2002 PLP 1 (CLC)

EJAZ AFZAL KHAN, J.‑‑‑ This writ petition has arisen out of the judgment, dated 20‑9‑1999 of the learned District Judge, Peshawar whereby he dismissed the,appeal of the petitioner and thereby upheld the order of the learned Rent Controller, dated 9‑2‑1999.

2. The facts leading to the institution of the present writ petition are that the petitioner landlady instituted an application for the ejectment of the respondent on the ground of default and personal use for reconstruction which was ultimately dismissed by the learned Rent Controller and appeal there against also met the same fate.

3. It was mainly contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that both the Courts below have based their findings on misreading, non -reading of evidence and' misapplication of law, therefore, are liable to be corrected by this Court in the exercise of its Constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973.

4. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent contended that where a Court or a Tribunal is vested with a jurisdiction to decide a matter, has the jurisdiction to decide it rightly or wrongly and no interference can be made by the High Court in the exercise of its Constitutional jurisdiction simply because the matter has been decided wrongly. The learned counsel' next contended that if this Court on reappraisal of the evidence comes to a different conclusion even then it cannot substitute its own view for that of the lower forums.

5. An examination of the evidence on the record would show that the landlady after applying for obtaining sanction from the Municipal Corporation, Peshawar instituted the instant application for the ejectment of the respondent on the ground of default and reconstruction and subsequently by examining the Vernacular Record Keeper of the Municipal Corporation; Peshawar brought the requisite sanction for reconstruction on the record, and by appearing as P.W.2 deposed about the default of the respondent in payment of rent and her requirement of the demised premises for reconstruction. On perusing the judgment of the learned Appellate Court, what we are led to conclude is that it despite being first Court of Appeal and final Court of fact has not considered altogether the evidence of the landlady on either of the scores that is, default and personal use for reconstruction in the light of the relevant law and has thus, based its findings on non‑reading of evidence, erroneous assumption of fact and misapplication of law which is clearly without jurisdiction and lawful authority, because the very condition for the conferment of jurisdiction on a Court or Tribunal is that it should record', its finding on proper application of law and appreciation of evidence.

6. The argument of the learned counsel for the respondent that where a Court or Tribunal is vested with jurisdiction, it has jurisdiction to decide rightly or wrongly is no more valid as this was very aptly repelled by the Honourable Supreme Court in the case of Utility Stores Corporation of Pakistan Limited v. Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal and others PLD 1987 SC 447 in the following words:‑‑ "It is not right to say that the Tribunal, which is invested with ‑the jurisdiction to decide a particular matter, has the jurisdiction to decide it 'rightly or wrongly' because the condition of the grant of jurisdiction is that it should decide the matter in accordance with law. When the Tribunal goes wrong in law it goes outside the jurisdiction conferred on it because the Tribunal has the jurisdiction to decide rightly but not the jurisdiction to decide wrongly. Accordingly, when the Tribunal makes an error of law in deciding the matter before it, it goes outside its jurisdiction and, therefore, a determination of the Tribunal which is shown to be erroneous on a point of law can be quashed under‑the writ jurisdiction on the ground that it is in exercise of its jurisdiction. "

7. Even in a recent judgment of the Honourable Supreme Court rendered in the case of Muhammad Lehrasab Khan v. Mst. Aqeel un‑Nisa and 5 others 2001 SCMR 338 it was held that when the District Court being a final Appellate Court, based its decision on misreading or non‑reading of evidence, erroneous assumption of fact and misapplication of law, the same can be interfered with by the High Court in the exercise of its Constitutional jurisdiction. The relevant paragraph thus, runs as under:‑‑ "There is no cavil with the proposition that ordinarily the High Court in its Constitutional jurisdiction would not undertake to reappraise the evidence in rent matters to disturb the finding of fact but it would certainly interfere if such findings are found to be based on non‑reading or misreading of evidence, erroneous assumption of facts, misapplication of law, excess or abuse of jurisdiction and arbitrary exercise of powers. "

8. From the above‑quoted paragraph, it is thus, clear that where a finding by a Court or Tribunal is based on misreading, non‑reading of evidence, erroneous assumption of fact and misapplication of law, as in this case, it is liable to be interfered with by the High Court in the exercise of its Constitutional jurisdiction.

9. For the foregoing reasons, we allow this writ petition, set aside the judgment of the learned, Appellate Court and remand the case thereto for deciding it afresh in accordance with law and evidence on the record. Q.M.H./M.A.K./354/P Case remanded.