1978 PLP 267 (PLC)
MUHAMMAD SAEED AKHTAR Versus MESSERS GHAZI INDUSTRIES LTD., MIAM CHANNU
| Citation | 1978 PLP 267 (PLC) |
| Forum / Court | IVth Labour Court Punjab |
| Bench Members | N/A |
| Parties | MUHAMMAD SAEED AKHTAR Versus MESSERS GHAZI INDUSTRIES LTD., MIAM CHANNU |
| Primary Law | Industrial Relations Ordinance (XXIII of 1969) |
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 1978 PLP 267 (PLC)?
This judgment primarily cites: Industrial Relations Ordinance (XXIII of 1969) as referenced in Pakistani case law index.
Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 1978 PLP 267 (PLC)?
The case was heard and decided by the IVth Labour Court Punjab bench comprising: N/A.
Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?
Cite this legal precedent as: 1978 PLP 267 (PLC) (MUHAMMAD SAEED AKHTAR Versus MESSERS GHAZI INDUSTRIES LTD., MIAM CHANNU). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.
Laws Cited
Representation
- Aqa Asif Jaffar for Respondent.
Headnotes / Summary
‑‑ S. 25‑A ‑ Re‑instatement ‑ Resignation‑ of a worker does not ipso facto operate as termination of services‑Management treating resignation of worker as termination of services without any formal order to that effect‑Worker directed to be re‑instated in service. Appellant in person
Judgment & Decree
‑‑ S. 25‑A ‑ Re‑instatement ‑ Resignation‑ of a worker does not ipso facto operate as termination of services‑Management treating resignation of worker as termination of services without any formal order to that effect‑Worker directed to be re‑instated in service. Appellant in person Aqa Asif Jaffar for Respondent. An appeal has been filed by Muhammad Sated Akhtar workman of Ghazi Industries Limited, G. T. Road, Mian Chunnu against the order of the Learned Junior Labour Court, Multan dated 18th November, 1974, whereby, his application for re‑instatement was dismissed. He was terminated by the respondent Management on account of his resignation dated 2nd February, 1974. But the date on which the resignation or the termination of appellant's service should have taken effect cannot be equitably fixed in the circumstances of the case. The case of the appellant in this respect is that he submitted the resignation on 2nd February, 1974, to be accepted forthwith by the Manage ment which was not due by it and he continued working in the factory till 6th March 1974 when he was verbally directed by the employer to go out of the factory. The grievance of the appellant is that he could not be ousted from service abruptly after retaining him is service for over one month from the date of his resignation without taking any action over it. The stand of the Management as put forth on its behalf by the learned counsel is that the resignation of the appellant was accepted on the very date of the resignation through an endorsement by the Director of the Mills on it to the effect that the appellant employee must have served one month's notice to the management for his desire to leave the service and in the event of his resignation he should either work further for one month or deposit one month's pay with the Management and that his dues would be settled after the expiry of the aforesaid notice. It is contended on behalf of the Management that the aforesaid endorsement was sufficient action in law taken by the Management to accept the resignation of the appellant. He has maintained that In case of a resignation by an employee it is not necessary for a Management to pass any termination order and the resignation must be deemed to be the termination of the services of a worker at his own accord whereafter he was only entitled to the dues outstanding to his favour. An important question arises out of the contentions of the parties whether a proper termination order is required to be made regarding the discharge of a temporary employee or mere resignation should be regarded as the conclusive basis of the termination of an employee services. The learned Lower Court without going into the delicacy of the question made a short shrift of the matter to the effect that as the services of the appellant were not terminated on a charge of misconduct and as it was termination simpliciter on the basis of resignation no further formality was necessary and the impugned termination of services was in order. He therefore rejected the application of the appellant. He has however, omitted in the impugned order to signify a definite date from which the resignation or the termination thereon would precisely take effect in the circumstances of the cast: It is pertinent to note that the endorsement given on the resignation (photostat Exh. P‑A) has been strongly opposed by the appellant to have been in existence of the sheet of resignation before the matter went to the learned Junior Labour Court. The fact is also admitted that the said endorsement or a copy thereof was never served on the appellant. It is only alleged that it was in the knowledge of the appellant. But it is to be noted that the endorsement was not even put to the appellant in his statement in the learned lower Court. On the other hand it has been denied as having been conveyed to the appellant in any form whatsoever. I have gone through the statements of the appellant and Muhammad Arshad a representative of the Management on the record of the learned lower Court. The appellant was cross‑examined at adequate length. But no assumption could be drawn on any score as to the knowledge of the endorsement on the resignation with the appellant at any time before the document was filed in the learned lower Court. The inference which cannot be resisted in the situation is that the resignation in question was not accepted by the Management or its acceptance conveyed in any form to the appellant till be was locked out and he had to move the junior Labour Court for the redress of his grievance. The subtlety of the situation persuades me not to see eye to eye with the argument of the learned counsel that the mere resignation of a worker should ipso facto operate as termina tion of service without any formal order of termination or discharge by the Management. In the event of resignation a termination order must be regarded a necessary step to be taken by the Management to give a definite to the effect of the resignation and to settle tie accounts of the worker on a fair basis apart from the mere fact of acceptance of resignation which is also a condition precedent for the termination of a worker on some comprehension a basis. For all these reasons the impugned order being set aside and the appeal being accepted, the appellant is directed to be re‑instated in service. The period spent by the appellant during his non‑employment would be treated as leave without pay in view of the misunderstanding, of the situation by both the parties.