1981 PLP (C (PLC(CS))

GHULAM RASOOL SHEIKH (CHAIRMAN).

This is an appeal under section 4 is of Sind Service Tribunals Act, 1973 against the stoppage of four incre ments. In March, 1973 the appellant was working an Assistant City Survey Officer, Karachi. Some lessees made an application to him for amalgamation of plot measuring about 4,000 Sq. Yards with the land already leased to them. The value of the plot to be so added was estimated to be about Rs. 4 lacs on 19‑3‑1973, he passed an order allowing the request of the lessees although earlier on 4‑10‑1972 the Deputy Commissioner had decided that the lessees were trespassers in the aforesaid plot, which belonged to 'Government and they had purchased it from some unauthorised occupants. It was also ordered by the Deputy Commissioner that encroachers be removed from the plot with the help of the Police. It is alleged that the appellant had approved the suggestion made by the office on 5‑2‑1973, on the basis of the orders of the Deputy Commissioner, but on 19‑3‑1973, he sent for the papers and passed the order allowing the request of the lessees. This was probably discovered in 1975 and so he was suspended. Sub sequently he was charge‑sheeted. He submitted his explanation. An inquiry was held and he was found guilty. His four increments were stopped by order dated 31‑3‑1977. He then filed review application to the same officer arid it was rejected on 16. 10‑1977. He filed departmental appeal on 9‑10‑1977 which was allowed as there was non‑compliance of rule 5(2) of the Sind Civil Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973 and the case was remanded. On remand compliance with the rule was made and the original order was maintained. The departmental appeal was filed and it was dismissed on 16‑9‑1978. The result of the appeal was communicated to the appellant by a letter of the same date and it was received by the appellant on 20‑9‑1978. Aggrieved by the aforesaid action, the appellant approached this Tribunal by way of appeal, which was sent by him by post and was received by this A Tribunal on 31‑10‑1978, although it was received at Karachi Post Office on 23‑10‑1978. The appeal was resisted. It was pleaded that the appeal was time barred and even otherwise the appellant was not a Mukhtiarkar/Tahsildar to exercise the powers of demarcation, but he was an Assistant City Survey Officer not having been invested with any such powers. It was also pleaded that the request of the lessees was earlier rejected by the Deputy Commis sioner and this was fully known to the appellant. Not only this but it was also approved by him and yet after a few days he passed the order allowing the claim of the lessees. Lastly it was said that it was not a case of demarcation of the boundries of the land leased to the lessees, but was a case of inclusion of another piece of land in the area of the land leased to the lessees, so the power of the addition of land in the existing leased land could never have teen vested in the appellant. The contention of the appellant that originally 8e was a Mukhtiarkar/Tahsildar as incharge of a Taluka/Tahsil was repelled on the ground that the relevant time for his status was the day, when he passed‑ the order which was found to be illegal and without jurisdiction and it was stressed that at that time he was City Surveyor and not holding the charge of Mukhtiakar/Tahsildar having any thing to do with administration of any Taluka/Tahsil as such. To elaborate further it was stated that even otherwise, the powers possessed by a Mukhtiarkar/Tahsildar incharge of a Taluka or Tahsil related to the demarcation of the boundries of a plot and this power was quite distinct from the power of addition to" the existing leased land or in other words amalgamation of different plots. We have considered the various contentions raised before us and we are of the view that in view of the successful plea of limitation, it is not necessary to deal with the powers and functions of the appellant and the vires of his order in respect of the amalgamation of additional land to the existing area of land leased to the lessees. According to section 4 of the Sind Service Tribunals Act, 1973, the appeal was required to be filed within 30 days of the communication of the order passed in appeal by the departmental Authority competent to entertain and decide the appeal against the original order. Annexure A attached to the appeal filed by the appellant shows that the order of the appellate authority was received by him on 20‑9‑1978. So the last date for filing the appeal was 20‑10‑1979 as the 20th September when the order was received by the appellant has to be excluded in computing the period of limitation. It may be noted here that according to rule 7 of the Sind Service Tribunals (Procedure) Rules, 1974 the appeal was required to be presented personally to the Registrar of the Tribunal. From what has been stated above, it is plain enough that the appeal suffers from two legal infirmities. In the first place there is violation of rule 7 of the Sind Service Tribunals (Procedure) Rules, 1974, which lays down that the appeal shall be presented to the Registrar during office hours personally by the appellant or his counsel but this was not done and instead it was sent, by post. There is no provision for sending an appeal by post. Secondly the appeal is time‑barred. An application for condonation of delay had been made on the ground that the appellant was busy with official) important duties and so could not undertake the journey to present the appeal personally. We are not impressed with what has been pleaded. It is a vague and bald statement without any supporting evidence or circumstance. It has not been shown what were those important official duties which prevented the appellant from coming to Karachi during the entire period of 30 days available for presenting the appeal within the period of limitation. Indeed to some extent the postal authorities were also responsible for some delay, but even that delay is of no avail to the appellant, as the last date for filing the appeal was 20th October whereas the appeal was received at Karachi on 23rd October, of course it was posted on 19th October, but it must be presumed to have been filed on the day when it was actually received by the Tribunal. Even ignoring the delay caused by postal authorities in delivering the letter to this Tribunal, the delay still remains as it could not be expected that a letter sent by registered post from the interior of Sind on 19th would be received by this Tribunal or even at Karachi on the following day. Considering the various circumstances we have no hesitation in holding that as the appellant himself was responsible for the delay caused in preferring the appeal and he pleaded false ground of his inability to present the appeal, personally within the period of limitation, so apart from other considerations the falsity of ground by itself, is enough to reject the prayer for condonation of delay. Consequently the application is rejected. In the result the appeal is dismissed. Appeal dismissed.