2017 PLP 767 (CLC)

Through the instant Intra Court Appeal filed under Section 3 of Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972 the Appellant has called in question the legality of impugned order dated 09.06.2016 passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P. No.20196 of 2016 whereby writ petition filed by the Appellant challenging the vires of Section 18 of the Federal Ombudsman Institutional Reforms Act, 2013 (the "Act") has been dismissed.

2. The Appellant argued that the findings of the learned Single Judge in the impugned judgment are not in consonance with the provisions contained in Section 18 of the Act; that refusing the prayer of the Appellant in the petition tantamount to violation of Article 4 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 (the "Constitution"); that the impugned order suffers from legal infirmity as the fact that the legislature was not competent to make any amendment to the Constitution that was in defiance of the nine commands mentioned therein, has not been taken into consideration; that the reasoning given by the learned Single Judge are not convincing, as such the same is liable to be set aside.

3. We have heard the arguments of the Appellant and examined the record available with this Appeal.

4. The Appellant in the writ petition had challenged the vires of Section 18 of the Act. The Act has been made to make institutional reforms for standardizing and harmonizing the laws relating to Federal Ombudsmen institution and the matters ancillary or akin thereto. The purpose of which is to provide speedy and expeditious relief to citizens by redressing their grievances to promote good governance. The contention of the Appellant that the legislature was not competent to make any amendment to the Constitution that was in defiance of the nine commands mentioned therein, is not instructive.

5. We fully agree with the findings of the learned Single Judge that the Parliament has, under the Constitution, power to set up administrative tribunals and other quasi-judicial forums for the adjudication of disputes and Section 18 of the Act does not mean any amendment in the Constitution rather it only bars the jurisdiction of other forums in the matters exclusively fall within its domain. For the sake of brevity said Section is reproduced herein below: "Bar of jurisdiction.

No Court or authority shall have jurisdiction to entertain a matter which falls within the Jurisdiction of an Ombudsman nor any Court or authority shall assume jurisdiction in respect of any matter pending with or decided by an Ombudsman."

6. Reliance in this regard can be placed on the case titled in SNGPL v. Wafaqi Mohtasib, (2015 MLD 1029) in which this Court held as under: "The intention and purpose of setting up these special bodies was very clear and admitted of no ambiguity. These were to deal with all matters relating to special laws, including adjudication of complaints and disputes within their remit. There was no scope for bifurcation of those powers and the sharing of some of those with the Wafaqi Mohtasib. The entire concept would be eroded if parallel proceedings were allowed to be held or continued at the two different forums. There are a myriad of scenarios which could arise leading to extremely awkward and mutually contradictory situations. Courts and agencies would be confronted with the unsavory situation of which order to follow and of which forum.

7. We do not see any illegality in the impugned order which has been passed strictly in accordance with law, as such does not warrant any interference by us. Consequently, the Appeal in hand, being devoid of any merit is hereby dismissed in limine. MQ/M-14/L Petition dismissed.