1992 PLP 1598 (MLD)

Date of hearing: 12th March, 1992. By this Revision Application the concurrent judgments of the two lower Courts i.e. IInd‑Additional District Judge, Karachi (Central) dated 24‑10‑1991 and Ist Sr. Civil Judge (Central), Karachi dated 5‑5‑1991, have been challenged, whereby the applicant's suit for possession and mense profits was dismissed.

2. The brief facts forming the background of this Revision Application are that the house bearing No. 111‑H‑6/39, Nazimabad, Karachi, measuring 66 sq. yds. was originally allotted to Akhtar Hussain on 20‑9‑1950. He died on 17‑8‑1957 leaving behind the applicant, as a son, respondent as a daughter and five other daughters and a widow. According to the applicant all of them executed relinquishment deed in his favour. On the strength of that deed the suit plot was leased out by the KDA to the applicant on 14‑9‑1985. The applicant raised the construction over the plot and started living in the same alongwith his family and three sisters. On 2‑6‑1973 respondent Khursheed Akhter was married to Abbas Ali Hashmi and started living with him in his house. 1n 1976 on account of illness of their mother, the respondent came to look after her and started living in the suit house alongwith her husband. In April, 1978 the husband of respondent got a job in Saudi Arabia and became well‑off and was therefore requested by the applicant to arrange for a separate house for himself and the respondent. The mother of the parties had also expired by that time. The respondent refused to vacate the house and complained to police authorities and started harassing the applicant. Hence the prayer for possession and mense profits.

3. The respondent contested the suit and filed a written statement, in which she denied that she had signed or executed the alleged relinquishment deed and that it was fraudulent. She, however, alleged that the applicant had obtained lease from KDA through fraud and misrepresentation. Hence the suit was liable for dismissal.

4. The learned trial Court framed as many as seven issues. Issue Nos. 4 A and 4‑B are the material issues, even according ‑to the Advocate for the applicant, which read as under:‑ (4‑a)"Whether the defendant and other legal heirs of the deceased Akhtar Hussain relinquished their right and interest in the plot in question with construction thereon and any valid deed of relinquishment as alleged by the plaintiff? (4‑b)Whether the alleged allotment, lease deed and mutation in the name of plaintiff are based on misrepresentation and fraud, if so, its effect?" Both these issues were answered against the applicant.

5. Mr. Sheikh Ejaz Ahmed, who is appearing for the applicant has vehemently contended that the findings on issue Nos. 4‑a and 4‑b are based on the conclusion that the respondent was minor at the time of the execution thereof and therefore the deed of relinquishment was not binding upon her which finding according to him was incorrect and was not based on proper appreciation of the evidence. According to him the respondent was born in 1945 and not in 1946, and therefore her age at the time of execution of relinquishment deed i.e. 29‑7‑1964 was 18 years and not below 18 years. He has also made an application for allowing him to produce additional evidence on this point.

6. The contention of Mr. Shaikh Ejaz Ahmed even if it is assumed to be correct; is not tenable. The Supreme Court in the well‑known case of Ghulam Ali reported in PLD 1990 SC 1 and in a number of other decisions which have followed that case has made it quite clear that Islamic law affords special protection to Muslim females. In the light of law laid down in these decisions, a relinquishment deed executed by a female while she is living under the roof o her father, brother, husband or any other male relative has no value whatsoever and she cannot be deprived of her property on the basis of such a relinquishment deed. One of those decisions is in the case of Ami Chand v. Fajroo (PLD 1991 SC 1001) and the other is in the case of Badshah Begum v. Ghulam Rasool (PLD 1991 SC 1140). In both these cases the Hon'ble Supreme Court has granted relief to the Muslim females involved in those cases as it was satisfied that they were not protected in the manner provided by Islam and the relevant law as laid down in Ghulam Ali's case (supra). I am also satisfied that the so‑called relinquishment deed was executed in such circumstances that it tended to violate the protection afforded by Islam and the law laid down in above cited cases.

7. In this view of the matter I do not find any merit in this revision application. I am, therefore, of the clear view that the two lower Courts have properly appreciated the facts and law of the case and have come to a correct conclusion. Hence I dismiss the revision application in limine. A.A./A‑1213/K Revision dismissed.