P L D 1953 Sind 4 (PLP)

VELLANI, J.‑This is an application under section 491, Cr. P. C. in the nature of Habeas Corpus questioning the legality of the applicant's detention under the Sind Maintenance of Public Safety Act of 1952. The applicant was arrested in April 1952 under an order of the District Magistrate Tharparkar under section 2 (2) of the Act. The grounds of his detention communicated to the applicant by the District Magistrate were that the applicant was a noto rious smuggler having close contacts with the people on the other side of the border and had a hand in smuggling 40 cows and oxen, and in the intended smuggling of wool. Within 15 days of the District Magistrate's order, the Pro vincial Government itself ordered the detention of the applicant under section 2 (1) of the Act upon which the order of the District Magistrate lapsed. The ground for the detention was that the applicant was "believed to be a notorious thief". It is said that the provisions of the section 4 of the Act have not been complied with. Section 4 of the Act reads as follows:‑ "

4. Where an order is made in respect of any person under clause (a) of subsection (1) of section 2 as soon as may be after the order is made, the authority making the order shall com municate to the person affected thereby, so far as such com munication can be made without disclosing facts which the said authority considers it would be against the public interest to disclose, the ground on which the order is made against him and such other particulars so are in the opinion of such authority sufficient to enable him to make, if he so wishes, a representation against the order and such person may at any time thereafter make a representation in writing to such authority against the order, and it shall be the duty of such authority to inform such person of his right of making such representation and to afford him the earliest practical oppor tunity of doing so." The specific point taken is that the communication received by the applicant does not contain any particulars. The question here is one of interpretation of this section. Under it, the authority making the order of detention is required to communicate to the person affected thereby the grounds on which the order is made against him and such other particulars as are in the opinion of such authority sufficient to enable him to make, if he so wishes, a representation against the order". The manifest object of the communication is to enable the detenu to make a re-presentation against the order. To effectuate that object the authority making the order is required to communicate "the grounds" and "other particulars" to the detenu. It is but reasonable to suppose that the authority making the order of detention acts upon information which enables it to formulate and express "the grounds on which the order is made. The grounds may be couched in general terms or may contain some particulars and it would seem that in order to ensure that the object of giving the detenu the opportunity of making a representation against the order is substantially effectuated the Legislature has provided that not only the grounds but also "other particulars" should be communicated, to enable the detenu to make a representation. It is true that sufficiency of "other particulars" is a matter of the authority's opinion, but the fact remains that that opinion is confined to their sufficiency. It does not amount to a discretion in the matter of giving or not giving particulars. The term "Particulars" connotes information as to details and is opposed to generality. The grounds are of the authority's own formulation and express the meaning which the information before it conveys to that authority. The context shows that the particulars spoken of are those related to the matter or informa tion from which the authority's order springs. It is true that the word "other" contemplates the possible presence of particulars in the grounds of the facts (which the authority thinks fit to disclose) contained in the communication, but the point remains that the words of the section require the communication to the detenu of "the grounds on which the order is made," as well as "other particulars" signifying that particulars are required to be: communicated. In enjoining the communication of the particulars to the detenu, the Legislature has sought to ensure that the; right and opportunity of the detenu to make a representation g against the order is substantial and real and that it is not; impaired or rendered ineffectual by the generality of the terms; in which the communication to him may be couched. Where, therefore, the grounds are couched in general terms and the communication gives no particulars, the requirements of section 4 are not complied with and the detention is not according to law. The grounds for the applicant's contention is expressed to be "that you are believed to be a notorious thief." These words are general, they certainly communicate nothing to the information or matter of any detail from which the authority's order springs. The conclusion therefore is that the communication which section 4 requires the authority ordering the detention to make has not been made and the applicant's detention is illegal. The detenu will be set at liberty. A. H. Petition allowed.