1976 PLP 385 (SCMR)

MUHAMMAD AKRAM. J.‑This is a petition for special leave to appeal from the judgment and order dated 9th July 1975, passed by a learned Single Judge of the Lahore High Court at Lahore dismissing the writ petition filed by the petitioners heroin against the respondents. Briefly the relevant facts are these. Sometime during 1957, respondent No. 1 applied to the Deputy Commissioner/Chairman Multan, improvement Trust, Multan, through the Directorate of Industries West Pakistan). Lahore for acquisition of 68 kanals of land situated in Mauna Taraf Ravi, Tehsil and District Multan, required for the purposes of installation of a cold storage and ice plant there. On 18‑12‑1958, in anticipation of the sanction, the Deputy Commissioner/Chairman, Multan Improvement Trust allowed respondent No. 1 to store their machinery and other stocks imported from abroad for the installation of the cold storage and ice factory on a part of the land proposed to be acquired without prejudice to the final decision that may eventually be taken in the matter. In due course on the recommendation of the Rehabilitation Commissioner, West Pakistan, Lahore, the Central Government, acting under section 25(2) of the Pakistan 'Administration of Evacuee Property) Act XII of 1957, permitted respondent No. l to purchase the land by its Memo. No. F‑16(89)‑58‑P‑11, dated 25th November 1958. In pursuance thereto the Land Acquisition Collector, (Directorate of Industries) West Pakistan, Lahore, vide his Memo. No. LAO/ 1 N D,' 14/2‑62 dated 8th February 1962, directed the respondent to deposit the costs for acquisition of the land. The respondent allegedly complied with the order and the Deputy Commissioner also delivered the possession of the property to the respondent on the 29th April 1962. In spite of the above, on a report put up by the Circle, Patwari, portions of the land were proposed and confirmed by the Assistant Rehabili tation Commissioner (Land) in favour of respondents Nos. 4 and 5 and one Khan Muhammad on or about 18.4‑1964. Those orders were passed in the absence of respondent No. 1 who went up in separate appeals against respondents Nos. 4 and 5 dismissed b, the Deputy Settlement Commissioner (Land), Multan as barred by time. Dissatisfied, respondent No. 1 then Bled two separate revisions against the orders. On the 27th May 1966, the Additional Commissioner (Revenue), exercising powers of the Settlement Commissioner (Land), Multan, condoned the delay in the two appeals filed by respondent No. 1 on the ground that it was in possession of the land on the spot and was never heard by the Assistant Settlement Commis sioner (Lard) at the time of making the allotment to respondents Nos. 4 and

5. On the merits he observed that the land in dispute had been acquired for respondent No. 1 for industrial purposes and that the possession thereof was also delivered to it. The entire area was built over by respondent No. 1 leaving only the land which was situated within a distance of 120 feet from the main road and could not be built over according to the Highway Act. As such, in the opinion of the Settlement Commissioner (Land) the land in dispute was not available for allotment to respondents Nos. 4 and 5 under the Rehabilitation and Settlement Scheme and was wrongly allotted to them on the erroneous assumption that it was so available for allotment to them under the scheme. It is stated that respondents Nos. 4 and 5 bad jointly sold the land in their allotments to the' petitioners for Rs. 3‑5,000 by means of a registered deed of sale dated tad April 1965. The petitioners, therefore, filed a writ petition under Article 98 of the late Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1962 against the respondents challenging the validity of the above mentioned order dated 27th' May 1966, passed by the Settlement Commis sioner (Land), Multan, in favour of resp3ndent No. 1 in revision. As already stated above, a learned Judge of the Lahore High Court dismissed the writ petition on the 11th July 1975. Hence this petition for special leave to appeal before us. We have heard this learned counsel for the petitioners. It was vehemently argued before us at the hearing that the two petitioners bad purchased the land in dispute for valuable consideration from respondents Nos. 4 and 5 by means of the registered deed of sale executed on the 2nd April 1965. In spite of this respondent No. 1 did not implead the petitioners in the revision accepted by the Settlement Commissioner (Land) on the 10th June 1966. In this connection it appears that the petitioners had in fact applied to the Settlement Commissioner (Land) for being impleaded as a party in the revision but no order seems to have been passed on the application The petitioners are themselves to be blamed for this state of affairs 4 as they did not press their application before the Settlement Com missioner (Land) at the hearing. Moreover the orders passed by the Assistant Settlement Commissioner (Land) for the allotment of the land to respondents Nos. 4 and 5 were subject to the usual incidence of appeal and revision against them. There is a well‑known maxim "pendente lite nihil innovetur (pending a litigation nothing new should be introduced). It provides that pendenre lite neither party to litigation, in which any right B to immovable property is in question, can alienate or deal with the property so as to affect his opponent. In fact section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 is based on this principle which is of general application. As already stated above on 25‑11‑1958 the Central Government gave its permission under section 25(2)(x) of Act XII of 195'7 for the transfer of the land to respondent No.

1. In pursuance thereto the possession of the land was also delivered to the respondent No. 1 on the 29th April 1962 and as is evident from the impugned order dated 10th June 1966 the respondent had also raised a building over the entire area, leaving of course 120 feet set back from the main road required under the Highway Act. In these circum9tances the High Court was justified in refusing to interfere at the instance of the petitioners. This is not a fit case for our interference and there is no force in this petition which is dismissed. Petition dismissed.