1988 PLP 1740 (SCMR)

NASIM HASAN SHAH, J.‑‑This judgment will dispose of the above appeals which arise out of a common judgment of the Lahore High Court passed in Intra‑Court Appeals of the respondents, which were allowed and the judgment dated 14‑1‑1986 dismissing respondents' writ petitions was set aside. The Punjab Road Transport Board, which was established by the Punjab Government under the Punjab Motor Vehicles Ordinance, 1965, was dissolved by a notification dated 9‑5‑1985 issued by the Governor of the Punjab and all its business, properties and assets etc. were vested in the Government. The officers and employees of the Board were placed in a surplus pool to be maintained by the Government of the Punjab for the purpose of payment of pay till their adjustment in other organizations considered suitable by the Government. The respondents being adversely affected by the actions taken subsequent to the dissolution of the Board, namely, the orders of retirement in some cases and termination of service in others, brought Constitutional Petitions in the High Court to challenge the said actions. These petitions were dismissed by a learned Single Judge of the High Court on 14‑1‑1986, whereupon the respondents filed Intra‑Court Appeals challenging the said orders which were allowed by an elaborate judgment dated " 5‑1980 passed by a Division Bench of the said learned Court. By the aforesaid judgment, the impugned notification dated 9‑5‑1985 was declared to be illegal and all subsequent consequential notifications, orders including the orders of retirement of Sh. Akbar Hussain (respondent in C.A.No.351 of 1986), Ch.Sanaullah (respondent in C.A.No.352 of 1986), Syed Muhammad Munir Gilani (respondent in C.A.No.354 of 1986) and Syed Ghulam Mustafa (respondent in C.A.No.355 of 1986) and the order of termination of services of Dr.Fayyaz Ahmad (respondent in C.A.No.353 of 1986) issued by the Governor of the Punjab and Mr. Muhammad Afzal Kahut, Administrator Surplus Pool of the Employees of the Punjab Road Transport Board, have been likewise declared to have been passed without any lawful authority and of no legal effect. The Government of Punjab sought leave from this Court against the aforementioned judgment of the Lahore High Court dated 28‑5‑1986 and after hearing the learned counsel for the appellants and the respondents, leave to appeal was granted, inter alia, to examine the following contentions: ‑ (i) Whether section 70 of Punjab Motor Vehicles Ordinance, 1965, which enables the Government to establish a Road Transport (Corporate Body) does not confer similar power on the Government to dissolve/abolish the same Board inasmuch as the section does not impose any obligation on the Government, but merely enables it to establish such a Board. (ii) Whether the learned High Court has correctly decided that once the Government establishes a corporate institution (the Board) through its executive fiat under an enabling provision of the Statute; it cannot bring the Corporation to an end in the like manner, through another executive fiat. (iii) Whether a Board (Corporate Institution) of the type contemplated by Section 70 would, like a corporate aggregate, not come to an end when the members constituting the Board are no longer in existence. These appeals came up for hearing before us on 12‑6‑1988 but during the course of the hearing we were informed on 13‑6‑1988 that in the meanwhile an Act had been passed by the appropriate legislature to validate the action of the Punjab Government to dissolve the Punjab Road Transport Board in May, 1985 and all the orders passed by it in connection with the winding up of the affairs of the Board. Since the Gazette of Pakistan, wherein this Act was notified, was not available with the learned counsel the case was adjourned to produce its copy. The case, accordingly, has come up again today (18‑6‑1988) and copies of the Gazette of Pakistan (Extraordinary .dated 29th May, 1988) wherein the relevant Act has been published, has been produced. This Act is called the Provincial Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 1988, and comes into force at once. Section 2 thereof is important for our purposes and provides:‑ "

2. Amendment of Section 70, West Pakistan Ordinance No.XIX of 1965.‑ In the Provi4icial Motor Vehicles Ordinance 1965 (W.P. Ordinance No.XIX of 1965), in section 70, after subsection (10), the following new subsection shall be added, namely:‑ "(11) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law or any instrument having the force of law for the time being in force, or any judgment of any Court, Government shall have the power, and shall be deemed always to have had the power, to dissolve by notification the Board established under subsection (1) and to lay down in the notification the manner in which all or any of the affairs of the Board, including matters relating to the assets, liabilities, employees and officers of the Board and all matters ensuing as a consequence of the dissolution of the Board shall be dealt with after its dissolution. (12) Any action taken, notification issued or order made by Government on or after the ninth day of May, 1985, for the dissolution of the Board established under subsection (1) and dealing with the matters ensuing as a consequence of the dissolution shall, notwithstanding anything contained in any law or any instrument having the force of law for the time being in force, or any judgment of any Court, be deemed to have been validly taken, issued or made, as the case may be." Learned counsel for the parties have been heard with a view to determining whether the judgment of the Division Bench dated 28‑5‑1986 has not been overridden by the provisions of the above‑mentioned amending Act and the present appeals must be allowed accordingly. After hearing Mr.S.M.Zafar for the appellants and Sh.Ghias Muhammad on behalf of the respondents, it is quite clear to us that all the infirmities found in the actions taken by the Punjab Government and the orders passed by the Administrator in connection with the winding up of the affairs of the Road Transport Board in the judgment of the learned Division Bench have been validated and can no longed be objected to. The upshot is that these appeals are allowed and the judgment of the Division Bench dated 28‑5‑1986 is set aside. Parties are left to bear their own costs. M.B.A./G‑117/S Appeals allowed.