1971 PLP 392 (PLC)

The provisions of section 54 of the `Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969', are worded as follows :‑ "Penalty for committing of settlement.‑Whoever commits any breach of any term of any settlement, award or decision which is binding on him under this Ordinance shall be punishable ‑‑ (a) for the first offence, with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine which extend to five hundred rupees, or with both; and (b) for each subsequent offence, with imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both." The above‑cited provisions of section 54 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, have to be read in conjunction with the provisions of section 64 of the same Ordinance, which are worded as follows:‑ "Trial of offences.‑No Court other than a Labour Court or that of a Magistrate of the first class shall try any offence punishable under this Ordinance" Keeping in view all the above‑cited provisions of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, one may legitimately maintain that there is nothing in any of these provi sions that could be considered to have conferred a vested right on any person to institute a complaint of criminal nature in a Labour Court for the purpose of invoking the punitive jurisdiction of a Labour Court against any workman who is alleged to have violated any binding settlement arrived at between the parties. The true position of the matter is that no criminal jurisdiction can be exercised by the Chairman of Labour Court under section 54, read with subsection (3) of section 36 and also read with section 64 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, in the absence of any notifi cation of the Provincial. Government under either section 12 or section 14 or section. 34 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 (as amended up‑to‑date. It is pertinent in this context to cite the provisions of section 12 of the Criminal Procedure Code, which are as follows :‑ "12.‑(1) The Provincial Government may appoint as many persons as it thinks fit, besides the District Magistrate, to be Magistrates of the first, second or third class in any district and the Provincial Government or the District Magistrate, subject to the control of the Provincial Government, may, from time to time, define local areas within which such persons may exercise all or any of the powers with which they may respectively be invested under this Code. (2) Except as otherwise provided by such definition, jurisdic tion and powers of such persons shall extend throughout such district." It is also essential for this Court to advert to the separate provisions of section 14 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Code, which are worded as follows :‑ "14.‑(1) The Provincial Government may confer upon any person all or any of the powers conferred or conferable by or under this Code on a Magistrate of the first, second and third class in respect to particular eases or to a particular class or particular classes of cases, or in regard to cases generally in any local area." All the above‑quoted provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code explicitly indicate that the Provincial Government is required‑to issue a special notification in regard to the appoint ment of any person as a Magistrate of the first class, whether on a full‑time basis or 'ex officio', and the same government has to define the local area within which that particular Magistrate of the first class may exercise all or any of the powers with which he has been invested under the Criminal Procedure Code. Even the complainant has conceded before me that no such notifi cation under the Criminal Procedure Code in regard to my own appointment as an `ex officio' Magistrate of the first class within Sargodha Division as yet been issued by the Home Department (Judicial Branch) of ‑the Government of Punjab. From this circumstance alone it is legitimate to draw the conclusion that I have absolutely no lawful authority for exercising jurisdiction as a Magistrate of the first class within the local limits of Qaidabad in Sargodha Division, to which the present complaint admittedly relates and where all the eight accused respondents and also the complainant reside any Magistrate of the first class stationed in the area in question can, of course, take cognizance of this complaint. It is also necessary to quote here the relevant provisions of section 35 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 (as amended up‑to‑date) in regard to the establishment of labour Courts. Section 35 of that ordinance, as recently amended, contains `inter alia' below‑quoted provisions:‑ "

35. Labour Court.‑(1) The Provincial Government may, by notification in the official Gazette, establish as many Labour Courts as it considers necessary and, where it establishes more than one Labour Court, shall specify in the notification the territorial limits within which each one of them shall exercise jurisdiction under this Ordinance: (2) A Labour Court shall consist of a Chairman appointed by the Provincial Government and two members to be appointed in the prescribed manner to advise the Chairman, one to represent the employers and the other to represent the workmen." Two inferences can rightly be drawn from the above -quoted provisions of subsections (1) and (2) of section 35 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. In the first place the Provincial Government is required to issue a special notification indicating the territorial limits within which a particular labour Court shall exercise jurisdiction tinder this Ordinance. Secondly, a Labour Court does not consist only of the Chairman of that. Court, nut also of two Members, who have to advise the Chairman, and on whom no magisterial powers whatsoever have been conferred by the Provincial Government. In the case of all these unquestionable facts it stands to reasons that the mere fact that subsection (3) of section 36 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance. 1969 has declared that a Labour Court shall, for the purpose of trying an offence under this Ordinance, have the same powers as have teen vested in. the Courts of Magistrates of the First Class under the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 (Act V of 1898) does not warrant the belie that the entire Labour Court (including two members) must readily c take cognizance of a complaint instituted before it under section 54 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, even though no notification has been issued by the Provincial Government for vesting such criminal jurisdiction in the two Members of that Labour Court and even though the exact territorial limits within which that Labour Court can exercise jurisdiction under the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 .(as amended up‑to‑date) have not been notified by the Provincial Government. For all the above‑recorded reasons I hold that this complaint under section 54 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, is not maintainable in the Punjab Labour Court (Central Zone) Lahore, the magisterial powers and the territorial jurisdiction of which Court under the Criminal Procedure Code; 1898 (as amended up‑to‑date) have never been notified by the Home Department (Judicial Branch) of the Provincial Government of Punjab. This complaint is, therefore, dismissed an limine.