PLC(CS) 1994

1994 PLP (C (PLC(CS))

KHALID SALEEM Versus GOVERNMENT OF PUNJAB and others

Jurisdiction / Court
Lahore High Court
Decided Date
Writ Petition No. 7811 of 1993, decided on 23rd August, 1993.
Honorable Judges
Mian Saeed‑ur‑Rehman Farrukh, J
Case Reference Summary (AEO Optimized)
Citation 1994 PLP (C (PLC(CS))
Forum / Court Lahore High Court
Bench Members Mian Saeed‑ur‑Rehman Farrukh, J
Parties KHALID SALEEM Versus GOVERNMENT OF PUNJAB and others
💡 Quick Legal QA & Summary / سوال و جواب خلاصہ
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 1994 PLP (C (PLC(CS))?

This judgment primarily cites: statutory provisions as referenced in Pakistani case law index.

Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 1994 PLP (C (PLC(CS))?

The case was heard and decided by the Lahore High Court bench comprising: Mian Saeed‑ur‑Rehman Farrukh, J.

Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?

Cite this legal precedent as: 1994 PLP (C (PLC(CS)) (KHALID SALEEM Versus GOVERNMENT OF PUNJAB and others). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.

Representation

  • Muhammad Asghar Malik for Petitioner.
  • Rana Muhammad Arshad, Addl. A.‑G. for Respondents Nos. 1 and 4.
  • Mahboob Ahmad for Respondents Nos. 2 and 3.
  • Ch. Ghulam Qadir Cheema and Khan Muhammad Yunus for Respondent No. 5.
  • 2. Alongwith the writ petition, an application for stay was moved wherein it was, inter alia, pleaded "that the petitioner has hot handed over the charge to his successor so far. As such the impugned order of transfer has not been implemented and taken into' effect". On 1‑8‑1983, while directing Additional Advocate‑General to obtain instructions, operation of the impugned order was suspended.
  • 5. Today Mr. Muhammad Asghar Malik, Advocate, has in the course of arguments, strongly urged that Vice‑Chairman, WASA (respondent No. 2) had no authority to order the transfer of the petitioner. He has pointed out with reference to Annexure `B' that respondent No. 4 has in fact issued the order of transfer on the verbal directions of respondent No. 2. Such a course of action was not countenanced by law. Mr. Mahboob Ahmad, Advocate, learned counsel for respondents Nos. 2 and 3 has conceded this position and stated that at no point of time respondent No. 2 was invested with delegated power or authority to order transfers of employees of LDA (inclusive of WASA).
  • 6. In view of the conceding statement made by counsel for respondents Nos. 2 and 3 matter appeared to be simple and fit to be resolved in favour of the petitioner.
  • However, Mr. Ghulam Qadir Cheema, Advocate, learned counsel for newly‑added respondent No. 5 has forcefully opposed the writ petition and pointed out that the petitioner, by his conduct, stands thoroughly disentitled to grant of discretionary relief in writ jurisdiction. It is submitted that impugned order of transfer was complied with by the petitioner and he after leaving charge at E and M (South) Tubewell Sub‑Division reported for duty at Ichhra Sub‑Division on 6‑7‑1993 vide arrival report (Annexure `B' with C.M.1852/93). Vide Annexure `C', he has been marking his presence on the attendance register and has even received salary for July, 1993 (vide Annexure `H'), there. Respondent No. 5 simultaneously shifted to the post vacated by the petitioner. It is contended that the petitioner, with a view to obtain relief, has deliberately conceded these facts in his writ petition.

Headnotes / Summary

Constitution of Pakistan (1973)‑‑‑ ‑‑‑‑Art. 199‑‑‑Estoppel, principle of‑‑ Transfer of employee ‑‑‑Challenge‑‑ Constitutional jurisdiction‑‑‑Exercise of‑‑‑Employee who was transferred from one place of working to another had challenged his transfer contending that Authority was not authorised to order his transfer‑‑‑Authority conceded that at no point of time he was invested with power to transfer an employee‑‑‑Matter appeared to be simple and was to be resolved in favour of employee, but employee in his application for stay had clearly stated that he had not handed over charge to his successor so far and as such order of transfer had not been complied with and. taken effect whereas evidence on record was otherwise‑‑ Evidence on record had fully established that transfer order was fully complied with by employee‑‑‑Employee after leaving charge reported for duty at place of his transfer vide arrival report, he had been marking presence on attendance register and had even received salary of one month from there‑‑‑Respondent who was transferred at place left by employee simultaneously shifted to post vacated by employee‑‑‑Employee who had complied with transfer order deliberately concealed material facts from the Court in an effort to obtain relief‑‑‑Held, no doubt order of transfer of employee was liable to be declared without lawful authority due to lack of jurisdiction of Authority but that was not an inflexible rule‑‑‑Constitutional petition against a void order could be dismissed‑‑‑Conduct of petitioner in Constitutional petition was of paramount consideration and in case it was found that petitioner had approached Court with unclean hands, by concealment/suppression of material facts, relief could be denied to him notwithstanding the fact that on legal/technical plane he may have a good case‑‑‑Employee having accepted transfer order by acting upon it Constitutional petition was fatally affected by principle of estoppel. Sharif Ahmad Hashmi's case 1982 SCMR 367; Muhammad' Afzal v. Ghulam Muhammad 1982 SCMR 371; Raza Khan v. Vice‑Chancellor 1982 SCMR 560 and Abdul Rashid v. Pakistan 1969 SCMR 141 ref.

Judgment & Decree

The petitioner, a Sub‑Engineer in the employment of Lahore Development Authority, has through Constitutional petition challenged the vires of the order dated 3‑7‑1993 passed by respondent No. 4 whereby he was transferred from E & M (South), Tubewell Sub‑Division, Lahore City, to Ichhra Sub‑Division. Through the same order respondent No. 5, another Sub‑Engineer who previously posted at Ichhra Sub‑Division was transferred and posted at E and M (South), Tubewell Sub‑Division. (respondent No. 5 was not impleaded by the petitioner and he was brought on record vide order dated 9‑8‑1993 on an application (C.M.1852/93) moved by him).

2. Alongwith the writ petition, an application for stay was moved wherein it was, inter alia, pleaded "that the petitioner has hot handed over the charge to his successor so far. As such the impugned order of transfer has not been implemented and taken into' effect". On 1‑8‑1983, while directing Additional Advocate‑General to obtain instructions, operation of the impugned order was suspended.

3. It is urged in support of the writ petition that respondent No. 2 (Vice Chairman, WASA) was not authorised to order the transfer of the petitioner, and the same having emanated from incompetent source merited to be quashed.

4. Alongwith the application for being impleaded as a party referred to above, respondent No. 5 also moved an application (C.M. 1853/93) praying for modification of order dated 1‑8‑1993, thereby directing maintaining status quo as prevailing on 1‑8‑1993. It was pointed out that the petitioner had joined his new assignment in Ichhra Sub‑Division since 6‑7‑1993. sThis application was disposed of on 9‑8‑1983 with the direction that status quo as existing on 6‑8‑1993 should be maintained.

5. Today Mr. Muhammad Asghar Malik, Advocate, has in the course of arguments, strongly urged that Vice‑Chairman, WASA (respondent No. 2) had no authority to order the transfer of the petitioner. He has pointed out with reference to Annexure `B' that respondent No. 4 has in fact issued the order of transfer on the verbal directions of respondent No.

2. Such a course of action was not countenanced by law. Mr. Mahboob Ahmad, Advocate, learned counsel for respondents Nos. 2 and 3 has conceded this position and stated that at no point of time respondent No. 2 was invested with delegated power or authority to order transfers of employees of LDA (inclusive of WASA).

6. In view of the conceding statement made by counsel for respondents Nos. 2 and 3 matter appeared to be simple and fit to be resolved in favour of the petitioner. However, Mr. Ghulam Qadir Cheema, Advocate, learned counsel for newly‑added respondent No. 5 has forcefully opposed the writ petition and pointed out that the petitioner, by his conduct, stands thoroughly disentitled to grant of discretionary relief in writ jurisdiction. It is submitted that impugned order of transfer was complied with by the petitioner and he after leaving charge at E and M (South) Tubewell Sub‑Division reported for duty at Ichhra Sub‑Division on 6‑7‑1993 vide arrival report (Annexure `B' with C.M.1852/93). Vide Annexure `C', he has been marking his presence on the attendance register and has even received salary for July, 1993 (vide Annexure `H'), there. Respondent No. 5 simultaneously shifted to the post vacated by the petitioner. It is contended that the petitioner, with a view to obtain relief, has deliberately conceded these facts in his writ petition.

9. It is true that an order, which is found to be without lawful authority is rendered liable to be declared as such, but this is not an inflexible rule. Writ against a void order can be dismissed. See Sharif Ahmad Hashmi's case 1982 SCMR 367 at 372: In writ jurisdiction conduct of the petitioner is of paramount consideration and in case it is found that the petitioner has approached the Court with unclean hands, by concealment/suppression of material facts, relief can be denied to him notwithstanding the fact that on legal/technical plane he may have a good case. See Muhammad Afzal v. Ghulam Muhammad (1982 SCMR 371); Raza Khan v. Vice‑Chancellor (1982 SCMR 560) and Abdul Rashid v. Pakistan (1969 SCMR 141).

10. It is really very sad that the petitioner deliberately concealed the material facts from the Court in an effort to obtain relief. The impugned transfer order having been implemented, it was his duty to make its full disclosure. He did not do so and merely by vaguely alleging that the charge has not been handed over, tried to get the transfer order quashed. Even otherwise, the petitioner having accepted the transfer order by acting upon it, the present writ is fatally affected by principle of estoppel.

11. The upshot of the above discussion is that the petition merits to be dismissed. It is ordered accordingly. C.M. 1884/93, moved by the petitioner for permission to place on record additional document is rejected. Keeping in view the conduct of the petitioner, he is burdened with costs of this petition. H.B.T./K‑97/L Petition dismissed.