1973SCMR 49 (PLP)

S. M. Zubair, Advocate Supreme Court instructed by Abdul Karim, Attorney for Respondent No. 1. Respondent No. 2 : Ex parte. Date of hearing : 22nd May 1968. HAMOODUR RAHMAN, J.‑This appeal by special leave arises out of a dispute relating to an evacuee property, being No. S‑83‑R‑24, situated on Lake Road, Lahore. The appellant and the respondent No. 1 were allottees in possession of portions thereof. The appellant who is a non -claimant displaced person and the respondent who is a claimant, both applied for the transfer of the property. It was originally transferred to the appellant by the Deputy Settlement Commis sioner. But on appeal, his order was set aside and the case was remanded. On the hearing on remand, the Deputy Settlement Commissioner divided the property and transferred one portion to each of the above two. Both of them being dissatisfied with this order went up in appeal to the Additional Settlement Commis sioner. He found that the two portions were entirely separate and as such dismissed both the appeals. In revision, however, the learned Settlement Commissioner disagreed with his subordi nates and held that the house was too small to admit of a division and transferred the whole house to respondent No. l, as he being a claimant had a preferential right. From this order the appellant came up by way of a writ petition to the High Court. The petition was dismissed by a learned Single Judge after perusal of the report of the Deputy Settlement Commissioner. This order was also upheld in a Letters Patent Appeal by a Division Bench. Leave was granted to consider whether the Settlement Com missioner had any jurisdiction to revise an order as to the divisibility of an evacuee premises passed by a Deputy Settlement Commissioner in exercise of his powers as a delegatee of the Chief Settlement Commissioner. In the case of Jalal Din v. The Chief Settlement Commissioner (PLD1965SC261) this Court had held that "as a general rule, if delegation of powers were not subject to any con dition, the exercise of those powers by the delegatee cannot be interfered with by the competent authority". After this decision, section 31, subsection (2) of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, was amended by the Displaced Persons Laws Amendment Ordinance XVIII of 1965 whereby any order passed by a Settlement Authority below the Chief Settlement Commissioner in exercise of any power delegated to such authority by the Chief Settlement Commissioner was to be and to be deemed always to have been subject to the provisions of Chapter I of the said Act in the same manner and to the same extent as any other order passed by such authority. This chapter dealt with appeals and revisions. Section 3 of the Ordinance further provided that "anything done or purporting to have been done under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, before the promul gation of the Ordinance was to be deemed to have been done under such Act as amended by the said Ordinance and shall have and shall be deemed always to have had effect accordingly". The effect of the amendment, read with the validation clause, came up for consideration before this Court in the case of Mohammad Yousuaf v. Chief Settlement and Rehabilitation Commis sioner (P L D 1968 S C 101) and it was held that the Ordinance No. XVIII of 1965 "had the effect that in such a case the executive or quasi‑judicial authority or Court in question, and equally, the Supreme Court, would be bound to act, in respect of the order under examination, B as if, at the time when it was made, it was subject to appeal and revision". The only point on which leave to appeal was granted in this case thus appears to be fully covered by the above decision and this appeal must, accordingly, fail on that ground. There is how ever, yet another reason upon which this appeal must fail. It is this that when this ‑appeal was called up for hearing, neither the learned counsel engaged in this case nor the attorney on record was present. The latter came after he was sent for but wanted time to go and fetch his learned counsel. The Court thereupon rose to give him time to do so but even when the Court re assembled, after about 15 minutes, neither the learned counsel nor the attorney was present. This appeal is accordingly dismissed but there will be no order as to costs.