. One of the applicants Muhammad Saleem was personally present alongwith the counsel. They both made separate statements as to withdrawal of the appeal. Although these were taken in English, which was the language of the Court, yet it is hard to believe that Muhammad Saleem was not made to understand it. It is rather axiomatic that such statements are fully explained by the Court to the persons making them. Presence of their counsel was in a way re‑assuring its correctness. The loss of faith in the counsel, now expressed, was made known to the Court earlier in that there was no, application either by the counsel or the appellants putting an end to his engagement in the appeal. To say that he was superseded by Mr. Qureshi and, therefore, lost authority to represent the applicants, cannot be entertained. Once a counsel is engaged, his authority cannot be revoked except with the permission of the Court. It is not the applicant's case that they had by an. overt application signified their intent to revoke authority of the counsel A and, therefore, statement made by him on their behalf was quite efficacious. Indeed, till then no Wakalatnama on behalf of the new counsel was presented, and even if it were so, the authority of the superseded counsel was not ipso facto recalled. It was neither the case that the applicants had made any reservation in the stereotyped Wakalatnama executed by them in favour of their counsel, to withhold authority of withdrawing appeals. The usual language employed therein conferred sufficient power on him to make any statement as to a compromise including withdrawal of appeal. Mr. Qureshi tried to place reliance on Mst. Nazira Begum v. Mir Hussin Khan etc. P L D 1984 Azad J & K

1. It is by a Single Bench and further does not seem to relate to a compromise. What was held therein was that general power conferred upon an Advocate to act, plead and appear on behalf of the executant of Wakalatnama did not include power to withdraw a suit. But the Wakalatnama executed in favour of Ch. Muhammad Bashir, Advocate in this case does include a clause authorising him to enter into a compromise. Further, he did not act singly, as he was instructed by one of the applicants who made a separate statement. It did not appear to be a case where the counsel acted without instructions; Mr. Irshad Qureshi, in fairness, referred to Messrs Arokey Limited and another v. Munir Ahmad Mughal and 3 others P L D 1982 S C 204 in which it was ruled that a statement made by counsel was binding upon the party especially when no fraud or unconscionable motive was attributed to him nor was any notice or communication sent to him revoking his authority to enter into compromise. We are bound by this dictum and as a sequal dismiss the civil miscellaneous. H. B. T. K‑6/1, Application dismissed.