1983 PLP (C (PLC(CS))

6. Now let us see what were the findings of the enquiry officer. His findings were as under :‑ Charge No. 1, wilful absence from duty, not proved. Charge No. 2, filing of a civil suit in Court of law, proved. Charge No. 3, that he knew departmental procedure of making representations, not proved. Charge No. 4, submission of applications direct to higher authorities, proved. Charge No. 5, of subversive activities, not proved. Charge No. 6, regarding publication in newspapers, not proved. Charge No. 7, regarding dismissal of civil suit, proved. Charge No. 8, regarding filing of a criminal case against senior officers, proved. Charge No. 9, publication in newspapers, not proved. The sum total of the above findings is that the appellant was found guilty of: (1) Filing of a civil suit. (2) Dismissal of the civil suit. (3) Filing of a criminal case and pursuing the same by engaging counsel. (4) Submitting applications/representations direct to the higher authorities. No other charge was proved against the appellant.

7. If we look at the so‑called `proved' charges, the same could not be called as charges. The charge No. 1 was that the appellant had filed a civil suit and the other was that the suit was dismissed. These charges snake no sense. If the suit was dismissed, how the appellant could be charges as guilty. The charge No. 3 was that he filed a criminal case. It is the basic right of every citizen to agitate his rights in civil Courts of the country. No one can hinder him from pursuing his remedy in the Courts of law. The appellant committed no offence or misconduct b knocking at the doors of a judicial Court of the country. If a civil wrong or a criminal offence is committed, it is rather a civic duty of a citizen to seek remedy in a Court of law. It is also his right to engage a legal counsel. The learned counsel for the State could not refute the principle, but he argued that the said act of the appellant had brought disrepute to the department and to the senior officers. If so, the senior officers' could seek remedy, if so advised, for libel or defamation, if they have moral courage and evidence to prove the same in the Court, of law.

8. The only charge that was proved against the appellant was that he made applications/representations to the higher authorities directly without sending them through proper channel. The enquiry officer had, in para. 4 of his enquiry report, quoted these specific instances which are enumerated as under :‑ (1) Application dated 4th February, 1978 addressed to the Chairman, Federal Inspection Team, Rawalpindi. (2) Application dated 2nd March, 1978 addressed to the President Employees Union, Islamabad. (3) Application dated 12th February, 1978 addressed to the Finance Secretary, Islamabad. There was no other application of which the appellant was charged or found guilty for sending the same direct to higher officers. So far as the application at S. No. (1) is concerned, it was addressed to the Chairman of the Inspection Team. An application to the Inspection Team is in they nature of a complaint and does not require to be sent through proper' channel. It was not an application addressed to the appellate authority or to any superior officer. Similarly, the application at S. No. 2, was addressed to the President of the Employees' Union and did not require to be channeled through any Government officer nor was it addressed to a superior Government officer. The only question that remained was that of the application at S. No. 3 which was addressed to the Secretary of Finance. The learned counsel for the appellant explained that this application was made in desparation when the appellant was not paid his salary and when all his representations made to his immediate officers were thrown in cold storage. He, therefore, made an attempt at a final representation, an advance copy of which was sent to the Secretary Finance, Islamabad. To send an advance copy of an application to a superior officer under such circumstances doses not violate any rule. 8‑A. I have already discussed that the appellant had a civil right to seek his remedy from civil Courts of the country and for that purpose to engage a counsel. It was not his fault that the local Press found material out of it for publication in papers. The enquiry officer found that the appellant had no hand in getting the same published. The only charge that stood proved against the appellant was that he had sent an advance copy of a representation ‑to the Secretary Finance. For such a minor fault the punishment inflicted was removal from service, which was totally out of proportion. This was an indication of prejudice and mala fides.

9. The enquiry officer had exonerated the appellant of practically all the charges and we find that the authority did not apply its mind while passing the removal order on grounds of the so‑called subversive activities, indiscipline and gross misconduct. This was not an order passed in accordance with law and as such should be termed as a mina fides order. The order is set aside and the appellant is re‑instated in service with all consequential benefits. Appeal accepted.